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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the effects of the transfer of English public sector audit 
contracts to private firms in 2012 as a result of the abolition of the Audit 
Commission. Financial audit is a key accountability mechanism over public 
spending, so changes in audit arrangements can affect the accountability of 
public sector entities. I use a constructivist grounded theory approach and 23 
interviews with auditors and clients to research how the transfer has affected 
the financial audit of public sector entities.  
I find that auditors and audit firms have reconstructed what it means to 
undertake a good quality audit in the UK public sector, in line with the firms’ 
commercial objectives. There is more emphasis on image and customer 
service, and less on public sector specialisation. Crucially, efficiency is 
incorporated into auditors’ understanding of audit quality, such that less work 
is necessary to do a good quality audit. I draw on Bourdieu’s theory of 
symbolic violence to demonstrate how the new meaning of audit is imposed 
and perpetuated.   
This research explicates hitherto unexplored practical consequences of the 
change to public sector audit in England. This could be valuable to those 
making policy decisions in other jurisdictions of the UK (Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland), which still operate national audit institutions similar to the 
Audit Commission. More generally, it helps to explain how some New Public 
Management cost savings are achieved. It also adds to our theoretical 
understanding of how the dominant parties in the audit sector continue to 
extend their remit, and to define how audit works. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This study explores the effects of the transfer of public sector auditors to 
private firms. This transfer took place in England in 2012, as a result of the 
controversial abolition of the Audit Commission (Ellwood, 2014; Prospect, 
2011; Tonkiss & Skelcher, 2015). The effects of the change in audit 
arrangements are not yet well understood (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015).  
This chapter begins by setting out the background to the research (Section 
1.2) and then the objectives of the study (Section 1.3) and the significance of 
the study (Section 1.4). Section 1.5 gives a brief overview of my use of 
grounded theory methodology. In Section 1.6 I discuss my personal position 
in relation to the research. Finally, Section 1.7 outlines the content of the 
thesis. 
1.2 Background to the study 
The English public sector spends hundreds of millions of pounds of public 
money on public services such as hospitals, social care, social housing, 
street lighting, police and probation services, and the fire service. Financial 
audit is one of the most significant ways in which the government secures 
confidence in the stewardship of public funds (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 
2015; Ferry & Eckersley, 2015; Power, 1997). Auditors were employed within 
the public sector from 1844 to 2012, although recent decades have seen a 
plural provision of public sector audit, overseen by a government quango, the 
Audit Commission.  
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The following sections establish the background and context for this study by 
setting out an account of role of the Audit Commission in England in 
appointing and conducting audits, and the transfer of its auditors to private 
sector firms in 2012. 
1.2.1 Public sector audit regimes 
Systems of public sector audit can be classified into three dominant models: 
the Napoleonic system, the Westminster system and the board system 
(Blume & Voigt, 2011). The UK follows the Westminster model, whereby a 
supreme audit institution (the National Audit Office) reports to a Public 
Accounts Committee, which reports to the government. The Public Accounts 
Committee is usually chaired by a member of the opposition.  
1.2.2 History of public sector audit in England 
English local authorities were audited by independent specialist auditors from 
1844, when the District Audit service was created, until 2012 (Ellwood & 
Garcia-Lacalle, 2015). Figure 1 shows a timeline of this period. 
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Figure 1 Timeline of English public sector audit 1844 - 2015 
 
The government established the Audit Commission, an independent 
oversight body for local government audits in England and Wales, in 1983 
(Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015).  The Audit Commission had responsibility 
for independently appointing auditors to all local authorities in England and 
Wales, as well as setting and monitoring fees and quality (Ellwood & Garcia-
Lacalle, 2015).  Over the next two and a half decades, the  Audit 
Commission assumed additional responsibilities, appointing auditors to NHS 
bodies and to police and fire and rescue service authorities as well as local 
authorities, and taking on other work such as data matching and best value 
inspections  (Audit Commission, 2014a). The number and range of public 
sector organisations falling within the Audit Commission’s remit are shown in 
Table 1.  
  
1844
District 
Audit 
(DA) set 
up 
1983
Audit 
Commission 
(AC) set up
2002
AC 
and 
DA 
merge
2012
Auditors 
transfer 
to 
private 
sector
2015
AC 
closes
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Table 1 Organisations within the Audit Commission’s remit 
(Audit Commission, 2013) 
 
353 local authorities  
 
265 NHS bodies  
 
37 police authorities (replaced by police and crime commissioners and 
chief constables in November 2012)  
 
83 other bodies, including the Greater London Authority and its 
associated bodies, fire and rescue authorities, national parks authorities 
and transport bodies 
 
nearly 10,000 'small' bodies (mostly parish and town councils and parish 
meetings)1 
 
 
The District Audit service, public sector provider of audits from 1844, became 
subsumed into the Audit Commission in 2002, ceasing to use the District 
Audit brand name, and operating instead as the audit practice arm of the 
Audit Commission (Campbell-Smith, 2008). Thus, from 2002 onwards, the 
Audit Commission comprised both a central function that appointed auditors, 
and an audit practice that could be appointed to conduct audits (Audit 
Commission, 2013; Campbell-Smith, 2008).  The Audit Commission’s 
established custom was to award around 30% of audits to private sector 
firms and the remaining 70% to its own in-house auditors (Ellwood & Garcia-
Lacalle, 2015). 
In 2012 the Audit Commission’s audits and around 700 auditors transferred 
to private firms (Audit Commission, 2014a; Ellwood, 2014) and in 2015 the 
                                            
1 ‘Small bodies’, defined by the Audit Commission (2014b) as those with income or 
expenditure less than £6.5m, operate under a slightly different regime and were not audited 
directly by the Audit Commission’s audit practice at the time of the transfer, therefore they 
are not considered in this study.  
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central Audit Commission, responsible for oversight and for independent 
appointment of auditors to the public sector, closed. The abolition of the 
Audit Commission has been debated elsewhere (e.g. Cearns, 2012; Ellwood, 
2014; Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2012, 2015; Ferry & Eckersley, 2015; 
Timmins & Gash, 2014; Tonkiss & Skelcher, 2015). The following section 
provides a brief overview of the reforms as well as some detail of the 
changes most relevant to this research. 
1.2.3 Changes in English public sector audit 
In 2010, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the UK government made a 
policy decision to reduce the size of the public sector and instigated the 
‘bonfire of the quangos’, including the abolition of the Audit Commission 
(Flinders & Skelcher, 2012; O’Leary, 2015), ostensibly for reasons of cost 
savings, accountability and efficiency (O’Leary, 2015), though Flinders and 
Skelcher (2012) also note longstanding and underlying political motives. 
These reforms were effected through changes in statute, principally the 
introduction of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, accompanied by 
regulatory and other transitional changes as the Audit Commission’s roles 
either ceased or transferred elsewhere. The most significant changes are 
described in the following sections.  
The reforms have unquestionably resulted in reduced audit fees (Baylis & 
Greenwood, 2016). This can partly be attributed to the cessation of some 
regulatory activities and performance assessment work, and the narrower 
scope of the audit.  
 
 
19 
 
1.2.3.1 The transfer of audit to the private sector 
Under the Audit Commission regime, auditors were appointed independently 
to public sector bodies. This began to change in 2004 with the introduction of 
NHS foundation trusts, with the power to appoint their own auditors (Ellwood 
& Garcia-Lacalle, 2015). All remaining Audit Commission audits transferred 
to the private sector in 2012. The Audit Commission itself organised the 
transfer (Audit Commission, 2012), awarding geographically based contracts 
to four firms: Ernst & Young, KPMG, Grant Thornton and Mazars (Audit 
Commission, 2012; Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2012; Roxburgh, 2012). 
Figure 2 helps to illustrate this change. 
Figure 2 Changes in public sector audit provision from 2012/13 
 
The diagram shows how the Audit Commission’s 70% share of audits was 
transferred to four firms in geographic blocks, while the other 30% held by 
private sector firms remained unchanged. Thus, for example, in the North 
East region, the Audit Commission’s share of around 70% of audit work was 
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reassigned to Mazars, with Deloitte (the private sector provider in that region) 
retaining its existing share. 
Table 2 shows some key details of the contracts awarded in 2012. 
Table 2 Audit Commission contracts transferred in 2012 (Ellwood & 
Garcia-Lacalle, 2012; Johnstone, 2012) 
 
Firm Firm 
characteristics 
Experience in 
public sector 
audit 
Winning 
contracts 
Location of 
contracts 
 
Grant 
Thornton 
 
5th largest UK 
firm 
 
 
Existing 
established 
public sector 
practice  
 
Four 
contracts 
£41.3m 
 
North West,  
West 
Midlands, 
London 
(South), 
South West 
 
 
KPMG 
 
Big 4 
 
 
Existing 
established 
public sector 
practice  
 
 
Three 
contracts  
£23.1m 
 
 
Humberside 
& Yorkshire,  
East 
Midlands, 
London 
(North) 
 
 
Ernst & 
Young / 
EY 
 
Big 4 
 
 
Previous 
experience but 
not in the 
years 
immediately 
prior to the 
transfer 
 
 
Two 
contracts 
£20m 
 
Eastern, 
South East 
England 
 
Mazars 
 
Smaller firm, 
limited UK 
presence  
 
 
No experience 
in UK public 
sector market  
 
One contract 
£5m 
 
North East 
and North 
Yorkshire  
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Around 700 auditors transferred from the Audit Commission to these four 
firms (Audit Commission, 2014) under the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) (TUPE) Regulations 2006 on 1 November 2012.   
1.2.3.2 The appointment of auditors 
From 2018/19, the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 allows public 
bodies to appoint their own auditors, but many have signed up to a voluntary 
scheme run by a new organisation, Public Sector Audit Appointments 
(PSAA), which manages the appointment of auditors on their behalf (Public 
Sector Audit Appointments, 2017; Russell, 2017). 
1.2.3.3 The narrowed scope of the audit 
The scope of public sector audit might be expected to extend beyond the 
financial statements, to include considerations such as economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015; Power, 1997; Sikka, 
2015a), but recent UK reforms have narrowed its scope. Audit now focuses 
almost exclusively on the financial statements, which is more in line with the 
private sector model (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015; Ferry & Eckersley, 
2015). This corresponds to the more general scaling back of public sector 
services as part of the austerity agenda (Bracci, Humphrey, Moll, & 
Steccolini, 2015). The narrowing of the public sector auditor’s remit has been 
debated elsewhere (e.g. Bracci, Humphrey, Moll, & Steccolini, 2015; Ellwood 
& Garcia-Lacalle, 2015; Ferry & Eckersley, 2015). 
The National Audit Office has taken on responsibility for publishing and 
maintaining the Code of Audit Practice (Morse, 2012; National Audit Office, 
2015), which prescribes how local public sector auditors conduct their work.  
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1.2.3.4 Audit quality monitoring 
PSAA monitors the audit contracts to which it has appointed auditors. This 
includes reviewing and reporting on audit quality (Public Sector Audit 
Appointments, 2018b). To inform its work, PSAA relies on the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC)’s reviews of audit files, as well as other information.  
1.3 Objective of the study 
The objective of the study was to explore the effects of the transfer of public 
sector auditors to the private sector in England. I aimed to contribute to 
theoretical understanding in both public sector audit and New Public 
Management (NPM), and to inform policy debate in relation to the state 
control of audit.  
1.4 Significance of the study 
Auditors have a central role in helping to hold governments to account 
(Ferry, Eckersley, & Zakaria, 2015). The abolition of the Audit Commission 
and the transfer of its auditors to private sector firms represents a substantial 
change in the accountability arrangements for the English public sector, over 
which Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2015) and Ferry and Eckersley (2015) 
both highlight concerns. Ferry and Eckersley (2015) argue that dismantling 
key institutions and processes has led to a focus on financial compliance at 
the expense of organisational performance, and an overall weakening of 
accountability. Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2015) suggest that removing the 
Audit Commission’s oversight has led to a loss of assurance over audit 
quality. Neither addresses the detail of how financial audit has changed, yet 
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major cost savings (Baylis & Greenwood, 2016) suggest that changes have 
been made. In the context of wider concerns about oversight and 
accountability (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015; Ferry & Eckersley, 2015) and 
the climate of public sector austerity (Bracci et al., 2015), an understanding 
of how audit has changed has even greater significance.  
The transfer of auditors to the private sector is consistent with the continued 
advance of neoliberalist and NPM policies worldwide (Hood & Dixon, 2016; 
Hyndman & Lapsley, 2016; Pollitt, 2016). This study adds to our 
understanding of how NPM cost savings are achieved (Humphrey & Miller, 
2012), a step towards enabling better decisions about whether they are 
desirable. This could be directly helpful to other jurisdictions of the UK 
(Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) that might contemplate a similar 
transfer in the future.  
This research also adds to a growing literature about the domination of the 
major accounting firms (Andon, Free, & O'Dwyer, 2015; Everett, 2003; Sikka, 
2015b; Stringfellow, McMeeking, & Maclean, 2015). It helps to illuminate how 
the firms continue to extend their domination of different areas – in this case 
public sector audit. Understanding and unveiling domination strategies is a 
step in the process of resistance to domination, and part of the process of 
social change (Cooper & Coulson, 2014). 
1.5 Approach to the research 
This research followed a grounded theory methodology (Charmaz, 2014; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967), engaging from the outset with the individuals who 
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experienced the transfer (Corley, 2015) to inductively build theory. The 
research began with a broad and open question. 
Initial research question (RQ) 
How is public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
The question developed as the study progressed and gained theoretical 
direction. Figure 3 summarises the main research question (RQ) and sub 
questions (SQ).  
Figure 3 The evolving research question 
RQ: How is public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
SQ1: How is the quality of public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
SQ2: What is audit quality? 
SQ3: What strategies do auditors use to maintain audit quality in the face 
of changes to their environment? 
 
SQ4: What is the effect of commercial strategies on the audit and the 
auditor? 
 
SQ5: How are the changes so widely accepted despite significant 
discomfort? 
 
SQ6: What are the practical implications of the research findings? 
 
These questions are revisited in Section 3.1.1 and Section 8.2.5. 
1.6 My position in relation to the research 
I have worked in the field of public sector audit for most of my working life, 
including a number of roles in different geographical locations at the Audit 
Commission. I feel strongly connected both to the idea of public sector audit 
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and to many individuals who worked in that field. I was made redundant as 
part of the disolution of the Commission in 2012, an unexpected shock 
experienced personally and alongisde the auditors who transferred to private 
firms. I do not purport to conduct this research from a neutral perspective. 
Rather, I recognise my personal investment in the Audit Commission and 
interest in the research. This is discussed further in Section 3.11.   
1.6.1 Personal motivation for the research 
My interest in the impact of audit privatisation was prompted by scepticism 
and speculation by practitioners about the ongoing quality of audits (e.g. 
Sheen, 2014). Much scholarly research in auditing was externally focused, 
and made assumptions and generalisations at odds with my practical 
knowledge; for example, that ‘earnings quality’ could be measured and used 
to draw inferences about audit quality (e.g. Francis, 2011b). I wanted my 
research to more faithfully represent the practice of auditing, by being 
grounded in auditors’ experiences. 
1.7 Outline of the thesis 
This research follows a grounded theory methodology, described in detail in 
Chapter 3. This approach is iterative and non-linear. The thesis is 
nevertheless structured in a standard way, and proceeds as follows. 
Chapter 2 begins by setting out the role and timing of the literature review in 
grounded theory methodology and goes on to review the domains of 
literature relevant to the research: the role and social construction of audit; 
audit quality; the environment of neoliberalism, NPM and austerity, and audit 
in the public sector. It then discusses key concepts from Bourdieu’s theory of 
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symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977), which are invoked in Chapter 7 to 
interpret and extend my substantive grounded theory. 
Chapter 3 describes and justifies my choice of constructivist grounded theory 
methodology (Charmaz, 2014) and semi-structured interviews in this 
research. I explain my use of a pilot study, outline data collection and 
analysis methods, and consider ethical issues and reflexivity. Finally I 
address quality criteria for qualitative research, and the limitations of the 
study. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 set out the findings of the research which together 
constitute my theory of reconstructing public sector audit. Chapter 4 
describes the commercialisation of public sector audit, extending a well-
documented phenomenon to the public sector and exploring its effects in 
detail. Chapter 5 shows how the meaning of audit quality has been 
reconstructed in accordance with firms’ commercial objectives, enabling 
auditors to do a good job with fewer resources. Chapter 6 discusses auditors’ 
different responses to the change, and argues that all responses lead to the 
reconstructed meaning of audit becoming embedded.  
Chapter 7 shows how I developed a core category and sub-categories from 
my data, and I related these to each other to construct my substantive 
grounded theory of reconstructing public sector audit. I then invoke 
Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977) to explore and 
interpret my theory. I argue that private sector firms have orchestrated a 
reconstruction of public sector audit in line with their own commercial 
objectives. 
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Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, drawing from the other chapters and 
articulating the contribution to practice and theory. It also sets out the 
limitations of the study and makes some suggestions for further research. 
The next chapter presents my literature review.  
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter first sets out the role of the literature review in my research 
(Section 2.2), then goes on to consider the substantive domains of literature 
that help to illuminate the findings.  
Section 2.3 discusses the role of audit. Section 2.4 explores the social 
construction of audit by audit firms and by individual auditors. Section 2.5 
analyses ideas about audit quality, a problematic concept that resists 
measurement and can only be observed to a limited extent, even by auditors. 
I consider five aspects of audit quality: competence, conscientiousness, 
independence, moral courage, and auditor reputation. 
Section 2.6 sets out the context of neoliberalism, NPM and austerity that 
constitute the setting for the transfer of auditors to the private sector. 
Section 2.7 introduces key Bourdieusian concepts which I use in Chapter 7 
to help interpret my research. Bourdieu’s concepts are helpful because they 
link individual behaviour with macro structures, yet still allow for agency 
(Everett, 2002).  
2.2 The role of the literature review in this study 
This research follows a grounded theory methodology (Charmaz, 2014; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which gives precedence to data over literature in 
the early stages, allowing the research to develop flexibly in a way that is 
relevant to practitioners (Corley, 2015).  
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There is significant debate about the role and timing of a literature review in 
grounded theory research (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Charmaz, 2014).   
Classical grounded theory is commonly considered to advocate delaying the 
literature review until after the data analysis phase (Urquhart, 2013).  Indeed, 
Glaser (1978, pp. 2-3) advises the researcher to “enter the research setting 
with as few predetermined ideas as possible – especially logically deducted, 
a priori hypotheses”. However, Dey (1999, p. 251) famously and helpfully 
draws a distinction between an “open mind and an empty head”. In practice, 
many authors recommend an initial literature review, in order to orientate the 
researcher in the field (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Charmaz, 2014; Goulding, 
2002; Urquhart, 2013).  
Reviewing the literature served three functions in this study. First, 
undertaking a preliminary, non-committal literature review allowed me to 
become familiar with the field of study at the outset (Bryant & Charmaz, 
2007; Goulding, 2002; Urquhart, 2013; Urquhart & Fernández, 2013). Next, it 
facilitated the development of theoretical sensitivity both at the start of the 
research, and as it progressed (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Urquhart, 2013). 
Towards the end of the research, a further literature review phase enabled 
me to develop a “theoretical story” from the grounded, “field-based story” 
(Locke, 2001, p. 122). 
Although I have conducted the literature review in this fragmented way, in the 
interests of clarity, it is presented here as a single piece. 
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2.3 The role of audit 
The Financial Reporting Council sets out the aim of an audit in paragraph 3 
of International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 200. 
The purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree of confidence of 
intended users in the financial statements. This is achieved by the 
expression of an opinion by the auditor on whether the financial 
statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with 
an applicable financial reporting framework. (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2016) 
Power (1997) draws attention to the normative and hopeful nature of such 
pronouncements; what an audit does, or is, in practice, is a different matter, 
and resists definition. Moreover, in the public sector, the ‘intended users’ of 
the FRC definition are not shareholders but something more nebulous, for 
example, ‘the taxpayer’ in the DCLG2’s Local Audit Impact Assessment 
(DCLG, 2014). 
A number of different formal theories have been applied to explain the value 
of audit. Agency theory, management control theory, signalling theory and 
the insurance hypothesis are some of the most common explanations (Hay & 
Cordery, 2018); the following sections discuss these in turn. 
2.3.1 Agency theory 
Auditing text books (e.g. Gray & Manson, 2011; Hayes, Wallage, & 
Goertemaker, 2014; Millichamp & Taylor, 2012; Porter, Simon, & Hatherly, 
2014) explain the need for audit with agency theory (M. C. Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976): auditors decrease agency costs by reducing the information 
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asymmetry between principal (shareholders) and agent (managers). Audit 
renders information more reliable, and therefore more valuable (Flint, 1988; 
Gray & Manson, 2011; Hayes et al., 2014; Manson & Zaman, 2001; Mueller, 
Carter, & Whittle, 2015). The increased reliability of audited information is 
professed to lead to the smooth running of capital markets (DeFond & 
Zhang, 2014; Porter et al., 2014) because it improves resource allocation 
and contracting efficiency (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). Agency theory applies in 
a similar way in the public sector (Gustavson & Sundström, 2018): an audit 
provides principals (public and Parliament) with confidence over the activities 
of their agents (public sector bodies) (Hay & Cordery, 2018). Audit can also 
be seen as securing the accountability of corporations (Millichamp & Taylor, 
2012; Porter et al., 2014). Accountability is at least as relevant in the public 
sector (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015; Ferry et al., 2015; Power, 1997).  
The putative benefits of an audit arising through the credibility of financial 
statements and the accountability of organisations accrue to society as a 
whole rather than to individual clients (Flint, 1988). For this reason, audit can 
be viewed as a public good (Hay & Cordery, 2018; Jim Stewart, 2006), 
imposed for the benefit of the community (Hay & Cordery, 2018). 
2.3.2 Management control theory 
Audit can be conceived of as a tool to help senior executives exert 
management control over large organisations (Hay & Cordery, 2018). This is 
consistent with the history of public sector audit (Funnell, 1994) and with the 
practice of auditors making recommendations to management (Hay & 
Cordery, 2018).  
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2.3.3 Signalling theory 
According to signalling theory, a (high quality) audit signals credibility (Titman 
& Trueman, 1986). Hay and Cordery (2018) argue that this explanation can 
apply in the public sector as well as the private sector, as governments have 
an interest in convincing the public that its statements are credible. This 
viewpoint is more cynical than agency theory and management control 
theory in that the function of the audit is to build reputation rather than to 
provide information. 
2.3.4 The insurance hypothesis 
Under the insurance hypothesis (Gray & Manson, 2011; Lennox, 1999; 
Wallace, 2004), a key purpose of the audit is for the auditee to have recourse 
to the auditor in case of an error. Wallace (2004) points out that this can 
relate to ‘insurance from blame’ in a political sense, as well as the traditional 
‘deep pockets’ consideration. This wider concept of insurance can also be 
applied in a public sector setting (Hay & Cordery, 2018): audit as insurance 
could provide a means for the recovery of reputations rather than, or as well 
as, monetary losses (Hay & Cordery, 2018; Wallace, 2004).  
2.3.5 Linking audit and public good 
Academics have highlighted disconnects at a number of points between the 
procedures undertaken by auditors and the public good arising from 
increased confidence in financial statements. First, there is a lack of clarity in 
the link between assurance over financial statements and the true and fair 
view provided by auditors, and between the true and fair view and 
professional standards (Humphrey & Moizer, 1990; Mautz & Sharaf, 1961; 
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Rutherford, 1985).  Next, there is significant doubt over whether professional 
standards are consistently followed. Humphrey and Moizer (1990) note 
differences between firm approaches and standards (firm standards usually 
being more strict). Research shows evidence of failure to follow procedures, 
for various reasons: auditors work to their own personal comfort level (Curtis 
& Turley, 2007; Fischer, 1996), make compromises with regard to audit 
evidence (Leung, 2011) and even omit or ‘botch’ procedures  (Herrbach, 
2005).  
Audit procedures and audit assurance are only loosely coupled (Downer, 
2011; Humphrey & Moizer, 1990; Pentland, 2000; Power, 1997) but 
procedures and terminology are required for legitimacy (Curtis & Turley, 
2007; Power, 2003a). Downer (2011) illustrates how audit work is conducted 
on two levels: ‘back stage’ work involving 'soft' factors such as intuition and 
previous experience of the clients (Herrbach, 2005; Pentland, 1993) provides 
the auditor with enough assurance to sign the audit opinion, while a separate 
‘front stage’ convinces clients, regulators, and potentially courts that they 
have done a good job.  
Critics also challenge the usefulness of the audit opinion. Young (2006) 
alleges that the financial statement ‘users’ referred to in professional 
literature are hypothetical, constructed by standard setters according to their 
ideas of who uses financial statements and what they should require. Malsch 
and Gendron (2009) dispute the theory that trust in audit leads to market 
stability. Sikka (2008b) points out that confidence in audited statements did 
not prevent a run on Northern Rock.  
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This is not to say that audit does not have a value. Auditors’ tendency to 
work to a personal level of comfort (Curtis & Turley, 2007; Fischer, 1996; 
Herrbach, 2005) supports the view that they glean a level of assurance from 
their work (Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, & Paillé, 2014; Pentland, 1993). Beattie, 
Fearnley, and Hines (2012) find that a significant majority of audit partners, 
chief financial officers and audit committee chairs (65.3% of survey 
respondents) considered audit to be valuable or very valuable. Moreover, 
there is evidence that audit is of interest to wider society. Regulatory 
changes in the EU and the US demonstrate the importance governments 
attach to financial audit, and a huge increase in the extent of voluntary 
certification practices (Francis, 2011a) attests to a societal demand for audit. 
Williams (2017), though very sceptical of the auditor’s purported role, sees 
value in the idea of auditors checking the conduct of corporations. In a very 
blunt footnote to his reflective piece in Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
he comments: “Auditors are the only eyes and ears inside large corporations 
that allegedly serve the public; maybe they should let the public know what 
those bastards are up to.” (Williams, 2017, p. 84 Footnote 27) 
This suggests that audit does have a significant role to play. It is less clear 
exactly what that role is. 
2.4 Social construction of audit 
2.4.1 The social construction of meaning 
Constructionism is the view that all knowledge, and therefore all 
meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being 
constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their 
world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social 
context. (Crotty, 1998, p. 42) 
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Berger and Luckmann (1991) conceive of reality as socially constructed by 
humans through the creation of institutions that are reified and legitimised 
through language and action. At the same time, individuals define meanings 
through socialisation, and with reference to other humans. Both intentionality 
towards an object and interactive human community are factors in how 
meanings are constructed (Crotty, 1998; Howell, 2013). Howell (2013, p. 89) 
draws a distinction between the view that meaning is created by individuals 
(‘social constructivism’) and the subtly different view that meaning is created 
through social agreement (‘social constructionalism’), but notes that “each 
amounts to a similar position” and that individual interpretation always takes 
place in a social context. 
The following sections discuss the socially constructed nature of audit, and 
how its meaning is constructed both socially by firms and individually by 
auditors.   
2.4.2 Audit as a social construction 
Audit is socially constructed (i.a. Dirsmith, Covaleski, & Samuel, 2015; 
Downer, 2011; Flint, 1988; Humphrey, 2008; Humphrey & Moizer, 1990; 
Power, 1997), an idea rather than a technical practice (Power, 1997). Flint 
discusses audit as “a social phenomenon” (p. 14) and “a social control 
mechanism for securing accountability” (p. 17), emphasising that it has no 
intrinsic value, except in its practical usefulness, a response to a perceived 
need for reassurance about the conduct or performance of others.  
Audit, like the broader field of accounting, changes over time. Miller (1998), 
Miller and Napier (1993) and Morgan (1988) all provide discussions of the 
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socially constructed and changing nature of accounting. Central to this is 
terminology and discourse (Khalifa, Sharma, Humphrey, & Robson, 2007). 
Key terminology used in both accounting and auditing is neither well defined 
nor fixed. For example, Rutherford (1985, p. 483) describes the true and fair 
view as a “largely empty” criterion. Fraser and Pong (2009, p. 107) suggest 
that “the nature of accounting ‘facts’ is less clear than ever before”, citing the 
increasing complexity of fair value accounting as a contributory factor. Leung 
(2011), in his ethnography of an accountancy department, makes a 
convincing argument that even such basic concepts as ‘asset’ and ‘expense’ 
are not definitive. Rather, their meanings are defined through use, which 
changes over time, including into the future. The key ideas on which the 
auditing profession rests are constructed and shifting. 
Flint (1988) saw the role of audit as determined as a response to the needs 
of society at a point in time. Andon et al. (2015) regarded it as contestable; 
the profession has agency in negotiating its role. Audit is open to be defined 
and shaped by society, and by interested sections of society. 
2.4.3 Construction of audit by firms 
Audit is constructed in an interested and political way (Carcello, 2005; 
Humphrey, 2008; Stringfellow et al., 2015), influenced and negotiated by 
those with power and control. 
Most accountants originally trained as auditors (Hanlon, 1994) and there is a 
growing bias towards training in large firms (Marriott, Telford, Davies, & 
Evans, 2011). These individuals become socialised in the ways of the 
profession (Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson, 2001; Suddaby, Gendron, & 
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Lam, 2009) and then go on to become not only auditor managers and audit 
partners, but also auditors’ clients and regulators, the staff of its professional 
bodies, and the standard setters. The auditing profession is self-regulating 
and self-referencing, leading to a weak regulatory environment (Sikka, 
2009a) where organisations have more power than professional institutions 
(Edgley, Sharma, & Anderson-Gough, 2016; Sikka, 2008a).  
Although Edgley et al. (2016) conclude that most accounting professionals 
remain committed to their profession, others are more sceptical. Hanlon 
(1994) convincingly dispels the image of the auditor as a disinterested 
professional, while Zeff (2003b) recounts the profession’s transition from 
public interest towards commercial interest. Indeed, a whole tranche of 
literature addresses the increasing commercialisation of the profession (e.g. 
Andon et al., 2015; Carcello, 2005; Carter & Spence, 2014; Hanlon, 1994; 
Humphrey & Moizer, 1990; Imhoff, 2003; Kornberger, Justesen, & Mouritsen, 
2011; Malsch & Gendron, 2013; Spence & Carter, 2014; Wyatt & Gaa, 
2004). Sikka (2008a) goes further, implicating audit firms in tax evasion and 
money laundering in their quest to increase profits.  
Audit firms use their power and influence to define and redefine their role 
(Andon, Free, & Sivabalan, 2014; Carpenter & Dirsmith, 1993; Gendron, 
Cooper, & Townley, 2007; Robson, Humphrey, Khalifa, & Jones, 2007). They 
construct and simultaneously legitimise audit procedures (Carpenter & 
Dirsmith, 1993; Robson et al., 2007) through the “rites and rituals of the 
profession” (Hamilton & Ó Hógartaigh, 2009, p. 911). 
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2.4.4 Construction of audit by individuals 
The power and control of audit firms notwithstanding, firms are constituted of 
individual auditors. Individuals decide when they have done enough work 
and whether to qualify their opinion on the financial statements (Curtis & 
Turley, 2007; Moizer, 1995). Individuals interpret mandates such as the 
Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 Part 5 s. 20 requirement that 
auditors “be satisfied” with audited accounts, and the ISA 200 instruction to 
obtain “reasonable assurance” (Financial Reporting Council, 2016, 
paragraph 11 (a)). How much assurance is reasonable, and whether an 
auditor is satisfied, are judgements made at an individual level, albeit in 
accordance with professional standards and subject to firms’ quality control 
and review procedures.  
Audits depend on individuals balancing the evidence they have gathered 
against the time available, and making decisions involving both ethics 
(Moizer, 1995) and personal levels of anxiety or comfort (Guénin-Paracini, 
Malsch, et al., 2014; Pentland, 1993). Humphrey (2008, p. 178) points out 
that “one person's optimality is unlikely to be adequate for others”.  
2.5 Audit Quality 
2.5.1 Defining audit quality 
Audit quality is socially constructed and difficult to define (Holm & Zaman, 
2012; Humphrey, 2008). Academics have nevertheless produced a variety of 
definitions. This thesis makes us of DeAngelo’s intuitive “market-assessed 
joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the 
client's accounting system, and (b) report the breach” (DeAngelo, 1981, p. 
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186). Alternatives address whether an audit meets legal requirements 
(Francis, 2011b) or professional standards (Christensen, Glover, Omer, & 
Shelley, 2016), the quality of inputs (Christensen et al., 2016), and the quality 
of financial reporting (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
2.5.2 Assessing audit quality 
‘Actual’ audit quality cannot be directly observed by the public (DeAngelo, 
1981; DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Francis, 2004; Mautz & Sharaf, 1961; 
Palmrose, 1988). Fischer (1996) asserts that it is almost equally difficult for 
the client to judge. 
We’re in a marketplace where the product quality is unobservable … 
Now, if you go out and buy a dozen eggs, and you break them open 
and they’re rotten, you know it right away,  If you buy a sub-GAAS 
audit you may never know it.  Because every audit looks exactly the 
same (quote in Fischer, 1996, p. 223)  
Improved insight and differentiation is provided by recent reforms to the 
auditor’s report (Boolaky & Quick, 2016), but the crucial interplay of timing 
and judgement (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961) and the essential difficulty (or 
impossibility) of determining what a good quality is (Fischer, 1996) mean that 
the problem of post hoc quality assessment remains unresolved. For Fischer, 
this difficulty extends even to the individuals producing the work. 
Many researchers use proxies for audit quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014), 
while practitioners rely on policies, guidelines, and last year’s file (Fischer, 
1996) as well as feelings such as comfort (Pentland, 1993) and anxiety 
(Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, et al., 2014) about their work. Clients, investors 
and the general public are likely to heed the brand name reputation of the 
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auditor (Firth, 1993) as a signal of audit quality (Herrbach, 2005; Watkins, 
Hillison, & Morecroft, 2004).  
2.5.3 Audit quality: dichotomy or continuum? 
Much audit literature regards audit quality as dichotomous: individual audits 
are either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Francis, 2011b) and audit quality refers to the 
instance of ‘bad’ audits. Francis and other high profile scholars are heavily 
critical of this model, arguing instead that audit quality varies along a 
continuum (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Francis, 2004, 2011b; Watkins et al., 
2004). Donovan, Frankel, Lee, Martin, and Seo (2014) employ two insightful 
analogies to challenge this stance: first, airlines do not differentiate on safety, 
and second, Akerlof’s (1970) used cars are unlikely to achieve a price 
premium if their quality is unobservable.  
2.5.4 Auditor attributes contributing to audit quality 
Table 3 and the following discussion expand DeAngelo’s (1981) definition of 
audit quality beyond the commonly invoked concepts of competence and 
independence (Francis, 2011b; Watkins et al., 2004) to arrive at five auditor 
attributes relating to audit quality: competence, conscientiousness, 
independence, moral courage and reputation.  
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Table 3 Audit quality attributes derived by the author from 
DeAngelo’s definition of audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981, p. 186) 
 
Section of DeAngelo 
definition  
 
Interpretation Auditor attribute 
 
The market-assessed 
joint probability … 
 
 
The market assesses 
how good it perceives 
the auditor to be at 
finding misstatements 
(Watkins et al., 2004) 
 
 
Reputation (Section 
2.5.9) 
 
… that a given auditor 
will both (a) discover a 
breach in the client's 
accounting system, … 
 
 
Auditors need to be 
competent enough to 
find a misstatement 
(many authors, 
including Francis, 
2011b; Watkins et al., 
2004) 
 
 
Competence (Section 
2.5.5) 
 
Auditors need to 
expend sufficient time 
and effort to enable 
them to find a 
misstatement 
(Herrbach, 2005; 
McNair, 1991) 
 
 
Conscientiousness 
(Section 2.5.6) 
 
… and (b) report the 
breach 
 
Willingness to report a 
breach is frequently 
interpreted as 
independence (many 
authors, including 
Francis, 2011b; 
Watkins et al., 2004) 
 
 
Independence (Section 
2.5.7) 
 
 
  
Auditors also need to 
have moral courage to 
report even when this 
is uncomfortable 
(ICAS, 2017).  
 
 
Moral courage (Section 
2.5.8) 
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This table represents a categorisation that I have found helpful in my 
analysis, rather than a definitive list of auditor attributes. 
2.5.5 Competence 
Audit literature often translates part (a) of DeAngelo’s definition as 
competence (Francis, 2011b; Watkins et al., 2004). In order to find a 
misstatement in an entity’s financial statements, an auditor must be 
sufficiently competent, and greater competence increases the likelihood of 
finding a misstatement. Archival research supports the idea that audit quality 
increases with expertise (Christensen et al., 2016) and a large volume of 
experimental research explores this relationship in more detail (Reheul, Van 
Caneghem, Van den Bogaerd, & Verbruggen, 2017). In particular, industry 
specialisation has been shown to increase auditors’ ability to perform audit 
tasks in an experimental setting (Moroney & Carey, 2011).  
The notion that assurance must be provided by experts is challenged by the 
success of Trip Advisor ratings (Jeacle & Carter, 2011; Power, 2011) and 
Amazon reviews (Jeacle, 2017), suggesting that expertise is either 
unnecessary (Power, 2011) or can be redefined in a way that does not 
require professionals (Jeacle, 2017). A more fundamental challenge to the 
primacy of expertise is its inherently social and self-referring institutional 
nature. Expertise is socially constructed (Gendron et al., 2007; Power, 1995) 
and interested (Gendron et al., 2007; Malsch, 2012). The audit profession is 
instrumental in creating and recreating audit expertise, in its own interest, as 
audit evolves, serving the continued legitimation of audit as a profession 
(Power, 1995). Since both audit expertise and what constitutes a good audit 
tend to be defined with reference to the same source (the profession), it is 
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perhaps not surprising that expertise has been found to be a factor in 
achieving a good quality audit. Power (1995) is especially critical of the 
experimental research setting in this regard. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, and using the generally accepted meaning 
of expertise, encompassing ideas of technical knowledge, generic and 
sector-related experience, we can nevertheless accept that auditor expertise 
is linked both to finding more errors and to perceptions of a higher quality 
audit (Christensen et al., 2016).  
2.5.6 Conscientiousness 
I now consider the concept of auditor effort, care or conscientiousness 
(Herrbach, 2005; McNair, 1991) as an additional attribute that increases the 
likelihood of an auditor finding a misstatement (Table 3). The idea of time as 
a contributory factor to audit quality is so well accepted that some 
quantitative researchers (e.g. Deis & Giroux, 1992) regard audit hours as a 
suitable surrogate for audit quality. This is problematic for a number of 
reasons. First, there are many reasons why some hours may be more 
effortful than others. Second, discovering an error involves a significant 
element of chance. Third, additional audit procedures are likely to yield 
diminishing returns beyond a certain optimal point, when the auditor has 
gathered enough assurance, but not spent an excessive amount of time 
(Francis, 2004). This optimum may differ between firms and individuals, and 
be impossible to define (Herrbach, 2005; Humphrey, 2008; McNair, 1991). 
However, it is clear that a certain amount of effort is required to give the 
auditor a reasonable chance of finding a misstatement, even though the 
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relationship between effort and the chance of discovering an error is not 
simple.  
The concept of conscientiousness combines the imperfect ideas of audit 
hours and effort with an element of personal responsibility. Herrbach (2005) 
highlights conscientiousness as an important auditor attribute in his study of 
audit practices in France, which shows how auditor conscientiousness allows 
auditing to ‘work’ even if there are glitches. Herrbach’s auditors express 
confidence in their audit opinions despite violating guidance and procedures, 
because they are conscientious and persevere until they are comfortable 
with their work. 
2.5.7 Independence 
The second part of the DeAngelo (1981) definition concerns the likelihood of 
the auditor to report a misstatement, which is usually translated as 
independence. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) argued that the significance of audit 
independence was so well established that they hardly needed to justify its 
position as a cornerstone in their theory of auditing. Independence mitigates 
the incentives for auditors to please their clients, and a lack of independence 
has been blamed for many audit failures (Bazerman & Moore, 2011; Sikka, 
2009b). Independence continues to occupy a prominent position in 
professional codes of ethics, and it has played an important role in the EU’s 
justification of their recent introduction of mandatory auditor rotation 
(Humphrey, Kausar, Loft, & Woods, 2011).  
There are challenges to the primacy of independence. Jamal and Sunder 
(2011) and Knechel, Wallage, Eilifsen, and Van Praag (2006) both 
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demonstrate that it is not an important consideration for customers in other 
settings. Andon et al. (2015) suggest that independence could be more 
important to the profession than to its clients, as a legitimating device, in 
place of traditional character-based ethics. Power (2011) considers 
independence as a function of reputation, rather than an individual attribute, 
arguing that its meaning is “much more fluid than we might realise” (p. 325).  
Thus the well-established concept of independence is complex, contested, 
and can be related to either character or reputation. These complications 
notwithstanding, I nevertheless regard independence to be helpful in 
considering the likelihood of auditors to report an error they have found 
(DeAngelo, 1981).   
2.5.8 Moral courage 
Reporting a misstatement, the second part of the DeAngelo (1981) definition, 
could be an unpleasant and uncomfortable experience for any auditor, 
irrespective of their independence. Recognising this, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Scotland has recently added moral courage to its 
Code of Ethics (ICAS, 2018) as an enabler of the fundamental principles of 
professional ethics (integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due 
care, confidentiality, and professional behaviour). Section 100.5 of the ICAS 
Code of Ethics explains: 
There is a need for the professional accountant to confront ethical 
dilemmas with courage. When facing an ethical dilemma, the 
professional accountant needs to have the courage to acknowledge 
the dilemma, to make a reasoned judgement as to the ethical action 
required to resolve the dilemma, and then to act accordingly. (ICAS, 
2017) 
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Courage enables an auditor’s ethical decision to be translated into an ethical 
act (Armstrong, Ketz, & Owsen, 2003; Imen, Khaled, & Hedi, 2016; Libby & 
Thorne, 2004). Therefore, moral courage can be considered an auditor 
attribute contributing to audit quality. 
2.5.9 Reputation 
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality not as how likely auditors are to find 
and report an error, but as how likely the market judges it is that the auditor 
will find and report an error (Watkins et al., 2004). If the purpose of audit is to 
make financial statements more credible, and credibility increases with the 
market’s faith in the auditor, then the auditor’s reputation can be considered 
a component of audit quality. Watkins et al. consider that ‘actual’ and 
‘perceived’ audit quality both contribute to overall audit quality, as shown in 
Figure 4. I have added the concepts of auditor conscientiousness (Section 
2.5.6) and moral courage (Section 2.5.8) to their model. 
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Figure 4 Model of audit quality, adapted from Watkins et al. (2004, p. 157) 
 
 
 
 
 
In this model, information quality and information credibility are two separate 
products of audit quality: good audit work only improves the credibility of the 
financial statements if the auditor also has a good reputation, and being 
audited by a firm with a good reputation can improve the credibility of the 
financial statements even if the audit work is poor (Watkins et al., 2004). 
Audit quality is therefore rhetorical rather than just technical (Holm & Zaman, 
2012) and reputation, or perceived quality, is of key importance both to audit 
firms and to the profession as a whole. Clients favour auditors they consider 
to have greater expertise (Carcello, Hermanson, & McGrath, 1992; Jamal & 
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Sunder, 2011; Knechel et al., 2006; Modlin & Stewart, 2014; Samelson, 
Lowensohn, & Johnson, 2006), but are unable to assess the ‘actual’ quality 
of work done (Section 2.5.2). Carrington’s (2010) study of Swedish 
disciplinary cases, and Jeacle’s (2017) research into Amazon reviews come 
to the same uncomfortable conclusion: that actual expertise is somewhat 
irrelevant, and it is more important to be seen to be credible. 
Regarding reputation as an element of audit quality makes sense if the role 
of audit is to enhance the credibility of the financial statements. This aligns 
with agency theory, with the insurance hypothesis, and with signalling theory. 
If, however, one of the purposes of the audit is Parliament’s means of 
assurance over the stewardship of public funds, then the substance of the 
auditors’ work matters more than their reputation. Thus, the definition of audit 
quality depends on the purpose of the audit, and could differ between the 
public and private sectors. 
2.6 The audit environment 
The Audit Commission was abolished and its auditors transferred to the 
private sector in a political environment informed by neoliberal ideas. This 
section discusses the ideology of neoliberalism and the related concepts of 
New Public Management and privatisation, and then goes on to consider the 
private sector provision of public sector audit and the commercialisation of 
audit.  
2.6.1 The context of neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is a debated term that has changed its meaning over time and 
incorporates a multitude of ideas (Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2013; Turner, 2008). 
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Its primary use has been derogative (Chiapello, 2017; Peck, 2013), with 
many proponents of its ideals preferring alternative terms such as ‘liberal’ (in 
the UK), ‘libertarian’ or ‘neo-conservative’ (in the US) (Turner, 2008). A 
number of authors discuss neoliberalism at length without defining it (e.g. 
Chiapello, 2017; Rose & Miller, 1992; Sikka, 2015a; Williams, 2017). For the 
purpose of this research, I draw on Turner (2008), who defines neoliberalism 
by delineating four central principles, as set out in Table 4. 
Table 4 Defining principles of neoliberalism (Turner, 2008) 
(1) Markets produce a natural order that efficiently allocates resources 
whilst safeguarding individual freedom. 
 
(2) Regulation is necessary to manage relations and potential conflicts 
between autonomous individuals. 
 
(3) State intervention should be minimal. 
 
(4) Private ownership is crucial because it decentralises decision 
making and reinforces the value of the individual. 
 
 
Features of governments that have adopted a neoliberalist ideology include 
privatisation (J. Clarke, 2004; Harvey, 2005), deregulation (Chiapello, 2017; 
Harvey, 2005), a retrenchment of the welfare state (Harvey, 2005; Wrenn, 
2014), and in the public sector, the introduction of competition and payment 
by results (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  
Neoliberal ideals were first conceived by academics in the inter-war years (D. 
S. Jones, 2012) as a response to the perceived threat of socialism to 
individual liberty (Friedman & Friedman, 1982; Harvey, 2005; Hayek, 2005). 
Hayek in Europe and subsequently Friedman in the US were proponents of 
the free market as a means to diversify power away from a potentially 
 
 
50 
 
dangerous totalitarian state (Friedman & Friedman, 1982; Hayek, 2005). 
Both Hayek and Friedman portray a dichotomy of socialism versus the free 
market; democratic socialism is considered unachievable (Hayek, 2005).  
Neoliberalism was a relatively eccentric concept until around the 1970s 
(Rose & Miller, 1992); policy change was slow and incremental (D. S. Jones, 
2012). D. S. Jones (2012) sets out three phases of neoliberalism, shown in 
Table 5. 
Table 5 Phases of neoliberalism (D. S. Jones, 2012) 
1920s – 1950s 1950s – 1980s 1980s onwards 
The term begins to 
acquire meaning. 
The ‘neo’ part of the 
term distinguishes 
neoliberalism from 
earlier ‘laissez-faire’ 
liberalism. 
UK and US policies are 
informed largely by 
neo-Keynesian ideas. 
While there is limited 
implementation of 
neoliberalist policies, its 
ideas gain coherence 
and maturity and are 
championed by 
academics and 
business people. 
An agenda of 
neoliberal policies 
spreads through 
Europe, the US and 
beyond. Neoliberal 
policies are also 
adopted by influential 
international 
organisations such as 
the World Trade 
Organisation and the 
International Monetary 
Fund. 
 
 
Neoliberalism started to become more mainstream from the mid-1970s 
(Rose & Miller, 1992). It was embraced enthusiastically by the UK and other 
countries as an antidote to Keynesian theories held responsible for 1970s 
stagflation (J. Clarke, 2004; Cooper, 2015; D. S. Jones, 2012; Williams, 
2017). Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US are 
particularly associated with extensive programmes of privatisation and 
deregulation (Harvey, 2005), but neoliberalist policy changes also occurred 
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both before and after this period (D. S. Jones, 2012). The ostensibly left wing 
governments of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton consolidated rather than redacting 
neoliberalist reforms (Casey, 2011), and neoliberalist ideology has continued 
to thrive since then, proving itself resistant both to financial crises and to 
severe criticism (Casey, 2011; Cooper, 2015; Guénin-Paracini, Gendron, & 
Morales, 2014; Mirowski, 2013; Peck, 2013).  
Criticism of neoliberalism comes from sources that are both populist (J. 
Clarke, 2004) and academic (Chiapello, 2017; Peck, 2013). It stands 
accused of, among other things, precipitating a dissolution of the public 
interest and public service (J. Clarke, 2004), reasserting class power 
(Duménil & Lévy, 2001), fuelling the financial crisis (D. S. Jones, 2012; 
Sikka, 2015a), and instigating the commercialisation of the audit profession 
(Windsor & Warming-Rasmussen, 2009) (Section 2.6.6). Williams (2017) 
argues that the framing of the market logic has become so pervasive in 
Western democracies that it has colonised every aspect of economic, social 
and political life. Other authors present a more tempered view: the reach of 
neoliberalism is broad but also limited (J. Clarke, 2004; Turner, 2008), and 
some of its alleged consequences are too entwined with other projects, such 
as globalisation, to be attributable to a single cause (Peck, 2013).   
One of the key aims of neoliberalism is to diversify power (Friedman & 
Friedman, 1982; Hayek, 2005; Turner, 2008), but Hayek and Friedman’s 
view of political power is simplistic and fails to take into account the 
“profusion of shifting alliances between diverse authorities” (Rose & Miller, 
1992, p. 174). While Hayek (2005) contends that the power of bureaucrats 
over individuals is inherently greater and more dangerous than any power 
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that can be exercised by the private sector, Sikka (2008a) provides evidence 
to the contrary. Accountancy firms, he argues, wield such power that they 
have become the ‘new masters of the universe’.  
Neoliberalism is supported by ‘enabling myths’ (Wrenn, 2014), by the 
scapegoating of individuals rather than examining the system (Guénin-
Paracini, Gendron, et al., 2014), and by a persistent view that organisation of 
society by markets is natural (Mirowski, 2013; Williams, 2017), but also by 
the lack of a viable alternative that has significant popular support (Casey, 
2011). Scrutiny of neoliberal beliefs is not on the political agenda (Sikka, 
2015a). 
2.6.2 New Public Management (NPM) 
New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991) is a concept closely related to 
neoliberalism (Pollitt, 2016). It is a collection of ideas (Hood, 1991) with the 
aim of making public sector organisations more business-like and market-
oriented (Diefenbach, 2009). The theory, a fusion of new institutional 
economics and managerialism (Hood, 1991), is that NPM practices increase 
efficiency and effectiveness (Hyndman & Lapsley, 2016).  
Like neoliberalism, NPM is ill-defined (Diefenbach, 2009; Dollery & Wallis, 
2000; Hood, 1991). Hood’s (1991, 1995) seminal papers on NPM describe it 
by delineating seven key precepts or doctrines (Table 6), although he takes 
care to point out that these are not all present in every case.  
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Table 6 Key doctrines of NPM (Hood, 1991, 1995) 
Visible, hands-on management; managers have clear responsibilities and 
are ‘free to manage’ 
 
Explicit standards and measures of performance (especially quantitative); 
increased use of performance indicators and audit 
 
Emphasis on output controls rather than procedures 
 
Disaggregation of the public sector into manageable units 
 
Increased competition, contracts and tendering 
 
Private sector management styles – shifting away from the public service 
ethic in recruitment and reward and towards ‘proven’ private sector 
management tools  
 
More discipline and frugality in the use of resources; more emphasis on 
the bottom line 
 
 
Diefenbach (2009) describes the shift towards NPM as an ethical change in 
governance from public welfare to value for money. NPM policies are 
focused towards markets, towards (the most powerful) stakeholders, and 
towards customers, a less demanding concept than citizens.  
NPM ideas have gained popularity and traction in various countries since the 
1970s (Hood, 1991). NPM has informed policy in all public service sectors, 
and is supported by all major political parties (Diefenbach, 2009). The UK 
government in particular, a self-styled leader in public management reform 
(Pollitt, 2013), has embraced NPM in recent decades, privatising services, 
introducing market testing and setting up public / private partnerships, in a 
bid to increase efficiency and accountability (Ferry & Eckersley, 2015). The 
abolition of the Audit Commission was part of the 2010 coalition 
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government’s ongoing commitment to the principles of NPM (Eckersley, 
Ferry, & Zakaria, 2014). 
Like neoliberalism, NPM is controversial. In his original 1991 paper, Hood 
notes that it arouoses strong and varied emotions, commentators variously 
lauding it as the only way forward or charging it with destroying a century’s 
work in public administration. An example of the former is Osborne and 
Gaebler’s 1992 book, which presents NPM, ‘a third choice’ alternative to 
raising taxes or cutting public spending, as innovative, flexible and 
empowering.  Among its many critics, Lapsley (2009, p. 1) describes NPM as 
“a cruel disappointment” and Humphrey and Miller (2012, p. 309) allege it to 
be “inherently failing”. Key criticisms are a narrowing in focus, leading to a 
reduction in the scope of services (Andrews & Van de Walle, 2013; 
Diefenbach, 2009), an increase in beuraucretisation (Diefenbach, 2009; 
Hood & Peters, 2004; Lapsley, 2009) and a reduction in accountability (Ferry 
& Eckersley, 2015; Gendron, Cooper, & Townley, 2001; Hood, 1995; 
Humphrey & Miller, 2012). There is also some strident critique of NPM in 
specific niche areas. For example, Jupe and Funnell (2015) show that the 
privatisation of British Rail has led to substantial and ongoing transfers of 
funds from the taxpayer to private companies, and Kartalis, Tsamenyi, and 
Jayasinghe (2016) show that NPM practices have led to a change in identity 
of the Greek Show Caves, shifting away from an archaeological and cultural 
focus towards economic concerns.  
Despite the heavy criticism, and in common with neoliberalism, NPM has 
defied prounouncements of its death and intensified following the financial 
crisis (Hyndman & Lapsley, 2016; Pollitt, 2016). Pollitt (2016, p. 434) refers 
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to it as “a hardy perennial”; its practices are very embedded. “A generation of 
civil servants have been professionally socialized into singing from the NPM 
songsheet — and their training courses and promotion criteria have also 
reflected these harmonies” (Pollitt, 2016, pp. 433-434). 
Hood’s (1991) paper ‘A Public Management for All Seasons?’ sets out three 
alternative types of core values for public management, as shown in Table 7: 
‘Honest and fair’ representing the traditional priority for public sector workers, 
‘Lean and purposeful’ describing NPM values, and a third category ‘Robust 
and resilient’, where security is most important. Hood argues that it is 
possible to design procedures to satisfy two out of three of these value sets, 
but difficult to satisfy all three at once. Therefore, systems designed to 
prioritise ‘lean and purposeful’ values may be less capable of ensuring 
honesty or resilience. Translating this to the audit context, a focus on 
efficiency could risk either the public interest (‘honest and fair’) or a safe 
audit opinion (‘robust and resilient’). Diefenbach (2009, p. 895) extends this 
argument further, alleging that in pursuit of efficiency, NPM policies ignore, 
reduce, damage or destroy a long list of other values: “impartiality, social 
equality, integrity, equity and community, qualitative dimensions and the 
uniqueness of individuals, citizenship, representation, neutrality, welfare, 
social justice”. 
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Table 7 Core values in public management 
Adapted from Hood (1991, p. 11) 
 
Core values Lean and 
purposeful Honest and fair 
Robust and 
resilient 
 
Characterised by 
 
Frugality; less 
waste 
 
Fairness, proper 
discharge of 
duties 
 
Resilience, 
security 
 
How this 
translates to 
public sector 
audit 
 
Efficiency / 
Doing just 
enough 
 
Protecting the 
public purse 
 
Safe audit 
opinion 
 
Despite the considerable extant literature debating NPM (e.g. Andrews & 
Van de Walle, 2013; Diefenbach, 2009; Hood & Dixon, 2015, 2016; Lapsley, 
2009), Humphrey and Miller (2012, p. 310) emphasise “the continuing 
importance of knowing more about what is done in the name of new public 
management”, because practical experience has frequently not tallied with its 
proponents’ claims.   
2.6.3 Austerity 
The 2010 change in UK government precipitated the prioritisation of fiscal 
restraint as the route to economic growth (Casey, 2011). NPM-type reforms 
continued and intensified (Hyndman & Lapsley, 2016; Pollitt, 2016), 
accompanied by across-the-board cuts, and recruitment and salary freezes, 
to satisfy the demands of the austerity programme (Pollitt, 2016). This 
resulted in services being scaled back (Bracci et al., 2015), and a 
reinforcement of the neoliberalist agenda (Peck, 2013, 2014). It is within this 
context that the Audit Commission was abolished and its auditors transferred 
to the private sector (Section 1.2.3).  
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2.6.4 Privatisation 
Privatisation has been defined as a deliberate sale of government owned 
assets or enterprises (Megginson, 2005) or more loosely as “the act of 
reducing the role of government or increasing the role of the private sector in 
an activity” (Savas, 1987, p. 3). The transfer of the Audit Commission’s 
auditors to private sector firms in 2012 (Section 1.2.3.1) clearly fits within this 
broader definition, although no assets or enterprises were transferred. 
The idea of increasing the role of the private sector and reducing the role of 
government accords with the NPM objective of making the public sector 
more business-like (Diefenbach, 2009), and fulfils the neoliberalist aims of 
maximising private ownership and minimising government involvement in 
service delivery (Harvey, 2005; Turner, 2008). Privatisation was a significant 
feature of Margaret Thatcher’s government in the 1980s (Harvey, 2005). It 
has also been a global phenomenon: almost all advanced democracies have 
launched significant privatisation programmes since that time (Obinger, 
2016). 
A common argument in favour of privatisation is the (supposed) superior 
efficiency of the private sector (Boycko, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1996; Savas, 
1987; Wrenn, 2014). Governments are held to be less efficient than the 
private sector because they address political objectives rather than 
maximising efficiency (Boycko et al., 1996; Obinger, 2016); for example, 
excess employment may be more palatable to governments than public 
sector redundancies (Boycko et al., 1996). Privatisation is also seen as a 
solution to the undesirable intervention of politicians in commercial decisions 
in state-owned enterprises (Obinger, 2016). Minimal state intervention is a 
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key tenet of neoliberalism (Turner, 2008). However, Rainey and Bozeman 
(2000) caution against oversimplifications of the difference between the 
public and private sectors, and Wrenn (2014) regards the ‘superior efficiency’ 
narrative as a myth; more efficient actually means cost cutting. She also 
cautions that privatisation changes the motive for the provision of public  
goods and services, so that making a profit, rather than for the welfare of the 
public, becomes the underlying concern (Wrenn, 2014). 
Positivist research (e.g. Megginson, 2005; Obinger, 2016; Savas, 1987) 
typically concludes that privatised services are more efficient than equivalent 
services run by government.  Such conclusions are often drawn from 
narrowly defined, frequently financial and almost always quantitative 
measures of service performance. The equivalence of the provision is 
therefore debatable, but for these researchers, any change in service quality 
is secondary to the main aim: to measure the improvement in efficiency.  
Where researchers give weight to considerations other than cost, results are 
more nuanced and more mixed. Zafra-Gómez, Plata-Díaz, Pérez-López, and 
López-Hernández (2016), in their study of waste, and Stolt, Blomqvist, and 
Winblad (2011), in their study of elderly care, both find that service quality 
improves with privatisation. Conversely, Schuster’s (2013) research into 
European postal services and O’Toole and Meier’s (2004) study of Texan 
schools both conclude that performance is worse after privatisation. Gong, 
Cullinane, and Firth (2012) report ambiguous findings from their study of sea- 
and airport privatisation, with no clear links between mode of ownership and 
performance. Alonso and Andrews (2015) report the interesting finding that 
privatised prisons in England and Wales perform better than the public sector 
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against indicators that are easy to measure and manage, and less well 
against indicators that are more difficult to measure and manage. J. Clarke 
(2004) comments that there is less control over the service quality of 
privatised operations. 
Some researchers document broader effects of privatisation, including 
discomfort and cognitive dissonance experienced by affected staff (Johnson, 
Smith, & Codling, 2000; White, 2014). J. Clarke (2004) also notes that 
workers of privatised operations are likely to suffer worse conditions of 
service and that the dissolution of public sector service organisations has 
disrupted some routes into work, especially affecting women and minorities. 
2.6.5 Private sector provision of public sector audit 
Researchers have studied the private sector provision of external audit in the 
contexts of Australia (Chong, Dolley, Houghton, & Monroe, 2009; English, 
2003), New Zealand (Bradbury, 2015), Florida (K. L. Jensen & Payne, 2005) 
and the UK (Basioudis & Ellwood, 2005; Baylis & Greenwood, 2016; Giroux 
& Jones, 2007). Most of these studies concentrate on audit fees, but their 
conclusions are far from consistent. Chong et al. (2009), Bradbury (2015) 
and Basioudis and Ellwood (2005) all find private firms more costly than 
public sector auditors, but Giroux and Jones (2007) report the opposite. 
Neither K. L. Jensen and Payne (2005) nor Baylis and Greenwood (2016) 
make a comparison of public and private sector fees, but both show a 
reduction in fees as a result of competition. English’s (2003) study is 
exceptional in not focusing on fees; she explores Australian public sector 
audit in from a critical stance, finding the change to private sector provision 
to be politically motivated. 
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Internal audit has similarities to external audit (Spira & Page, 2003), and has 
been subject to more frequent outsourcing and market testing than external 
audit, however research is limited and results are mixed (Jenny Stewart & 
Subramaniam, 2010). Stewart and Subramaniam’s review concentrates on 
independence and objectivity, and concludes that it is unclear whether 
outsourced internal audit services are more or less objective than those 
provided in-house. 
2.6.6 The commercialisation of audit 
Over the past 30 years, researchers have documented a shift in auditors’ 
priorities away from traditional professional values towards commercial 
considerations such as maintaining the firm’s image and making a profit (e.g. 
Carcello, 2005; Carter & Spence, 2014; Hanlon, 1994; Hopwood, 1998; 
Humphrey & Moizer, 1990; Imhoff, 2003; Spence & Carter, 2014; Wyatt & 
Gaa, 2004; Zeff, 2003a).  
Professional and commercial logics are often portrayed as separate and 
conflicting (e.g. Carter & Spence, 2014; Gendron, 2001; Holm & Zaman, 
2012; Lander, Koene, & Linssen, 2013; Sikka, 2009a). Interpretations of 
professionalism traditionally include a concern for public service (e.g. 
Gendron, 2001; Hall, 1968), which has been criticised as idealised (Sikka, 
2009a) and symbolic (Neu, 1991), but Carter and Spence (2014) argue that 
this view is not entirely outdated. Rather, it is one part of a complex picture: 
the professional logic is too valuable to lose (Power, 1995; Spence & Carter, 
2014) and it continues to exist alongside the commercial logic (Spence & 
Carter, 2014; Suddaby et al., 2009) – although, in the new regime, the 
commercial logic has a higher status (Carter & Spence, 2014; Spence & 
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Carter, 2014).  Carter, Spence, and Muzio (2015, p. 1208) liken traditional 
professionalism to an extinct volcano: “The shell is there but the burning core 
of public service, independence and a commitment to a higher set of values 
has long been extinguished.” Other authors chart changes in professional 
logics, encompassing broader ideas such as client service (Robson et al., 
2007) and diversity (Edgley et al., 2016).  
Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen (2009) argue that commercialisation has 
exacerbated the inherent flaw of the auditor’s financial dependence on the 
auditee, thereby damaging independence. Sikka (2008a, p. 268) makes 
serious allegations about the practical consequences of commercialisation, 
accusing audit firms of “anti-social behaviour” such as “price fixing, tax 
avoidance/evasion, bribery, corruption, money laundering and practices that 
show scant regard for social norms and even laws”.  
Audit firms are keen to present a good image (Carrington, 2010), and have 
become more client focused (Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson, 2000; 
Hanlon, 1994). Audit procedures are designed to be ‘auditable’ by courts and 
regulators (Power, 1997, 2003b, 2004). Power (2004) argues that the firms’ 
concern for reputational risk management has led to a preoccupation with 
auditability, prioritising the documentation of an auditable trail of work at the 
expense of providing useful information.  
Firms simultaneously employ strategies to reduce costs. These include 
resourcing audits predominantly with junior staff (Hanlon, 1994; Herrbach, 
2005; Lee, 2002; Sheen, 2014; Turley et al., 2016) and operating a long 
hours culture (Anderson-Gough et al., 2001; Hanlon, 1994; Lupu & Empson, 
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2015). Firms also design new audit practices, for example through the use of 
data analytics, although this has so far been limited to some firms and its 
application is not without challenges (Al-Htaybat & Alberti-Alhtaybat, 2017; 
Brown-Liburd, Issa, & Lombardi, 2015; Earley, 2015; Financial Reporting 
Council, 2017).  
2.7 Overview of Bourdieusian concepts and theories 
This thesis employs Bourdieusian concepts and theories to help interpret the 
findings and substantive theory from this study. The relevant ideas are 
outlined here to complete the literature review. In the following discussion, I 
draw on significantly on Bourdieu’s own explanation of his theories and 
concepts (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) and link these to their use in 
accounting research. 
2.7.1 Field, capital and habitus 
A field is a social space, constituted of relations between positions anchored 
according to capital, or power. The focus on power is key, and differentiates 
a Bourdieusian understanding of field from that in organisation theory 
(Everett, 2002). Different fields have various forms of capital, for example, 
social, economic and cultural capital, with different amounts of relative 
power. Capital that is recognised and legitimated within a field becomes 
symbolic capital; which capitals are symbolic depends on the field. The field 
and the capitals cannot be defined except in relation to each other. Fields are 
dynamic. Agents struggle within the field to either preserve or change its 
form, according to their own interest. Wacquant uses the analogy of a 
battlefield (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
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Audit firms can be regarded as subfields within a wider field of audit (Everett, 
2002), and individual auditors as actors in the field. In the audit field, one of 
the most valued stakes is economic capital (Andon et al., 2015; Carter & 
Spence, 2014) in the form of revenue generated from clients. Other types of 
capital include social capital, such as contacts and networks within and 
between the firms and clients, and cultural capital, for example image and 
interpersonal skills (Carter & Spence, 2014). Examples of symbolic capital 
include the chartered accountancy qualification, which carries weight in the 
firms, and client portfolios (Carter & Spence, 2014).  
Habitus is “a set of historical relations ‘deposited’ within individual bodies in 
the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation and 
action” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 16). It links structures (fields) to 
behaviour. Habitus and field can only be understood in relation to each other. 
Habitus is at least partially unconscious; as in playing a game (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Crossley, 2005), players must both know how to play well 
enough to play instinctively and make conscious decisions about their play. 
The concept of habitus therefore occupies a position between rational choice 
and determinism (Crossley, 2005). 
Bourdieu differentiates between the primary habitus, acquired in childhood 
through immersion in family culture, and secondary habitus, which can be 
‘grafted on’ subsequently, usually via deliberate learning, for example at 
work. Therefore, although habitus is not strictly an individual characteristic, 
individuals can have multiple layers of different habitus scaffolded on top of 
each other (Wacquant, 2014), which compose a “substratum from which 
identity is formed” (Todd, 2005, p. 437).   
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2.7.2 Doxa, illusio and symbolic violence 
Doxa is the ‘common sense’ or unwritten rules that operate within a field but 
may appear arbitrary or nonsensical from outside. Doxa can legitimise 
systems that produce an unequal distribution of capital (Stringfellow et al., 
2015). Illusio is the acceptance of doxa. It is implied by participation in the 
field, and recognising the rules of the game – even if acceptance is in the 
form of resistance. The concept of illusio has been invoked in the accounting 
context to explain the culture of overwork in Big Four firms (Lupu & Empson, 
2015). 
Symbolic violence is the imposition of a system of rules regarding symbolic 
power on agents who may be disadvantaged by them, and who have little 
choice but to accept them (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
Both the dominating and the dominated parties are at least partially 
unconscious of symbolic violence; they collaborate together, playing by the 
(unfair) rules, misrecognising them as logical or natural. Domination through 
symbolic violence is a position that is “not so much undergone as chosen” 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 192). Bourdieu describes symbolic violence as “gentle” 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 192), but this is not to diminish its insidious effects. 
Indeed, Cooper and Coulson (2014, p. 240) describe symbolic violence as 
“more powerful than physical violence in that it is embedded in the very 
modes of action and structures of cognition of individuals”. Likewise, Oakes, 
Townley, and Cooper (1998, p. 271) comment “When the mechanisms of 
change are hidden or misrecognised, the impact on an organisation is 
sometimes more substantial than when the direction and impetus to change 
is completely recognised and consciously planned and directed”. 
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Symbolic violence theory has been invoked in accounting research to 
demonstrate the dominance of the Big Four over smaller firms (Stringfellow 
et al., 2015) and in securing a monopoly over effectiveness audit (Everett, 
2003). It has also been applied in the context of public sector change (Oakes 
et al., 1998).  
2.7.3 Autonomous and heteronomous subfields 
Bourdieu draws a distinction between ‘generalised’ and ‘restricted 
production’ fields (Bourdieu, 1993; Everett, 2002). In a restricted production 
field, producers create and sell their goods within a restricted sphere of 
specialist consumers who understand the product. By contrast, in a 
generalised or widespread field, goods are intended for the public at large. 
Fields of restricted production, Bourdieu argues, are likely to value cultural 
capital, and evaluate production according to internal criteria. Generalised 
fields are less influenced by specialist criteria because they are oriented 
towards the general public. Bourdieu describes a tendency for the 
generalised field to influence the restricted fields. A heteronomous field is 
influenced to a significant degree, whereas an autonomous field retains its 
own values to a greater extent (Everett, 2002).  
Bourdieu’s context is that of intellectuals and artists, but these concepts have 
been applied to describe how the previously autonomous field of the 
Canadian museum sector has become gradually colonised by the wider 
economic field (Oakes et al., 1998).  
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2.7.4 Bourdieu, change and hysteresis 
Bourdieu disputes criticism that his theories do not allow for change, 
emphasising that fields are arenas of continuous struggles for power 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Similarly, habitus is subject to continuous 
change through reinforcing and modifying experiences (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Everett, 2002). Often these may be micro changes, but 
Lupu, Spence, and Empson (2018) show that dispositions can sometimes 
also adapt to circumstances. Bourdieu concedes that his theories have been 
used to describe slow and gradual changes but argues that the reason for 
this is empirical rather than theoretical (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
Hysteresis is the term Bourdieu uses to describe the mismatch and time lag 
between changes in habitus and field (Bourdieu, 1977; Hardy, 2014; 
McDonough & Polzer, 2012; Yang, 2013). Habitus and field are both 
inextricably linked and constantly changing, therefore changes in habitus 
lead to changes in the field, and vice versa, but change does not necessarily 
happen at the same rate, or to the same extent, in each. The concept of 
hysteresis has only rarely been used in organisational change research 
(McDonough & Polzer, 2012) and is so absent from accounting literature that 
it is not even mentioned in recent reviews of the use of Bourdieu’s concepts 
in accounting research (Everett, 2018; Malsch, Gendron, & Grazzini, 2011). 
However, McDonough and Polzer’s (2012) deployment of the concept in their 
review of public sector organisational change resonates strongly with my 
own research.  
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2.7.5 Relating Bourdieu’s concepts to this study 
Following Everett (2002), I regard audit as a field and individual firms as sub-
fields within the main field (Section 2.7.1). The Audit Commission’s audit 
practice was similar to an audit firm and I also regard it as a sub-field. The 
status of different capitals varies between fields (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992). In audit firms, especially big firms, economic capital is very significant, 
and professionalism is an important type of cultural capital (Carter & Spence, 
2014). I regard the Audit Commission’s audit practice as a weakly 
autonomous subfield in which symbolic capitals were slightly different to 
those in the wider audit field (Bourdieu, 1993; Everett, 2002; Oakes et al., 
1998).  
Auditors’ habitus is their general disposition towards the field (Section 2.7.1); 
this can be influenced by both their personal history and their more recent 
professional socialisation (Lupu et al., 2018). Habitus and field are in 
constant flux and in my study the subfield in which auditors work has 
changed significantly. Many auditors’ habitus has changed only slowly, 
leading to a mismatch between habitus and field, which I regard as 
hysteresis (Bourdieu, 1977; Hardy, 2014; McDonough & Polzer, 2012; Yang, 
2013) (Section 2.7.4). 
Doxa is the received wisdom or common sense that operates within a field 
(Section 2.7.2). The concept of doxa has been applied to the consensus that 
working extremely long hours is normal and logical (Lupu & Empson, 2015) 
and to the view that small firms may be less capable than large firms of 
undertaking some audits (Stringfellow et al., 2015). It could also be applied to 
audit procedures themselves. The ‘epistemological obscurity’ of audit 
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(Pentland, 2000; Power, 1997) means that audit procedures can be 
considered to be acts of faith (Humphrey & Moizer, 1990) which make sense 
to auditors but not to an uninitiated observer. An accepted way of doing an 
audit can therefore be regarded as doxa. Illusio is the acceptance of the 
doxa, or worldview, of the firms (Lupu & Empson, 2015). 
Symbolic violence (Section 2.7.2) is the imposition of a set of rules, or doxa, 
that results in the domination of some actors over others. In the field of audit, 
big firms have been shown to use symbolic violence to exert domination over 
smaller firms (Stringfellow et al., 2015) and to extend their remit (Andon et 
al., 2015; Everett, 2003). Actors misrecognise the doxa as natural and 
legitimate. 
2.8 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I reviewed five domains of literature, providing a foundation for 
my own research. Section 2.3 discussed the role of audit, finding that it is 
unclear what the role of audit in society is, especially in the public sector. 
Section 2.4 discussed social construction, and how the concept of audit is 
open to be constructed and shaped by society, and by interested sections of 
society. There is evidence of big firms taking advantage of this to define and 
redefine their role. Section 2.5 analysed the concept of audit quality, drawing 
out five key attributes: competence, conscientiousness, independence, moral 
courage and reputation. These attributes are contested and depend on what 
the role of audit is.  
In Section 2.6 I addressed the wider context of my study: a neoliberalist 
government agenda intensified by austerity. Neoliberalist ideology continues 
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to inform political decisions and NPM reforms are ongoing despite popular 
resistance and strident academic criticism. There is a substantial amount of 
literature in this area but Humphrey and Miller (2012) stress the ongoing 
need to understand what is done in the name of NPM. There is also a 
significant volume of literature researching privatisation but its results are 
mixed, especially where researchers focus on issues other than cost. 
Similarly, studies of the private sector provision of public sector audit 
concentrate mostly on fees and yield mixed results. I also considered the 
ongoing commercialisation of audit. There is significant literature 
documenting the shift in auditors’ priorities from professional values towards 
a more commercial logic. This literature focuses on the private sector. 
Finally, Section 2.7 introduced key Bourdieusian concepts and their 
application in accounting research. In the audit sector, researchers have 
used Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic violence and illusio to show how big 
firms maintain their domination over smaller firms and over their own staff. 
Bourdieu’s concept of hysteresis is not evident in accounting literature but 
has been used in the context of organisational change in the public sector to 
help explore the mismatch between habitus and field. 
In summary, my review of the literature highlights a number of areas relevant 
to my study that are not already well understood: the role of audit, especially 
in the public sector; how audit is defined; detailed consequences of 
neoliberalist policies and NPM reforms, especially beyond considerations of 
costs; and the commercialisation of audit in relation to the public sector. 
Having established the context for my research within existing literature, 
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Chapter 3 goes on to discuss the methodology through which I addressed 
my research question. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out and justifies my choice of constructivist grounded 
theory (Charmaz, 2014) as a research methodology, and specifies how I 
have used it in my research. Grounded theory methodology is particularly 
appropriate for this study, because it allows research to begin with a broad 
and open research question, emphasises staying close to the data, and from 
early data analysis proceeds according to emerging theoretical direction 
(Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Thus the path through the 
research is influenced by those most closely involved in the audits (Corley, 
2015), facilitating the construction of a grounded theory that is relevant to 
practice.   
I start by setting out the evolving research question, before outlining the rest 
of the chapter. 
3.1.1 The evolving research question 
The research began with a broad research question (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967): 
• How is public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
Figure 5 shows how the research question evolved from this very broad 
question to more detailed and specific questions (in the blue boxes) about 
commercialisation, audit quality, and auditors’ strategies. The white boxes 
highlight some of the key information and ideas that led to the next iteration 
of the question.   
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Figure 5 The evolving research question
How is public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
Initial literature 
review: 
privatisation 
Much archival research discusses the impact of 
quantifiable aspects of privatisation, for example 
financials (Megginson, 2005) 
There is substantially less research into the detail of 
what happens to services following privatisation. 
 
How is the quality of public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
Initial literature 
review: audit 
quality 
Audit quality is not measurable (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Fischer, 1996; Giroux & Jones, 2011) 
Archival studies use proxies for audit quality that 
have severe limitations (Humphrey, 2008). 
 
What is audit quality? 
Data collection 
interviews: initial 
questions 
Many auditors reported that audit quality means 
meeting international standards. International 
standards are compulsory, therefore audit quality 
cannot change and has not changed. 
 
What strategies do auditors use to maintain audit quality in the face of 
changes to their environment? 
Focused coding; 
return to literature 
review; further 
data collection  
Auditors discussed the “commercial reality” of 
maintaining audit quality at lower cost. This links to 
NPM (Hood, 1995) and the commercialisation of audit 
(Humphrey & Moizer, 1990). Some auditors reported 
changes to how the work is done, but also a definite 
shift towards working longer hours. 
 
What is the effect of commercial strategies on the audit and the auditor? 
Focused coding; 
return to literature 
review;  
further data 
collection  
Auditors discussed the increased importance of 
presenting an image and winning work. This links to 
Power’s (1997, 2000, 2003b) ideas of auditability.  
My analysis shows significant discomfort among many 
auditors, but high levels of enthusiasm from others. 
 
How are the changes so widely accepted despite significant discomfort? 
Theoretical 
coding; literature 
review; reflecting 
on and extending 
the substantive 
theory 
Firms have imposed their view of what an audit is.  
This links to Bourdieu’s ideas around field, habitus 
and symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992). 
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3.1.2 Structure of this chapter 
In Section 3.2, I set out my philosophical world view, that meanings are 
subjective and socially constructed, depth in research is important, and the 
researcher plays a role in constructing the research. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 
respectively explain my choice of grounded theory methodology and 
interviews with auditors.  
Section 3.5 details my pilot study, and how this led into the main project. In 
Section 3.6 I discuss intensive interviewing (Charmaz, 2014) to gather rich 
data. Section 3.7 explains the sample selection process, starting with open 
sampling, followed by theoretical sampling, as a tentative theory started to 
emerge. Section 3.8 discusses ethics. 
Section 3.9 describes my data analysis process, including grounded theory 
techniques and my use of software. Section 3.10 addresses the iterative 
nature of grounded theory methodology, and I use Section 3.11 to reflect on 
my personal position in relation to the research.  
The subsequent sections provide a detailed account of how I have used 
Charmaz’s (2014) interpretation of grounded theory data analysis procedures 
to yield meaningful codes and categories from the raw data. Initial coding, 
focused coding and category construction procedures are set out in sections 
3.12, 3.13 and 3.14 respectively, and supported by detailed examples.  
I undertook a ‘member reflections’ exercise (Tracy, 2010) at the end of the 
data analysis stage, which is explained in Section 3.15. Section 3.16 
describes the final stage of linking the grounded substantive theory to 
literature and extant formal theories.  
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Section 3.17 sets out quality criteria for good qualitative research (Malsch & 
Salterio, 2016; Tracy, 2010) and relates them to my work. Finally, Section 
3.18 discusses limitations of this research and how I have mitigated these 
where possible, and Section 3.19 summarises this methodology chapter. 
3.2 Philosophical approach 
I approach my research from the viewpoint that meanings are subjective and 
socially constructed, depth in research is important, and the researcher plays 
a role in constructing the research. I use the label ‘constructivism’ for 
consistency with seminal researchers in the fields of audit (Power & 
Gendron, 2015) and grounded theory methodology (Charmaz, 2014), whose 
work I draw on. 
3.2.1 Ontological position 
Following Berger and Luckmann (1991), I view meanings as constructed by 
individuals through their engagement with the world and with each other. 
Ontologically, this viewpoint is both realist and relativist, both subjective and 
objective (Crotty, 1998; Howell, 2013). Audit exists independently of 
individuals’ minds, but is given meaning by those who interpret it (auditors, 
clients and stakeholders), through their socialisation, direct and indirect 
experience of audit and through their interaction and negotiation with other 
individuals. These meanings can vary between individuals and are therefore 
multiple rather than uniform. 
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3.2.2 Epistemological position 
My philosophical stance rejects the positivist epistemology that research 
methods can be mobilised by a neutral observer to find an objective truth. 
Rather, I adopt a constructivist paradigm, whereby research findings are co-
constructed by the researcher and participants in order to reach 
understanding (Howell, 2013). From this perspective, it is important to seek 
out a complexity of different perspectives and to rely on the participants’ 
views as much as possible (Creswell, 2009). 
I have substantial professional experience as an Audit Commission auditor, a 
shared history with the auditors I researched, and personal or professional 
connections with some participants. Instead of trying to remove bias with the 
aim of achieving objectivity and neutrality, the constructivist perspective turns 
my familiarity and insights into an advantage to be exploited in interpreting 
and making sense of auditors’ experiences (Charmaz, 2014). As Power and 
Gendron (2015 p. 156) put it, “subjectivity is a resource rather than an 
imperfection”. 
3.2.3 Audit research from a constructivist perspective 
Researching audit from a constructivist perspective enables me to engage 
with the complexities arising from its inherently social nature. Audit is difficult 
to define precisely (Power, 1997). It can be regarded as an art (Mautz & 
Sharaf, 1961), a social concept (Flint, 1988), a ritual (Pentland, 1993; Power, 
1997), a cultural issue, a product of communities and environment (Power, 
1997).  Its only objective is to fulfil a social purpose (Flint, 1988). At a more 
micro level, the activity of auditing is social, involving such abstract concepts 
as intuition (Humphrey & Moizer, 1990), comfort (Pentland, 1993) and 
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anxiety (Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, et al., 2014). Rather than being a 
predominantly technical process, audit work involves “a lot of talk” (Dirsmith 
et al., 2015, p. 169). Therefore research from a constructivist perspective, 
which can access the depth, complexities and variation in practices and 
viewpoints, is appropriate. Furthermore, Parker and Northcott (2016) argue 
that qualitative research and ‘naturalistic’ generalisation may have greater 
potential to impact on accounting practice and policy than traditional 
statements of prediction.  
3.3 Choice of grounded theory methodology 
Grounded theory methodology is an inductive methodology that aims to 
develop theory whilst simultaneously being grounded in empirical 
observations and practice (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Charmaz, 2014; Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998; Urquhart, 2013). This is well 
suited to my research scenario for several reasons, which I discuss in the 
following sections. 
3.3.1 Justification of grounded theory methodology 
The following sections set out four justifications for my choice of grounded 
theory methodology.   
3.3.1.1 Grounding the research in practice 
I selected a methodology that seeks to rely as much as possible on 
participants’ (auditors’) views, consistent with my philosophical approach 
(Creswell, 2007). Connecting directly with auditors helps the research to be 
truly grounded in practice (Charmaz, 2014; Corley, 2015; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967) which is important in creating ‘trustworthy’ research that resonates 
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with practitioners (Hibbert, Sillince, Diefenbach, & Cunliffe, 2014; Malsch & 
Salterio, 2016; Power & Gendron, 2015; Tracy, 2010).  Grounded theory 
methodology allows participants’ (auditors’) own views on concepts to 
emerge from the research, rather than imposing preconceived ideas on it 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Urquhart, 2013). Indeed, Corley (2015) views this 
direct engagement with those involved in an area as one of its key strengths. 
Urquhart and Fernández (2013, p. 233) point out that the “built-in closeness 
to the data” in grounded theory methodology leads to theories that have 
relevance. 
3.3.1.2 Exploring an area that is not already well understood 
Grounded theory methodology is appropriate where concepts and 
relationships are not already well understood (Urquhart, 2013).  Much 
existing literature on privatisation (e.g. Boycko, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1996; 
Megginson, 2005; O'Toole & Meier, 2004; Savas, 1987; Stolt, Blomqvist, & 
Winblad, 2011) and auditing (e.g. DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Francis, 2011b; 
Giroux & Jones, 2011; Krishnan & Schauer, 2000; Samelson et al., 2006) is 
quantitative archival research undertaken from a positivist perspective. At the 
more detailed level that can be accessed by qualitative research, there is 
therefore much detail still to be explored (Alonso & Andrews, 2015; Ellwood 
& Garcia-Lacalle, 2012; Francis, 2011b; Gong, Cullinane, & Firth, 2012; 
Humphrey, 2008).  
3.3.1.3 A flexible methodology 
Grounded theory is a suitable methodology where the research question is 
flexible and there is freedom to explore a phenomenon (Urquhart, 2013). In 
this research, the initial research question was relatively broad, and direction 
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evolved as the research progressed, “guided by an empowered researcher” 
(Howell, 2013, p. 131) and influenced by participants (Corley, 2015). 
3.3.1.4 An established methodology 
Grounded theory methodology is well established in accounting research, 
including that undertaken from an interpretivist perspective (Elharidy, 
Nicholson, & Scapens, 2008). Examples of researchers employing this 
approach in the broad field of accounting and corporate governance include 
Beattie, Fearnley, and Brandt (2004); Beattie, Fearnley, and Hines (2015); 
Bowyer and Davis (2012); Ezzamel, Robson, and Stapleton (2012); Fischer 
(1996); Goddard (2004, 2005); Goddard, Assad, Issa, Malagila, and Mkasiwa 
(2015); Howell and Sorour (2016); Hutaibat, Von Alberti-Alhtaybat, and Al-
Htaybat (2011); Solomon and Solomon (2006); and Sorour and Howell 
(2013).  
3.3.2 Versions of grounded theory methodology 
There are multiple versions of grounded theory methodology (Bryant & 
Charmaz, 2007).  These are frequently grouped into three schools: the 
classical or Glaserian school, advocating close adherence to the principles of 
the original Discovery of Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) , the 
Strauss and Corbin school, that follows a more rigid structure (especially 
Strauss & Corbin, 1990), and the constructivist school, championed by 
Charmaz (Charmaz, 2014).  Significant variations exist within and beyond 
these three schools (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). In addition, there are 
researchers who use grounded theory coding procedures within a more 
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general research design (Charmaz, 2014; Urquhart, 2013) although a partial 
approach can attract criticism (Goulding, 2002; Suddaby, 2006).  
Fundamental tenets of grounded theory common to the different versions 
are: an iterative process of data collection and analysis, theoretical sampling, 
and constant comparison (Gurd, 2008; Suddaby, 2006). The following 
sections outline some of the key differences between the versions, before 
setting out my choice of constructivist grounded theory methodology.   
3.3.2.1 Classical grounded theory 
The original Discovery of Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) seeks 
to explain and to legitimise how to generate theory from data. Grounded 
theory methodology is presented as a contrast to deductive methodologies. 
The researcher uses comparison to create categories from data, leading to a 
substantive theory generated as a result of empirical enquiry. Theoretical 
sampling adds variety to the data and detail to the categories. After the 
substantive theory has been ‘discovered’, the researcher can consider linking 
it to a formal (more conceptual) theory. Induction is paramount in classical 
grounded theory methodology; theory ‘emerges’ from the data. Glaser 
criticises other versions of grounded theory methodology, especially Strauss 
& Corbin’s (1990) version, for ‘forcing’ the data (e.g. Glaser, 1992), which he 
views as contaminating the research with other theories and ideas, violating 
the inductive nature of the methodology (Howell, 2013; Suddaby, 2006).  
Classical grounded theory has three coding stages: open coding, selective 
coding and theoretical coding (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Urquhart, 2013). 
Open coding aims to break down the data to generate many codes (Glaser & 
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Strauss, 1967), selective coding refines the analysis to areas of interest or 
relevance, and theoretical coding builds relationships between categories 
(Urquhart, 2013) to “weave the fractured story back together” (Glaser, 1978, 
p. 17). Glaser provides lists of suggested ‘coding families’ (Glaser, 1978, 
1998) which can be used to facilitate the theoretical coding stage. Memo 
writing is practised alongside coding and is stressed as vitally important 
(Glaser, 1978, 1998; Glaser & Strauss, 1967); in fact, Glaser (1978, p. 83, 
italics in original) refers to it as “the core stage in the process of generating 
theory, the bedrock of theory generation”. 
The title of the seminal work Discovery (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) suggests 
the methodology’s realist roots; there is an objective truth to be discovered. 
Glaser (1998) writes of processes that are free from time and place, a view 
of theory that sits uncomfortably in a more constructionist paradigm. An 
alternative stance is that classical grounded theory can accommodate a 
variety of philosophical positions (e.g. Breckenridge, Jones, Elliott, & Nicol, 
2012; Urquhart & Fernández, 2013; Walsh et al., 2015).  
Many classical grounded theorists advocate close adherence to the original 
texts (e.g. Glaser, 1998; Gurd, 2008; Suddaby, 2006; Walsh et al., 2015), in 
spite of an invitation in Discovery for researchers to develop the methodology 
in their own way (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Glaser has recently emphasised 
the importance of following all the procedures: “every step is required, and 
every step follows on from the one before” (Walsh et al., 2015, p. 593). Other 
authors oppose this position; for example, Amsteus (2014) argues that 
setting out procedures in advance and following them rigidly contradicts the 
spirit of induction, and Locke (2015) calls for researchers to be more 
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pragmatic. Still others actively celebrate new developments, regarding them 
as strengthening rather than detracting from the methodology (e.g. Bryant & 
Charmaz, 2007; Corley, 2015; Fendt & Sachs, 2008).  
3.3.2.2 Strauss and Corbin’s grounded theory 
Strauss & Corbin’s (1990, 1998) version of grounded theory methodology is 
simplified (Howell, 2013) by being much more codified (Elharidy, Nicholson, 
& Scapens, 2008) and systematic (Creswell, 2007) than the classical 
version. It is well established and widely used, including in accounting 
research (Elharidy et al., 2008; Gurd, 2008).  
Strauss and Corbin (1990) set out three coding stages slightly differently 
from Discovery (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). As in Discovery, the process starts 
with open coding, but researchers work to understand the properties of 
codes earlier in the process. A new intermediate stage, axial coding, 
precedes selective coding. Axial coding makes use of a ‘paradigm model’ to 
make connections between categories. Specific techniques such as flip-flop 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Walker & Myrick, 2006) are recommended to help 
explore the data at all coding stages. In common with Glaser, Strauss & 
Corbin also regard memo writing as essential. Finally, the ‘conditional matrix’ 
is presented as a way to explore different levels of emerging theory, from 
incident level to international level.  
Both the paradigm model and the conditional matrix prompt the researcher to 
consider the causal conditions, context, intervening conditions, action / 
interaction strategies and consequences in relation to a phenomenon. These 
proposed relationships reflect the first of Glaser’s coding families, the 6 Cs 
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(causes, context, contingencies, consequences, covariances and conditions) 
(Glaser, 1978, p. 73). A key difference is that Strauss and Corbin’s 
relationships are prescribed, whereas Glaser’s are suggested. Indeed, 
Glaser emphasises that “the reader will think of other words for each family 
as well as discover new families” (Glaser, 1978, p. 73).  
Strauss and Corbin’s step-by-step procedures have been widely criticised for 
being too prescriptive, and for ‘forcing’ data into categories and theories 
(Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Charmaz, 2014; Glaser, 1992, 1998; Walker & 
Myrick, 2006). Glaser (1998, p. 81) writes “If one strangles the data enough, 
it will give up”. Others claim that excessive focus on procedures can lead to 
neglecting the overall substance of the research (Elharidy et al., 2008), and 
that the rigid procedures make the methodology more complex (Urquhart, 
2013; Walker & Myrick, 2006). 
Some of the criticisms of Strauss and Corbin’s methodology can be 
attributed to differences in philosophical stance. For example, Walker and 
Myrick (2006) question whether working to understand the relationships 
between categories is paradoxical if these relationships should emerge or be 
discovered. This echoes Glaser’s accusations of forcing the data (Glaser, 
1992, 1998). By contrast, Mills, Bonner, and Francis (2006) regard strategies 
such as flip-flop as different ways of looking at the data; from a constructivist 
viewpoint, this is a valid and helpful way of constructing theories. Discussion 
of forcing in grounded theory remains unresolved (Charmaz, 2014). 
Strauss and Corbin’s grounded theory, more than the other versions, has 
changed over time (R. Jones & Noble, 2007). It arguably has constructivist 
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influences (Gurd, 2008; Mills et al., 2006) and allows the researcher to use 
their knowledge and experience to  influence their research (R. Jones & 
Noble, 2007). From 2008, the methodology includes reflexivity (Gentles, 
Jack, Nicholas, & McKibbon, 2014). This can be regarded as problematic 
(bias, if the researcher is aiming for objectivity) or advantageous, from a 
more constructivist perspective (Gentles et al., 2014). 
3.3.2.3 Constructivist grounded theory 
Many of the differences between the various schools of grounded theory can 
be attributed to differences in ontology and epistemology (Charmaz, 2014; 
Fendt & Sachs, 2008; Mills et al., 2006). Whereas philosophical 
considerations are generally implicit in Glaser, Strauss and Corbin’s texts 
(Mills et al., 2006), Charmaz (2014) endorses an explicitly constructivist 
version of the methodology. She emphasises diverse local worlds and 
multiple realities (Creswell, 2007) and conspicuously acknowledges the role 
of the researcher in the title of her book: Constructing Grounded Theory is a 
telling contrast to Discovery. Considerations of interpretation, judgement and 
reflexivity are paramount throughout, and the resulting theory is contextual 
and situated (Keane, 2015). 
Stages of coding in constructivist grounded theory methodology are similar to 
those in the classical version. Charmaz’s initial coding, like open coding, 
aims to break the data down to generate ideas. This is followed by focused 
coding, which corresponds to selective coding; the most promising codes are 
selected to move forward with. Unlike Glaser and Strauss and Corbin, coding 
beyond the focused coding stage is optional. Charmaz endorses theoretical 
coding, with or without Glaser’s coding families, as a final stage, to construct 
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(rather than find) relationships between categories, but while theoretical 
coding is seen as very useful for building theory, theory building itself is 
optional; in a constructivist paradigm, it is possible to make a contribution 
without creating a theory (Charmaz, 2014). Charmaz also includes a 
somewhat unenthusiastic suggestion of axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990): “Axial coding provides a frame for researchers to apply. The frame 
may extend or limit your vision” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 148).   
Constructivist grounded theory is the most flexible of the three main strands 
of the methodology (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Creswell, 2007). Charmaz 
(2014) provides suggestions and guidance, rather than mandating specific 
steps. This allows the methodology to be tailored to each unique study and 
to be influenced by the participants’ concerns (Corley, 2015). However, this 
can be a source of criticism, especially for researchers in the classical 
tradition such as Walsh et al. (2015) who uphold the necessity of following all 
the steps. 
A further contentious issue in constructivist grounded theory is the output of 
the research, which can be more modest than that envisaged by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). For example, Breckenridge et al. (2012) regard the 
theoretical product as a significant divergence from classical grounded 
theory. Charmaz (2014) argues that constructivist grounded theory can 
indeed move beyond micro-analysis, but warns that premature 
decontextualisation can be a problem, and cautions researchers to attend 
closely to complexity at a contextual level and to explicate categories 
thoroughly before progressing to larger units of analysis. 
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3.3.2.4 My choice of constructivist grounded theory 
I have chosen to follow Charmaz’s (2014) constructivist version of grounded 
theory methodology. Its emphasis on contextualisation serves Parker, 
Guthrie and Linacre’s (2011) call for accounting research to be socially, 
politically and institutionally contextualised, in order for it to be relevant to 
practice. Its flexibility encourages creativity, as advocated by Humphrey 
(2008, p. 195): “In qualitative research, it is vital that creative thinking is 
encouraged and that we do not emphasise the pursuit of process over the 
development of ideas”. Flexibility allows me to respond to emerging data and 
theories, and to create and recreate the research strategy as the study 
progresses. This facilitates engagement with the research participants, a key 
strength of grounded theory methodology (Corley, 2015). 
Constructivist grounded theory methodology also aligns most comfortably 
with my own philosophical stance and therefore contributes to the 
‘meaningful coherence’ of my research (Tracy, 2010). Keane (2015) offers 
three examples of how to align grounded theory methodology with 
constructivist values. First, she emphasises critical self-reflection. Reflexivity 
is explicitly built into Charmaz’s methodology (Charmaz, 2014) and is 
discussed in Section 3.11. Second, Keane advises actively involving 
participants. This is facilitated by Charmaz’s ‘intensive interview’ strategy 
(Charmaz, 2014), which helps to ensure that data collection focuses on 
participants’ concerns. I also sought member reflections towards the end of 
the project (Section 3.15). Third, Keane advocates incorporating thick 
contextual description in the final presentation of the research. Charmaz 
facilitates this by advising that the participants’ voices are retained in memo 
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writing (Charmaz, 2014). While staying mindful of ethical and confidentiality 
issues, my findings chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) use sufficiently long 
quotes, where appropriate, to convey a sense of the participants’ world to the 
reader. 
The rest of this chapter shows how I have employed constructivist grounded 
theory methodology (Charmaz, 2014) to approach my research. 
3.3.3 Building theory 
The explicit aim of grounded theory methodology is to build theory (Charmaz, 
2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990), but ideas about what 
theory is may differ. In Discovery, Glaser and Strauss (1967, footnote 22, p. 
31) take the narrow view that theory “explains or predicts something”. 
Interpretive or postmodern conceptions of theory tend to be broader and 
more inclusive (de Loo & Lowe, 2017; Locke, 2001) and “more concerned 
with frameworks for providing insight, understanding and validity in historical 
and specific circumstances” (Howell, 2013). A. Clarke (2005) eschews the 
word ‘theory’ altogether; a transcendent formal theory, she argues, makes no 
sense from postmodernist perspective, where society and social action are in 
constant flux. Charmaz (2014) takes an intermediate position: theorising is 
important, indeed the aim of the methodology, but researchers can take 
different positions on what theory is, and make a contribution without it. 
I view theory as “an abstract theoretical understanding of the studied 
experience” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 4). Through data analysis, I construct a 
substantive theory of reconstructing public sector audit, which I then relate to 
extant formal theory (Chapter 7). 
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3.3.4 Overview of the application of grounded theory methodology 
Figure 6 outlines my methodological approach. The process was iterative, 
involving much back and forth movement between stages. The chapter 
proceeds to discuss each stage in detail.  
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Figure 6 Overview of grounded theory methodology  
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3.4 Choice of interviews for initial data collection  
I sought to choose research methods that fitted well with my constructivist 
philosophy (Howell, 2013; Suddaby, 2006) and facilitated answering the 
research question (Charmaz, 2014): 
 
How is public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
 
Rich data is the starting point for a strong grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014). 
Collecting detailed, locally situated data accords with Hopwood’s (1983) call 
to researchers to seek to understand accounting in context, echoed more 
recently by de Loo and Lowe (2017), Humphrey (2008), Suddaby et al. 
(2009) and Sikka (2009a).  
Table 8 shows the data sources I considered for “open sampling” (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990, p. 181). 
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Table 8 Consideration of data sources 
Data collection 
method 
Examples Advantages Disadvantages 
Field observations Goddard et al. (2015); 
Mohammad and Roszaini 
(2009) 
Direct evidence of what auditors do 
without relying on them to recall and 
report this retrospectively 
Client confidentiality 
Practically difficult to arrange 
Requires access during auditors’ 
busiest period 
Cannot access past audits  
 
File reviews Curtis and Turley (2007) Can access past audits 
Does not rely on auditors’ disclosure 
Eliminates some of the practical 
obstacles of direct observation 
Client confidentiality 
Not everything that takes place during 
an audit is recorded in the file 
Review of published 
FRC regulatory 
reviews 
Giroux and Jones (2011) No practical or ethical issues 
Can access past audits 
Not everything that takes place during 
an audit is recorded  
The FRC’s worldview is an integral 
part of the data 
Interviews Gendron and Spira (2009, 
2010) 
Allows access to the full scope of the 
audit, including auditors’ thoughts 
Can access past audits 
Facilitates co-construction of 
knowledge (Charmaz, 2014) 
 
Limited to what the auditor remembers 
and chooses to disclose 
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I selected interviews with auditors to start my data collection, in order to 
access in-depth information from those directly involved, including their 
thoughts, feelings and reflections (Malsch, Tremblay, & Gendron, 2012), and 
“how they think about specific issues” (Power & Gendron, 2015 p. 156).  This 
yielded a complexity of views (Creswell, 2009), leading to a deeper, more 
nuanced understanding than would be possible through other methods.  
Interviews necessarily rely on what participants remember and wish to 
disclose. From my social constructivist perspective, this is less important 
than credibility and authenticity (Crotty, 1998; King & Horrocks, 2010; Power 
& Gendron, 2015; Tracy, 2010). Conversing with interviewees also facilitates 
co-construction of knowledge between the researcher and participants 
(Charmaz, 2014). 
3.5 Pilot study 
The following sections describe and justify my use of a pilot study.  
3.5.1 Aims of the pilot interviews 
The aims of the pilot interviews were as follows. 
(1) to familiarise myself with the practical and human aspects of the 
research (Carlson & McCaslin, 2003; Nunes et al., 2010). 
(2) to gauge the reactions of auditors to being interviewed, and anticipate 
any potential issues. 
(3) to decide whether to audio record interviews.   
(4) to practice my interview and data analysis skills (Arksey & Knight, 
1999; Carlson & McCaslin, 2003).   
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(5) to start to develop insight into the research area, in order to refine 
research tools and facilitate efficient and effective research planning 
and design (Nunes et al., 2010).   
The following sections describe how the pilot interviews proceeded and how I 
used them to achieve these aims. 
3.5.2 Selecting participants for the pilot study 
I undertook one pilot interview (P1) with a colleague, purely to practice 
research techniques. The next two participants (P2 and P3) were former 
Audit Commission auditors who had left instead of transferring to the private 
sector in 2012. They provided a good knowledge of the subject area to help 
me developing insight into the research area, and genuine reactions to being 
interviewed and possibly recorded.   
3.5.3 Conducting the pilot interviews by telephone 
I conducted pilot interviews P2 and P3 by telephone in order to save time. 
My pre-existing relationship with the interviewees mitigated the limited 
opportunity this gave to develop trust and credibility (Block & Erskine, 2012). 
The interviews ran smoothly and yielded a substantial amount of rich data.  
3.5.4 Deciding whether to record interviews 
Audio recording is normal in academia but not in auditing. I was concerned 
that recording might deter auditors, or cause them to temper their speech. 
Glaser recommends not recording interviews because it slows down the data 
collection and analysis process unnecessarily (Glaser, 1998; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Charmaz (2014) subscribes to the more conventional view 
that recordings are valuable because of the detail that can be maintained 
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and reviewed in retrospect (Arksey & Knight, 1999). I decided to use the pilot 
interviews to compare the relative experiences of recording and not 
recording. 
Interview P2 was not recorded.  I took extensive notes during the 
conversation, which I considered a minor and manageable impediment to 
conducting the interview. I was conscious, however, of making decisions 
during the interview about what to document, as it was impossible to note 
everything. Writing up the notes took two days, and I found it more difficult to 
remember details the next day. I sent my finished notes to the interviewee, 
which led to a somewhat uncomfortable exchange as he had not expected 
me to reproduce the conversation in so much detail, wanted to amend some 
of the script, and qualified and provided additional explanations for some of 
his comments. I amended the document in a way that we both agreed.  
Although this process resulted in a co-constructed, shared understanding, I 
felt that this had come at the detriment of our ongoing relationship, and some 
detail had perhaps been lost.  
Interview P3 was audio recorded. I explained in advance of the telephone 
call that audio recording was optional but would help me. The interview 
proceeded very smoothly. I made scant notes, to help with my questioning, 
but relied on the recording for detail. The recording was very clear and 
enabled me to transcribe everything, including some things I had forgotten.  
The interview transcript was much longer than my notes from interview P2, 
emphasising the additional detail that had been retained. I decided to record 
all future interviews, where participants consented to this.  
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I noticed that transcribing helped me to become immersed in the data and 
encouraged deep thinking, which expedited the data analysis process. 
Although not an explicit aim of the pilot study, this prompted my decision to 
transcribe my own interviews, in order to stay close to the data and facilitate 
analysis. 
3.5.5 Reflecting on and analysing the pilot interviews 
I reflected on the interviews and the themes that had arisen during the 
interviews, by writing notes immediately following the interviews. I found this 
helpful in crystallising my substantive and reflexive thoughts prior to more 
formal analysis. 
I coded each interview on a line-by-line basis to produce initial codes 
(Charmaz, 2014), then reviewed and compared the codes with each other 
and with the underlying data (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to 
give some tentative focused codes (Charmaz, 2014).  I started theorising by 
documenting my ideas in memos (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
The findings from the pilot study are summarised in Table 20 in Appendix B, 
on p. 317. Table 20 shows the output from my pilot study in the form of 
tentative focused codes, my ideas relating to these tentative codes, and 
considerations arising that I took forward to the main study. 
3.5.6 Deciding whether to use software for data analysis 
Specialist software such as NVivo can be used to advantage in qualitative 
data analysis (Bazeley, 2013; Bringer, Johnston, & Brackenridge, 2004), 
including in grounded theory studies (Bringer, Johnston, & Brackenridge, 
2006; Hutchison, Johnston, & Breckon, 2010). A key benefit of using 
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software for research is efficient organisation and analysis (Bringer et al., 
2004), but some authors (e.g. Goulding, 2002; Suddaby, 2006; Urquhart, 
2013) urge caution. Goulding (2002) fears that using software could be 
regarded as jeopardising the researcher’s very close link to the data, a key 
advantage of grounded theory methodology. Suddaby (2006) and Bringer et 
al. (2006) warn that software makes it possible to generate findings without 
fully understanding the data. Suddaby (2006) emphasises the researcher’s 
responsibility for making interpretations and decisions, regardless of whether 
software is used. For Urquhart (2013), the chief concern is the difficulty and 
distraction for the researcher in learning new software at the same time as 
learning to analyse data. 
Mindful of these criticisms, I followed Urquhart’s (2013) advice to start coding 
manually. I tried coding using pen and paper, and then using Word, but 
found both of these methods increasingly unwieldy and difficult to track as 
the number of codes grew. Using NVivo software helped enormously with 
organising my analysis, as well as allowing me to experiment with different 
coding structures and track my work. Furthermore, my confidence in the 
systematic storage of codes helped me to keep moving through the process. 
3.5.7 Using the findings from the pilot interviews 
I imported the findings from the pilot study (Appendix B) into a fresh NVivo 
file for the main study, where they were available for information and 
reference, but did not translate them directly into either codes or interview 
questions. This early analysis contributed towards my theoretical sensitivity 
(Glaser, 1978), foreshadowing some of the key themes in the main study, 
especially ideas about presenting an image, not being too perfect, and being 
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a specialist or a generalist. I also noted at this stage the importance of 
regulatory reviews and started to consider their meaning. Other ideas such 
as consistency of staffing and helpfulness of auditors did not earn their way 
in to the final theory (Charmaz, 2014). 
3.5.8 Reviewing the pilot study 
Table 9 shows how the pilot study helped to shape my research. 
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Table 9 Revisiting the aims of the pilot study 
 
Aim (Section 3.5.1) How this helped to shape the research 
 
 
(1) 
 
to familiarise myself with 
the practical and human 
aspects of the research  
 
 
I became more familiar with the participants’ world, timetable and priorities. This helped with 
scheduling subsequent interviews and with being sensitive to some of the issues of importance to 
auditors that might arise in later interviews. 
 
 
(2) 
 
to gauge the reactions of 
auditors to being 
interviewed, and anticipate 
any potential issues 
 
 
I had underestimated confidentiality concerns. I reassured participants that I did not need details 
of clients, and decided henceforth not to disclose the identities of other participants. However, 
participants were relaxed and forthcoming during the interviews, which gave me confidence to 
proceed with few interview questions, in order to elicit what participants thought was important.  
 
 
(3) 
 
to decide whether to audio 
record interviews   
 
 
I decided to record all subsequent interviews, and to transcribe them myself. 
 
 
(4) 
 
to practice my interview 
and data analysis skills 
 
 
The pilot study gave me confidence in my interview technique and practice at coding. I decided to 
use NVivo software to analyse the data.  
 
(5) 
 
to start to develop insight 
into the research area 
 
The findings from the pilot study (Appendix B) provided helpful insight into the research area and 
helped me to develop theoretical sensitivity (Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).   
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In summary, the pilot study helped me to test, practise and refine the 
research techniques I then implemented in the main research phase. The 
codes from the pilot stage did not feed directly into the data collection or 
analysis of the main study, but contributed towards developing my theoretical 
sensitivity (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Nunes et 
al., 2010). This facilitates theory building by enhancing the researcher’s 
ability to ascribe meaning to data and to identify theoretical possibilities 
(Charmaz, 2014; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
The next section discusses the main data gathering phase. 
3.6 Data collection 
This section describes in more detail how I used interviews in the study. 
Following a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), the interviews evolved as the research progressed, and were used 
not only to gather data but also to refine the research questions and to 
explore theories as they developed, in an iterative process. I start with 
explaining the ‘intensive interview’ style (Charmaz, 2014), and how I applied 
theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and move on 
to practical considerations such as timing and location of interviews. I then 
discuss how I documented my reflections on the interviews, and the 
transcription process.  
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3.6.1 Interview style: intensive interviews 
Focusing on the participants’ concerns is crucial to generating a substantive 
theory that has relevance (Corley, 2015; Urquhart & Fernández, 2013). I 
used “intensive interviews”, defined by Charmaz (2014 p. 56) as “a gently-
guided, one-sided conversation that explores research participants’ 
perspectives on their personal experience with the research topic”, in order 
to “allow interviewees to express themselves according to their own 
interpretive schemes – with as little disruption as possible” (Power & 
Gendron, 2015 p. 156).  
I created a semi-structured interview guide, derived partly from literature, 
although the literature was not used extensively in the early stages, or to 
generate hypotheses (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Appendix C on p. 319 shows 
my original interview guide. It consists of a list of prompts of the information 
to share with interviewee at the start of the interview, followed by a table of 
original questions and the rationale for each question. The interview guide 
evolved as the research progressed, in accordance with theoretical sampling 
(Section 3.6.3 and Appendix D). Using an interview guide helped to remind 
me of key areas to cover, but I did not follow it rigidly, instead improvising in 
order to respond quickly to new ideas, and generate more data about new 
and emerging concepts (Charmaz, 2014). The question “What do you do 
now that is different to when you worked at the Audit Commission?” was the 
mainstay of the first few interviews, repeated several times in slightly 
different ways to encourage more information.  
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3.6.2 Constructing an understanding of public sector audit 
I viewed the interviews as interactions during which the participants and I 
together constructed an understanding of their stories (Charmaz, 2014).  
Table 10 provides an example of an exchange illustrating this co-
construction.   
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Table 10 Interview extract showing co-construction of the 
participant’s story 
 
Extract from interview with participant 
 
Explanation of researcher input 
Participant we do much better focused 
work around management 
override as a significant 
risk.  Which we didn’t do 
anything on I think in the 
Commission, I don’t think 
we even knew it was a risk.  
Even though… 
Contrary to the participant’s 
assertion, I remembered 
considering the risk of 
management override, 
especially in the context of 
journals, as an Audit 
Commission auditor.  
Interviewer Yes, you used to look at 
journals didn’t you, and 
who’d signed them off … 
I decided to challenge this 
assertion to elicit more 
information. 
Participant Yeah, but not in a 
particularly controlled 
manner.  And we didn’t do 
anything to make sure the 
population was complete.  
Again my memory contrasted 
with the participant’s assertion. 
I remembered reviewing the 
sequencing of journals, to verify 
the audited entity’s control over 
management overrides. 
Interviewer Look at the sequencing. My interjection refers to what I 
did, as a Commission auditor, 
to gain assurance about the 
completeness of the population.
Participant What, for the whole year? The participant points out that 
reviewing sequencing by hand 
(at the Commission) would only 
provide assurance on a sample 
basis. 
Interviewer Maybe not.  I definitely 
looked at some 
sequencing. 
I concede the point in but 
reiterate that at the Audit 
Commission, I did some work in 
this area (rather than none, as 
the participant first suggested). 
Participant Yes, you’d look at some.  
But a tool that reconciles 
opening and closing, you 
know you’ve got the full - 
you’ve got all transactions 
and you know therefore 
you’ve got all journals 
within that population. 
The participant agrees that 
there would have been some 
work in this area, and goes on 
to clarify exactly how he 
believes his firm’s new 
procedures provide better 
assurance.  
 
 
 
102 
 
This part of the interview became an interactive discussion about how the 
auditor’s work on management override controls had changed, leading to a 
fuller understanding of the change in practice.  
3.6.3 Adjusting the interview questions 
I used theoretical sampling to adjust the interview questions as the research 
progressed, in order to further the theoretical evolution of the research 
(Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). As well 
as improvising during the interviews in order to pay attention to participants’ 
concerns, I added questions that helped to explore my emerging categories 
in more detail, and to confirm and disconfirm the emerging theory (Charmaz, 
2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Appendix D on p. 322 shows my evolved 
interview guide. For each original questions and rationale, additional columns 
show my notes about whether to retain or remove the questions in future 
interviews, and my reasoning. Additional rows show further questions I 
added for later interviews, with their rationale. 
3.6.4 Using interviews to elicit member reflections 
As my analysis progressed, I used the interviews to invite participants’ 
reflections on my emerging theory (Charmaz, 2014; Tracy, 2010), leading to 
collaboration and elaboration (Tracy, 2010). Table 11 shows extracts from 
two different interviews illustrating how I encouraged reflections. 
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Table 11 Interview extracts demonstrating member reflections  
 
Extract from interview relating to ‘just enough’  Explanation  
Participant 
 
 
 
 
Interviewer
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant 
 
… it was much more about other skills 
than technical skills. So they were valued, 
but not to the same extent that they were 
in the Audit Commission. 
 
Would you say that there's a kind of 
minimum level of specialist knowledge, 
and then once you've got enough 
specialist knowledge to do the job, then 
they wouldn't really care if you had any 
more? 
 
Yes. I'd agree with that statement. And I 
wouldn't say that that level of technical 
knowledge is particularly high. The bigger 
issue is to be able to deal with - if a 
technical issue comes up, to be able to 
deal with the client, and, sort of, maybe 
not resolve it there on the spot - obviously 
it's good if you can - but to know how to 
resolve it rather than being the person 
who solves it. 
Participant offers 
his view on the 
value of expertise 
in his firm 
 
I share my idea 
of ‘just enough’ 
expertise and ask 
for his thoughts 
 
 
 
The participant 
agrees and adds 
detail  
Extract from interview relating to standardisation Explanation  
Interviewer
 
 
 
 
Participant 
 
Interviewer
 
 
 
Participant 
There's this idea audit quality is binary. 
It's either good enough, or it isn't. And 
there's no point in being any better than 
good enough. 
 
I think that's right. 
 
Yeah. Would you ... because I was kind 
of - I didn't like that idea to begin with, but 
I'm coming round to it.  
 
I don't like that idea either. From a values 
point of view .... ‘Good enough’ is not 
something I'm very comfortable with. But I 
think that's exactly where the firms are, in 
terms of - audit to £5m, audit to your 
testing threshold, audit to your materiality 
threshold, and do not do a minute, or a 
figure more than that, because if you do 
you're wasting cost and eroding the profit 
margin. 
I share my idea 
of standardised 
audit quality 
 
 
He agrees 
 
I volunteer my 
opinion to prompt 
further detail 
 
The participant 
adds his own 
thoughts, 
emphasising his 
agreement  
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Member reflections lend trustworthiness (Malsch & Salterio, 2016) and 
sincerity (Tracy, 2010) to the research and the additional detail provided by 
the participants adds authenticity to their agreement with my ideas. 
Further member reflections were elicited at the end of the data analysis 
phase (Section 3.15). 
3.6.5 Timing of interviews 
Interviews took place across two years, in the winter of 2015-16 and 2016-
17, in order to avoid auditors’ busy season. I allowed significant gaps in my 
schedule to give time for reflection and analysis between interviews, and to 
adjust the direction and content of subsequent interviews through theoretical 
sampling (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
3.6.6 Face to face versus telephone interviews 
The first interviews were conducted face to face, because this is widely 
accepted as giving the best chance of collecting rich data (Block & Erskine, 
2012). Furthermore, I felt that this familiar format would feel comfortable to 
auditors, and facilitate interaction and conversation. Participants’ comfort 
was important, both for ethical reasons and to encourage them to provide 
rich, reflective information (Malsch et al., 2012). 
In the first year, I conducted all interviews face to face, visiting participants at 
a location of their choice, usually their office. For several reasons, later 
participants were mostly interviewed by telephone. The first two telephone 
interviews were requested by participants who requested the telephone as 
most convenient for them. I found the anticipated loss of interaction (Block & 
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Erskine, 2012) to be minimal; both interviews yielded a significant amount of 
rich data. Moreover, telephone interviews saved a lot of time. Then in 
February 2017 an accident hindered my ability to travel. From then, I 
conducted all but the most local interviews by telephone. I found little 
detrimental effect in not being able to see the interviewee face to face. My 
shared background with the participants and substantial experience in 
interviewing mitigated the potential awkwardness of the interactions, and 
these interviews yielded a similar volume of rich detail to my previous 
interviews.  
3.6.7 Recording interviews 
Following the pilot study, I recorded all interviews using a hand held 
recording device. I checked that participants were comfortable with this 
before commencing each interview. During the interviews, I made notes to 
help me keep track of the conversation and follow up interesting ideas, but I 
relied on the recording to retain the detail. 
3.6.8 Personal reflections 
I documented my reflections on each interview soon afterwards, often 
staying in the interview room after the participant had left. The reflection 
served two purposes. First, noting my impressions of the substantive content 
of the interview assisted my preliminary analysis (King & Horrocks, 2010). I 
noted whether anything had been omitted, key messages I thought the 
participant was trying to convey, and anything that I was surprised at or 
wanted to follow up. I added some tentative interpretations and notes forward 
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for the next interview. Second, I reflected on the process, and how I could 
maintain or improve this for future interviews 
3.6.9 Interview transcription 
One of my three pilot interviews and 22 of 23 subsequent interviews were 
transcribed in full. Transcribing data myself helped me to feel close to the 
data, to think about it deeply, and to remember details that I had forgotten. 
Five of my later interviews were transcribed by a professional transcription 
service. I revisited these interviews in great detail, listening to the recording 
and checking the transcription for accuracy. This contributed towards my 
deep engagement with the data. 
The final interview was not transcribed because it yielded substantially less 
detailed information than the others. The participant did not have experience 
of audit prior to the 2012 transfer of auditors, and was therefore only able to 
discuss his experiences in relation to private sector firms. Nevertheless, I 
followed the same procedure of reflection and interpretation following this 
interview, and it did contribute towards my analysis. 
3.7 Sample selection  
This section explains how I selected my sample of participants for interviews, 
starting with open sampling (Section 3.7.1) and progressing to theoretical 
sampling (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) (Section 3.7.2).  
3.7.1 Initial sample selection 
At the beginning of the research, the researcher goes to “the most obvious 
places and the most likely informants” (Goulding, 2002, p. 67). Strauss and 
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Corbin (1990 p.181) refer to this as open sampling, the aim being “to uncover 
as many potentially relevant categories as possible along with their 
properties and dimensions.” My starting point was the four audit firms that 
took on Audit Commission contracts and staff in 2012, summarised in Table 
2 in Section 1.2.3.1. 
I started data collection with a small sample of experienced public sector 
auditors who had transferred from the Audit Commission to a firm in 2012, 
and therefore had experience working under both systems. I selected 
auditors from three firms of different sizes and in different geographical 
locations, in order to elicit a range of views. 
I started to analyse the data soon after the first data collection. This gave the 
study theoretical direction and facilitated theoretical sampling. 
3.7.2 Theoretical sampling 
Theoretical sampling is an essential feature of grounded theory (Charmaz, 
2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Suddaby, 2006). In Discovery, it is defined as: 
the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the 
analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his data and decides what 
data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his 
theory as it emerges. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967 p.45) 
This applies both to adjusting interview questions (Section 3.6.3) and to 
selecting subsequent participants. Therefore, sampling took place throughout 
the study rather than just at the beginning (Locke, 2001), and was 
determined by the ongoing analysis, with the specific aims of both confirming 
and contradicting emerging theory, and to fill in gaps in categories as I 
developed them (Charmaz, 2014).  
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Appendix E on p. 330 shows my interview schedule. Columns show which 
part of my study the interviews relate to (pilot study, initial sample or 
theoretical sampling), the mode of conducting the interview (face to face or 
telephone), some information about the participants’ places of work at the 
time of the transfer and at the time of the interviews, and the participants’ 
positions at the time of the interviews. This summary demonstrates the depth 
and breadth of the participants’ experience. The 23 interviewees included 21 
former Audit Commission auditors, as well as NHS and local government 
clients and non-executive directors. The auditors included those still working 
at the firm they had transferred to and those who had subsequently left. 
Obtaining views from these different perspectives contributed to 
‘crystallisation’; that is, making use of multiple data sources in order to be 
receptive to a more complex understanding of the issue, and therefore 
increase the credibility of the research (Tracy, 2010). I conducted most 
interviews with auditors because I found that these provided the most in-
depth information that enabled me to fill in my categories and further the 
development of my substantive grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014). 
3.7.3 Towards theoretical saturation 
Grounded theory methodology requires sampling to continue until categories 
are saturated (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990); that is, 
“when gathering fresh data no longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor 
reveals new properties of these core theoretical categories” (Charmaz, 2014 
p. 213). Determining when theoretical saturation has been reached can be 
one of the key difficulties of the grounded theory approach (Creswell, 2009).  
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Recognising that I as the researcher construct the research, determining 
when saturation has been reached was dependent on my judgement. 
3.8 Ethical considerations 
This section demonstrates how I followed required ethical procedures 
(Section 3.8.1) as well as taking into account broader ethical considerations 
in my research activities (Section 3.8.2). 
3.8.1 Following university procedures 
I followed the University’s ethics procedures (Tracy, 2010) by submitting my 
proposal to the University’s ethics committee and receiving approval from the 
committee in advance of collecting data. Appendix F on p. 334 shows my 
Student Research Ethical Issues Form. 
All participants were told that they were participating voluntarily, and could 
withdraw from the study at any time. I emphasised that they were responding 
to my questions as individuals, rather than as representatives of their 
organisations, and explained how data would be stored and kept confidential. 
Probably the most significant concern expressed by participants was 
confidentiality. To address this concern, I devised and explained to 
participants a system for referring to participants by number and firms by 
letter. 
To start with, participants were required to sign a consent form (Appendix G 
on p. 336) to confirm their understanding and acceptance of their 
involvement in the study. In February 2017 I obtained ethical approval for two 
amendments to the original application. These allowed me to involve 
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participants other than auditors and to conduct interviews by telephone. 
Telephone participants were not required to sign a form, but I e-mailed the 
form to them, and explained the issues at the start of each interview, as with 
the face-to-face interviews. My ethics amendment request is shown in 
Appendix H on p. 338. 
3.8.2 Continuing ethical considerations 
Tracy (2010) advises that ethical issues should be considered throughout the 
research, rather than just at the beginning. Continuing reflection on ethical 
issues led me to make two changes during the research. First, following the 
pilot interviews, I noticed that interviewees were interested in my over-
arching perspective of the four firms, and asked me who else I had spoken 
to. If I spoke freely to participants about other interviewees, this might enable 
them to identify each other in my completed work, even if I had kept the 
content of the interviews confidential. From that point, in addition to 
maintaining confidentiality in my stored research data, I did not reveal to any 
participants who the other participants were. The only exceptions occurred 
when I interviewed multiple individuals in the same visit, and in these cases I 
sought the participants’ permission.  
The second reflection was that although I sent participants details of my visit 
in advance, they rarely read them in detail. At the start of the interviews, 
participants were not very interested in the ethical aspects of the interview 
and just wanted to proceed with the questions. They seemed to regard the 
process of reading and signing the ethics form as an extra burden on their 
time. I discerned, and one participant told me directly, that trust was a factor: 
I had a shared background with the participants and many of them knew me, 
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or knew of me, personally or professionally, prior to the interview. This 
created an existing level of trust between us, which meant that they inclined 
to trust my word rather than the ethics process. But ethical procedures 
require that participants understand ethical issues. After some consideration, 
I changed my approach to ethics in the interviews. Rather than introducing 
ethics procedures as a means of protecting participants, I explained that 
discussing ethical issues was a necessary step for me to go through in order 
to conduct my research properly. I found that interviewees were more patient 
with this approach and listened to my summary of the forms because it was 
something I needed them to do, rather than for their own benefit.  
Ethical considerations continued through the writing up phase. I found that 
participants had generally been open and unguarded in what they said 
during their interviews. In some cases I had quotes or information that could 
be potentially inflammatory or that could undermine confidentiality. I 
considered all the quotations I used carefully and censored my writing to 
ensure that anonymity was preserved and the participants were protected.  
3.9 Grounded theory techniques for data analysis 
Following the initial data collection, data collection and analysis took place 
simultaneously (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Goulding, 2002; Urquhart, 2013) and followed Charmaz’s (2014) 
interpretation of grounded theory coding. The following sections outline the 
coding process I followed, my use of data analysis software, and grounded 
theory techniques for data analysis. 
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3.9.1 Coding 
Coding is the process of attaching concepts to data (Urquhart, 2013). The 
first step, initial coding (Section 3.12), involved working through interview 
transcripts at a very detailed level to generate a very large volume of codes. 
The second stage, focused coding (Section 3.13), involved selecting those 
codes with most analytical significance to move forward with. Next, I worked 
to develop these focused codes into a core category and sub-categories that 
summarised the main themes of the study in an abstract way (Section 3.14) 
Theorising continued through exploring the relationships between the codes 
to generate a substantive theory (Chapter 7). Chronologically, all of the 
coding stages overlapped with each other, with data collection and with 
constant comparison, as I moved towards building a substantive grounded 
theory.  
After experimenting with my pilot data (Section 3.5.6), I used NVivo software 
to document and develop my initial and focused coding. At the theoretical 
coding stage, I broke off and returned to pen and paper (Section 3.9.4).   
3.9.2 Constant comparison 
Constant comparison is a key tenet of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Gurd, 2008; Suddaby, 2006). From the focused 
coding stage, I used NVivo to repeatedly compare instances of codes within 
interviews and across different interviews. This led me to amend the coding, 
changing the names of codes, which ones were treated as focused codes, 
and the organisation of the coding hierarchy, as well as prompting analytical 
ideas and interpretations, which I wrote up in theoretical memos. Table 12 
shows an example comparison of auditors’ responses to the requirement to 
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work longer hours, which led me to create the new codes ‘Being positive’ and 
‘Feeling uncomfortable’, which transcended the specific circumstances the 
auditors described. 
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Table 12 Memo extract: attitudes to long hours 
Memo extract Function of 
this part of the 
memo 
 
Attitudes to long hours 
12/19/2016 9:11 AM 
 
P7 
"you think, oh, I’ve got a week to do this – and then you 
realise, you’ve got the set up meeting, you don’t really 
start looking at the file till Monday lunch time.  You’ve got 
a closing meeting by Thursday morning.  So you 
suddenly realise actually you haven’t got five days to do 
it, you’ve got two. 
"Two and a bit. 
"Yes, so some long evenings and some early mornings.  
But it was really good, and it’s really useful having such a 
diverse team doing it.  And I think that works really well.  
So you have obviously they could ask the GPS people 
some GPS specific questions – what’s a collection fund 
and that kind of stuff– but they would also bring in their 
knowledge as to how the audit approach should work.  
And that was really good learning.    I think it worked well 
as a team thing as well." 
 
Although P7 spells out the firm's unrealistic expectations 
in terms of budgets and timescales, his attitude, and the 
overriding message of his words, is one of privilege in 
being involved in this work, and pride in doing a job well.  
He seems to be thriving on the pressure. 
 
This is totally different from the messages from P 11 / P 
12 / P13. 
E.g. P12: 
"And there was definitely an expectation of long hours.  
And so they had their resourcing tool and you would 
receive [participant’s emphasis; suggests no choice or 
negotiation] the resourcing plan.  And it would have 
someone who’s contracted for 28 hours allocated for 50 
hours.  That’s excluding – that’s 50 chargeable hours.  
That’s without admin and travel and all the rest of it.  So 
you were being asked for the part time staff that you were 
line managing, to sell that to them somehow.  Well, it was 
impossible.  Well, I found it impossible.  I wasn’t prepared 
to do it myself, let alone make someone else do it." 
Memo title 
Date / time  
 
Reference 
Extract from 
interview 
considered in 
this memo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
My thoughts 
and comments 
 
 
 
Comparison 
with other 
interviews 
 
Extract from 
second 
(contrasting) 
interview 
considered 
here 
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3.9.3 Memo writing 
Memo writing is “the pivotal intermediate step” between collecting data and 
generating theory (Charmaz, 2014, p. 162) and a core grounded theory 
technique (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; 
Urquhart, 2013). I composed numerous and varied theoretical memos 
throughout the data analysis process, creating new memos and adding to 
existing ones at frequent intervals. These documented my thoughts and 
interpretations as I worked through the data, and helped me to explore the 
emerging concepts and tentative relationships between them. Gradually the 
memos became more abstract, analytical and theoretical.  
An example of a theoretical memo is provided in Table 12 in the previous 
section.  
3.9.4 Using mind maps and diagrams 
In the final stages of coding, I created many mind maps and diagrams 
relating the codes to each other, as advocated by Charmaz (2014) and 
Urquhart (2013). This was a creative process and I sometimes altered the 
codes I included, or gave them slightly different names, as well as 
experimenting with different relationships between them. I moved outside of 
NVivo for most of this stage, which helped me to experiment more freely with 
how the codes related to each other. Appendix I on p. 339 shows some of 
my numerous mind maps and diagrams. 
3.9.5 Stages of data analysis 
Analysis progressed from very detailed initial coding to more selective 
focused coding. I then worked with my codes to construct and develop 
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categories. The final stage was to elucidate the relationships between the 
categories, in order to build a substantive grounded theory. These stages 
and the output from each stage are set out in Table 13. The subsequent 
sections of this chapter provide detailed descriptions and supporting 
examples for each stage of the process. 
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Table 13 Stages of data analysis 
Data analysis stage Output Section 
reference 
 
Initial coding 
Generating ideas by 
creating initial codes 
from interview data 
 
983 initial codes Section 3.12 
Focused coding 
Focusing the initial 
codes into a 
manageable number 
of meaningful codes 
to work with 
 
24 focused codes Section 3.13 
Constructing 
categories and sub-
categories 
Developing abstract 
themes from the 
focused codes to 
create a core 
category and sub-
categories that 
summarise the main 
themes of the study, 
and explicating their 
properties 
 
One core category:  
Reconstructing public sector 
audit 
 
Three sub-categories: 
Commercialising the audit 
Reconstructing audit quality 
Embedding the reconstruction 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 3.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creating a 
substantive theory 
Using theoretical 
coding and 
diagramming to 
explore the 
relationships between 
codes and categories 
to create a 
substantive theory 
 
Substantive theory of 
reconstructing public sector 
audit 
Chapter 7 
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3.10 The iterative nature of grounded theory methodology 
Grounded theory methodology is iterative rather than linear; the researcher 
goes ‘to and fro’ between the different stages, and between the codes and 
the data (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Charmaz (2014) advises 
an imaginative and playful approach. “Grounded theory coding is part work 
but it is also part play. We play with the ideas we gain from the data. … 
Theoretical playfulness allows us to try out ideas and to see where they may 
lead” (Charmaz, 2014 p. 137). In order to maximise the power and 
effectiveness of the method, playfulness, flexibility and responsiveness to the 
data take precedence over rigid adherence to procedures (Amsteus, 2014; 
Corley, 2015). Therefore, although I present a sequence of coding steps with 
a prescribed procedure for each, the distinctions between coding stages 
were very blurred and the movement between them not strictly chronological. 
3.11 Reflexivity in the research process 
Charmaz (2014) suggests that prior knowledge can help or hinder research.  
It is necessary to be aware of background assumptions and perspectives 
(Charmaz, 2014; Horrocks & King, 2010).  Suddaby (2006, p. 635) advises 
researchers to “pay attention to extant theory but constantly remind yourself 
that you are only human and that what you observe is a function of both who 
you are and what you hope to see”.  
Reflexivity is the process of reflecting critically on the self as researcher 
(Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2018). This is built in to grounded theory 
methodology through theoretical sensitivity (Gentles et al., 2014); even 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) comment that reflection is necessary to discover 
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what has been found, but Charmaz (2014) goes much further, requiring the 
researcher to explicitly take their own perspective into account throughout 
the research process, and especially through memo writing.  
Here I set out my reflections on my relationship to my research, and how it 
has affected my approach.  
I worked at the Audit Commission for a substantial part of my career, from 
2001 until 2012. Starting as an audit team lead, I worked in a number of roles 
in four different geographical locations. As part of the Commission’s technical 
unit, I helped and advised auditors nationally, represented the Audit 
Commission at client-facing events, and was instrumental in determining the 
Commission’s stance on some controversial topics. I was conscious that my 
long association and public advocacy of the Audit Commission predisposed 
me to think well of the Commission and its approach to audit. During the 
initial interview phase, I became aware that some research participants were 
also conscious of my background, and might temper their disclosures to 
protect my feelings. 
In 2012 when the audit practice and its auditors transferred to the private 
sector, I and my colleagues in the technical unit were made redundant. I 
therefore experienced the closure of the Audit Commission directly, 
personally, and alongside auditors who subsequently became my interview 
participants.  The closure of the Audit Commission was unanticipated, and, 
many auditors felt, ill justified and poorly managed (Prospect, 2011).  There 
was an extended period of uncertainty when many people, myself included, 
did not know whether they would be made redundant.  The Audit 
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Commission was denigrated in the press (Tonkiss & Skelcher, 2015) (see for 
example Groves, 2010; Sparrow, 2010). This powerful shared experience 
impacted on my approach to the research, how I interpreted data and built 
theory. It also had the potential to impact on how participants viewed me and 
my research. Interviewees might see me as an insider to whom they could 
divulge information freely and feel understood. More problematically, they 
might try to anticipate my agenda as seeking to demonstrate that audit 
quality has suffered as a result of the transfer, and set out to corroborate or 
disprove this. 
I took steps to mitigate the risk of auditors adapting their narratives to what 
they thought I wanted to hear. I included in my sample auditors I did not 
already know personally. I was very clear in explaining my research question 
to participants: that I was interested in exploring how the transfer of audit to 
the private sector had affected the audit. I explicitly stated that I was 
interested in both good and bad aspects of how the audit had changed.  I 
also posed detailed questions and showed interest and enthusiasm for new 
strategies and processes recounted by auditors. These strategies helped 
give me the best chance of obtaining detailed and balanced information from 
my participants, but I acknowledge that any such information is always an 
interpretation. 
I also took action to remind myself of my own potential preconceptions, and 
challenge my interpretations throughout the research. Writing up my 
reflections after every interview helped me to do this, and I maintained the 
process of reflection via my continual use of theoretical memos through the 
data analysis stage.  
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In writing up the research I have used the first person throughout, which is an 
appropriate style to reflect my attitude towards and engagement in the study 
(de Loo & Lowe, 2017; Wolcott, 2009). 
3.12 Initial coding 
Initial coding The early process of engaging with and defining data. 
(Charmaz, 2014, p. 343) 
The aim of initial coding was to engage with the raw data, transcriptions of 
intensive interviews, at a very detailed level, in order to generate fruitful ideas 
that I could continue to work on (Charmaz, 2014). This process produced a 
very high volume of initial codes, only some of which formed part of the 
eventual substantive theory. 
The following sections describe two elements of initial coding: line-by-line 
coding (Section 3.12.1), and working with the initial codes (Section 3.12.2).  
3.12.1 Line-by-line coding 
I assigned each line a code, in order to maximise the generation of ideas and 
to avoid making premature judgements about which sections of the text were 
significant (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). I used gerunds where possible in order to focus on actions (Charmaz, 
2014; Glaser, 1998; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Appendix J on p. 342 provides 
a detailed illustration of my initial coding for an excerpt from one interview. 
Initial coding generated 983 codes, all of which I recorded in NVivo. Some 
codes were concise, analytic and action-based; others were more descriptive 
or clumsy.  At this stage, I prioritised volume of ideas over elegance or 
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insightfulness, reserving judgement on which codes were useful to take 
forward to the next stage, focused coding (Section 3.13). 
I used the line-by-line coding technique throughout the first interviews, and 
later revisited sections of the transcriptions and coding multiple times at this 
very detailed level. As the research progressed and the direction of the 
research became clearer, I moved straight to focused coding for some parts 
of interviews where the focused codes I had already developed seemed to fit 
the data. 
3.12.2 Working with the initial codes 
I used the constant comparison method (Section 3.9.2) to compare instances 
of the same code appearing in different places, to attain a greater 
understanding of the codes. With this insight, I began to arrange the codes in 
a provisional hierarchy, by grouping similar codes together. Figure 7 shows 
some examples of my early groupings of codes. 
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As I worked, I wrote memos (Section 3.9.3) which logged my thoughts and 
helped me to think about the data on a more analytical level, and create 
more analytical codes.  
3.13 Focused coding 
Focused coding A sequel to initial coding in which researchers 
concentrate on the most frequent and / or significant codes among 
their initial codes and test these codes against large batches of data. 
(Charmaz, 2014, p. 343) 
The aim of focused coding was to select codes to move forward with for 
further analysis and theorising. To do this, I considered which of the initial 
codes occurred most frequently or appeared more significant than others 
Figure 7 Screen shots from NVivo showing extracts from the early 
coding hierarchy, after coding four interviews (created by the author, 
2018) 
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(Charmaz, 2014) by “concentrating on what [the] initial codes say and the 
comparisons [I made] with and between them” (p. 140) and by reflecting on 
Glaser’s question “What is actually happening in the data?” (Glaser, 1978, p. 
57).  
3.13.1 Creating focused codes 
I created provisional focused codes either as new, more analytical codes, or 
simply by using initial codes that seemed to work well. Table 25 in Appendix 
K on p. 345 provides an illustration of focused coding. It uses the same 
interview excerpt as the example of initial coding in Table 24 in Appendix J, 
but there are two extra columns to illustrate the coding. After the initial codes, 
which are the same as in Table 24, the second coding column shows the 
focused codes arising from working with the initial codes. The final column 
presents my reasoning for the selection of the focused codes.   
Some initial codes were elevated directly to focused codes, some were 
grouped together into new focused codes, and others culled. I denoted 
focused codes by changing their colour in NVivo. ‘Supporting audit staff’ 
(Table 25, Appendix K) is an example of an initial code elevated to a focused 
code without changing its wording. Its recurrence in multiple different 
circumstances led to interesting contrasts surrounding situations when staff 
felt as though they were or were not supported. ‘Standardising’ (Table 25, 
Appendix K) is an example of a new focused code created from many initial 
codes, one of which was ‘Following a process’. As I collected more data and 
created more codes, I explored how following a process related to the audit 
becoming more standardised. Figure 8 shows how these two codes were 
constituted of many other codes.  
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Figure 8 NVivo screen shots showing coding hierarchies of the codes 
‘Standardising’ and ‘Following a process’ (created by the author, 2018) 
 
 
3.13.2 Working with the focused codes 
I used the techniques of constant comparison (Section 3.9.2) and memo 
writing (Section 3.9.3) as I continually revisited codes, compared them with 
data and with each other, renamed them, merged them, reconsidered which 
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ones I considered to be focused codes, and restructured the hierarchy in 
ways that made sense to me analytically. Restructuring the coding hierarchy 
helped me to view the different data in different ways, and provided fresh 
analytical insights, which I noted in theoretical memos. Some groupings 
appeared more obvious than others. For example, the code ‘Not being clear’ 
helped me to understand the code ‘Being clear’, so I merged these two 
opposite codes together. 
It was not always possible to find a definitive best place in the structure for 
each code. Sometimes I moved a code around several times but still felt 
uneasy with its location in relation to other codes. Charmaz (2014) and 
Suddaby (2006) both advise that grounded theorists need to be able to 
tolerate ambiguity, and Charmaz emphasises the provisional nature of 
research. Therefore, I accepted and proceeded with imperfect coding. As I 
continued to compare data and write memos, I gained further insights into 
my codes, and it became possible to arrange them into provisional 
categories and sub-categories (Section 3.14).  
My designation of which were focused codes, and how they were organised, 
changed frequently as I progressed through the research. For example, the 
code ‘Supporting audit staff’ derived from the excerpt in Table 25 was useful 
in comparing different ways in which auditors did or did not feel supported. 
This comparison contributed towards developing the more analytical codes 
‘Doing just enough’ and ‘Feeling uncomfortable’, which eventually 
superseded it in my final theory.  
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3.14 Constructing categories and sub-categories 
Categorizing The analytic step … of selecting certain codes as 
having overriding significance or abstracting common themes and 
patterns in several codes into an analytic concept. (Charmaz, 2014, p. 
341) 
Core category A concept that is sufficiently broad and abstract that 
summarizes in a few words the main ideas expressed in the study 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2015, p. 187) 
I arranged the focused codes into tentative categories that expressed the 
main ideas in my research. The aim was to reach a single core category that 
encompassed the ideas of a small number of sub-categories. I achieved this 
by selecting promising focused codes, and exploring them through continued 
and repeated use of the core grounded theory techniques of constant 
comparison (Section 3.9.2) and memo writing (Section 3.9.3).  
3.14.1 Theoretical coding 
Theoretical codes inspire us to think about different relationships 
between categories. (Urquhart, 2013, p. 110) 
Considering relationships between codes is an essential stage in building 
theory, and theoretical coding is a technique designed to facilitate this 
(Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Urquhart, 2013). Embarking on 
this stage, I ensured that I was familiar with Glaser’s coding families (Glaser, 
1978) and allowed them to inform my exploration of the interrelationships 
between codes, but I neither limited myself to these codes (Charmaz, 2014; 
Glaser, 1978, 1998; Urquhart, 2013) nor applied them in any systematic way 
(Charmaz, 2014). Rather, I prioritised ideas emerging from the data 
(Charmaz, 2014; Glaser, 1998). 
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Charmaz (2014 p. 245) uses the term “theoretical playfulness” to emphasise 
that building theory is imaginative rather than mechanical. I ‘played’ with my 
codes by experimenting with different coding hierarchies within NVivo and by 
making extensive use of mind maps and diagrams (Section 3.9.4), both 
within NVivo and using large paper and coloured pens (Appendix I). I also 
persevered with the grounded theory techniques of constant comparison 
(Section 3.9.2) and memo writing (Section 3.9.3). 
The process of theorising continued in an iterative way for a period of several 
months. I was influenced at this stage by member reflections (Section 3.15), 
by comparisons with existing literature (Section 3.16) and by writing, 
presenting and receiving feedback on conference papers. 
3.15 Member reflections 
Section 3.6.4 showed how I used some of the later interviews to elicit 
member reflections on my emerging analysis and theory. This was invaluable 
in checking emerging ideas as they arose, but there was a long time gap 
between completing my data collection interviews and completing my 
analysis. In order to obtain participants’ reflections on my overall theory, I 
added an additional step: I created a very short summary of my substantive 
theory and e-mailed it to some participants, requesting their comments. My 
e-mail message is shown in Appendix L on p. 351. I limited the sample to 
those participants I had contacted directly and whose contact details I still 
had, both for convenience and because I wanted to minimise disruption to 
participants at what was for them a very busy time of year. I e-mailed 13 
participants and received four responses. Although this is a small number of 
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responses, they represented auditors from two different firms (B and C), one 
who had left and two still working as auditors, and one client, therefore 
provided a good representation of my overall sample.  
In constructing the e-mail I was mindful of how busy the participants were. 
During the data collection phase, which I had planned to coincide with the 
auditors’ least busy period, participants had generally been willing to meet 
me but less enthusiastic about spending any more time on my project, for 
example, not having time to read either the ethics forms or my transcriptions. 
I therefore worked on making the summary of my theory as concise and easy 
to read as possible, avoiding any academic language or references. The 
finished version was four paragraphs in length, which fitted into the text of an 
e-mail, so that recipients did not need to open an attachment. 
The four respondents indicated broad agreement with my theory, providing 
effective additional corroboration to the member checking undertaken during 
the interviews. Two provided detailed additional comments, which I used to 
consider and challenge my interpretation of my findings. One auditor 
commented that PSAA has a significant role in audit quality, that PSAA 
ratings are treated just as seriously as FRC and that the FRC is employed on 
behalf of the PSAA. This suggests that the public sector, in the form of the 
PSAA, might have more influence than I have suggested in my e-mail 
5.3summary. I have addressed this in Section 5.7.6. The second respondent, 
a former auditor, commented that in their view the client service is poor 
(though they agreed that there is more client focus) and that it is unclear 
what risks are being addressed. Client service is discussed at Section 4.3.1 
and focuses on the auditor’s viewpoint, therefore this opinion is not 
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inconsistent. Risk and secondary risk management (Power, 2004) are 
discussed in Section 5.5, and the participant’s comments corroborate my 
theory that risk has been recalibrated, so that it now has a different meaning.  
3.16 Linking to literature 
From the start of the study and initial non-committal literature review 
(Urquhart, 2013; Urquhart & Fernández, 2013) I had an awareness of 
academic research in the areas of audit and public sector, and then, later, in 
New Public Management, but I had no pre-ordained theoretical orientation or 
conceptual framework (Charmaz, 2014). As the theoretical categories and 
framework developed and began to stabilise, I read more academic 
literature, and started to integrate ideas from existing literature with my own 
grounded theory (Locke, 2001). This was an iterative process and involved 
rewriting the literature review (Chapter 2) alongside the final development of 
the theory. The findings chapters of the thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) refer to 
literature where it is helpful in explicating the findings. 
During the later phase of developing the grounded theory by working on the 
relationships between codes and comparing with existing literature, I decided 
that Bourdieu’s concepts of field, capital, habitus, hysteresis, doxa, illusio 
and especially symbolic violence (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Grenfell, 
2014) would help in understanding and interpreting the changes in public 
sector audit. These concepts are discussed in the literature review (Section 
2.7) and they compose the formal theory I use to reflect on and interpret my 
substantive theory (Chapter 7). 
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Thus the Bourdieusian concepts discussed in this thesis are not part of a 
Bourdieusian field analysis of the research. Rather, they are used to help 
interpret and understand a story that has been developed through a 
grounded theory methodology (Charmaz, 2014), and to translate it into a 
theoretically informed theory that links to existing literature.  
3.17 Quality criteria 
Standard criteria for judging the quality of traditional, positivist research are 
not appropriate to research undertaken from a constructivist perspective 
(Malsch & Salterio, 2016; Power & Gendron, 2015; Tracy, 2010). Tracy 
(2010) sets out eight helpful criteria that can be applied across paradigms. 
Malsch and Salterio (2016) suggest five questions specifically for assessing 
qualitative audit research from an interpretivist perspective. Table 26 in 
Appendix M on p. 353 interprets Malsch and Salterio’s questions with the 
help of Tracy’s criteria, and links to specific parts of the thesis to demonstrate 
how quality is evidenced in my research. 
3.18 Limitations of the research 
This section sets out the limitations of the research and how I have sought to 
mitigate them. 
As with most research, time constraints limited the number of participants 
that could be interviewed. This was mitigated by several factors. First, the 
participants were very experienced in the research area and represented a 
broad range of perspectives (Section 3.7 and Appendix E). Second, 
participants were willing to spend time discussing and reflecting on their 
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experience. Most of my interviews were around an hour long, therefore 
yielded a very substantial volume of relevant data. Third, the research 
methodology, grounded theory, mobilises the data in such a way as to 
ensure that research continues until robust and complete theoretical 
categories are created. Fourth, from a constructivist perspective, achieving 
resonance is more important than using a representative sample. By 
following grounded theory procedures to stay close to the data (Charmaz, 
2014; Corley, 2015) and incorporating ‘member reflections’ (Tracy, 2010) into 
later interviews, I have been able to increase the resonance of my analysis. 
(Section 3.17 discusses quality criteria in relation to constructivist / 
interpretivist research.)  
Nevertheless, gathering additional data from slightly different perspectives 
could have achieved further ‘crystallisation’ (Tracy’s (2010) alternative to the 
more positivist word ‘triangulation’). My research concentrated mostly on the 
perspectives of auditors, with some consideration of the views of clients. This 
was a deliberate strategy to maximise my understanding of the detail of the 
auditors’ actions in relation to the change in their work environment. Further 
research could use more varied data sources to explore perspectives of 
other stakeholders, for example, audit committees, the Financial Reporting 
Council, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance Accountants (CIPFA), and 
the National Audit Office. It would also be interesting to compare to systems 
in other countries, especially Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The findings of the research were dependent on which individuals 
participated in the study, and I recognise that involving different individual 
participants could have yielded different results. This is an inherent feature of 
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qualitative research. The selection of participants was dependent both on me 
selecting and making contact with individuals, and on those individuals 
consenting to take part. My sample includes more participants from two of 
the four audit firms that took on public sector contracts than on the other two. 
However, I used the grounded theory strategy of theoretical sampling 
(Section 3.7.2) to ensure that I reached a sufficient level of theoretical 
robustness, and member reflections (Section 3.15) to invite collaboration and 
enhance resonance. 
A further limitation was the time lag of between three and four years between 
auditors transferring to the private firms and my interviews with them. Some 
interviewees claimed to have forgotten the Audit Commission way of doing 
things and this did hinder some of the detailed comparisons between audit 
techniques. This was mitigated by my own Audit Commission knowledge, 
which, although also four years in the past, was not muddied by having 
subsequently learnt a different audit methodology. (Section 3.6.2 provides an 
example of how I used my own knowledge to construct a better 
understanding of the contrast between Audit Commission and firm 
methodologies.) It also allowed chance for auditors to have fully experienced, 
understood and reflected on the changes (Gendron & Spira, 2010). 
3.19 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I have set out my constructivist (Charmaz, 2014; Power & 
Gendron, 2015) philosophical approach to the research: meanings are 
subjective and socially constructed, depth in research is important, and the 
researcher plays a role in constructing the research. I have defined my 
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research question and explained how it evolved over time, and explained 
how I have employed constructivist grounded theory methodology and 
intensive interviews (Charmaz, 2014) to gather and analyse rich data in order 
to create a substantive grounded theory that addresses the research 
question. I have also reflected on my own position in relation to the research. 
This chapter has set out how I have analysed the data arising from my 
research interviews, using Charmaz’s (2014) interpretation of grounded 
theory procedures and techniques. I provided detailed examples of how I 
used initial coding to generate codes, and more analytical focused coding to 
refine them. I then described how I theorised from this point, using theoretical 
coding, constant comparison, memo writing and diagramming to construct a 
single core category with concepts related to other concepts and codes. 
Section 3.17 addressed the quality of the research, and demonstrated how 
my research meets qualitative quality criteria. Some limitations remain and 
these were discussed in Section 3.18. 
The thesis now goes on to present the detailed findings of the research. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 each present one of the sub-categories developed, 
which are brought together in Chapter 7 as a substantive grounded theory.  
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4 Commercialising public sector audit 
4.1 Introduction 
This is this first of three chapters setting out the detailed findings of my 
research which together form the substantive theory discussed in Chapter 7. 
It addresses the commercialisation of public sector audit, and how the audit 
has changed as a result.  
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 4.2 starts by showing how I 
created the sub-category Commercialising public sector audit from my data, 
and introducing the main concepts within this sub-category. The subsequent 
sections discuss each of these concepts in more detail. Presenting an image 
(Section 4.3) and Doing just enough (Section 4.4) emerged as major 
strategies firms employ to achieve their commercial aims of winning work, 
managing risk and being efficient, in order to make a profit. Subordinating 
public sector concerns (Section 4.6) is a consequence of prioritising 
commercial considerations. The chapter proceeds by discussing the codes 
identified through data analysis that contribute to the Commercialising sub-
category, and which help to describe and explain what auditors do in their 
everyday jobs when they are auditing. 
The phenomenon of working longer hours is discussed in Section 4.5. I 
regard this as an efficiency strategy and a way to achieve ‘just enough’ audit 
work, but it could also be considered as a consequence of prioritising 
commercial concerns over the principle of fairness. 
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4.2 Constructing the sub-category 
‘Commercialising’ is a sub-category of the main category ‘Reconstructing 
public sector audit’ (Chapter 7). By ‘Commercialising’, I mean prioritising 
commercial concerns such as making a profit, managing risk, and winning 
work, over other concerns such as protecting the public interest and serving 
the taxpayer.  
I created the code ‘Being commercial’ (which I later altered to 
‘Commercialising’) from my interview with Guy at Firm A, who used the 
phrase ‘commercial reality’ repeatedly; for example, when discussing the 
firm’s advisory offering: “that’s a commercial reality”. This phraseology was 
echoed by Paul at Firm D with reference to the expectation of winning new 
work: “that’s just the commercial reality of what you’re doing”. Dean at Firm B 
also uses the word ‘commercial’ when he talks about the pressure to work 
more efficiently, for example by using more junior staff: “the firm are trying to 
obviously move us in a bit more of a commercial direction”.  
I organised the codes relating to Commercialising into commercial aims, 
identified through data analysis as the driving forces behind what auditors 
do, and commercial strategies to achieve those aims. These are 
summarised in Figure 9 overleaf. I identified the focused codes Presenting 
an image and Doing just enough as the major strategies the firms use to 
achieve their commercial aims. These occur frequently in the data, and help 
to describe and explain what auditors do in their everyday jobs when they 
are auditing. I regarded the focused code Subordinating public sector 
concerns as a consequence of Doing just enough, rather than as a strategy. 
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Figure 9 Aspects of Commercialising
Commercialising
Competing for 
work
Offering a low 
cost service
Being 
customer 
focused
Selling
Managing risk
Getting audit 
assurance
Being clear
Being 
auditable
Being efficient
Reducing 
audit work
Weakening 
the skill mix
Working 
longer hours
Presenting an 
image
Doing just 
enough 
Subordinating 
public sector 
concerns 
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I explored these ideas through theoretical sampling. I added questions to my 
interviews (Appendix D) to probe into areas such as whether and how 
staffing profiles had changed through recruitment, leavers and promotions, 
whether auditors felt there was a focus on efficiency and how this 
manifested, how they regarded audit quality reviews, and whether they felt 
that public sector expertise was valued. This enabled me to develop my 
emerging codes and categories further by adding detail to them.  
4.3 Presenting an image 
Auditors aim to present an image of quality and competence, in order to 
retain existing audits, win new audits, and sell non-audit services to clients 
and non-clients. Image has particular significance for an audit firm, because 
of the opacity of audit quality (Section 2.5.2). It is difficult for an external 
observer to assess whether auditors have delivered a good service. Auditors 
therefore invest time and effort in proxies, like branding, that could be 
interpreted as indicators of high quality (Herrbach, 2005). Issues around 
networking, showcasing services and general brand promotion arose during 
my interviews, and would provide interesting material for further study. In this 
thesis, I focus on the ways in which individual auditors present an image to 
their clients (Section 4.3.1) and to reviewers (Section 4.3.2) as they do their 
audit work. 
4.3.1 Presenting an image to the client 
This section discusses four aspects of how auditors present an image to their 
clients: by focusing on client service rather than public service (Section 
4.3.1.1); being seen to add value (Section 4.3.1.2); targeting the decision 
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makers (Section 4.3.1.3); and maintaining appearances through careful 
censoring of messages (Section 4.3.1.4).  
4.3.1.1 Client service versus public service 
The Audit Commission regarded the public in general as its customer, as 
advertised very publically through its tag line ‘Protecting the Public Purse’. 
  
(Audit Commission, 2014) 
Since the removal of the Audit Commission as an appointing body, firms now 
have a more direct relationship with their audit clients, and customer care 
has become more important, in order to preserve a firm’s image, to retain 
clients and to win new clients and consultancy work. 
it’s not like you can - just do your basic audit work … I’ve got to come 
in here and make this work … make sure we keep our current clients 
happy rather than serving the audit just itself (Christina, Firm B) 
Christina links her efforts to “keep our current clients happy” with the 
commercial success of the business. This underlines the relationship 
between presenting an image to the client and meeting the firms’ commercial 
objectives (Figure 9). The words “make this work” show that Christina views 
client satisfaction as essential. She contrasts this commercial perspective 
with the alternative of “serving the audit just itself”, a narrower view of the 
auditor’s job, which focuses more on technical aspects of the audit. This 
resonates with literature documenting the increasing weight granted to social 
skills over technical skills in audit firms (Carter & Spence, 2014; Hanlon, 
1994; Robson, Humphrey, Khalifa, & Jones, 2007; Spence & Carter, 2014). 
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The quotes in Table 14 illustrate the importance of customer service across 
all four firms. 
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Table 14 Auditor and client views on customer service 
 
Firm A the client’s view is really important to us and we do a lot of client 
satisfaction reviews, we do client care panels as well for our – what 
we would see as our key account clients, our big clients.  So for 
example [county council], because of the size of the audit fee, is one 
of our top 50 audit fee earners ... So to give you an example, I had a 
managing partner down here with a team of people interviewing the 
chief exec and [Finance Director] here. (Guy) 
 
Firm B I know that [council] audit committee for example, there's a few 
councillors on there that are very funny about glossy reports, so they 
don't like anything that looks too private sector, so we send very plain 
reports to [that council] because, you know, [they think] it's a waste of 
money if you send glossy reports. (Natalie) 
I think it’s recognising what they need, you know, they don’t want 
necessarily an auditor sitting in their room in their building. If they do, 
we still try to give them that, but if they don’t then we’ll leave them 
alone for most of the year and come round for, you know, four weeks 
and get in and out. I think we’re a lot more flexible about that now. 
Being responsive to what they want. (Christina) 
 
Firm C I think the actual client relationships are one of the key parts of the 
whole process (Tracey) 
now you’ve got a slightly – another focus – that you want to do a 
good piece of work, you want to meet the deadlines, but you actually 
want to keep the client happy as well. (Derek) 
I suppose you are more aware of the kind of client satisfaction 
surveys and obviously retendering, so that is always at the back of 
your mind. (Matilda) 
 
Firm D the client is king (Alison) 
The Audit Commission was: we're here to do a job. We're a public-
sector auditor. We are a regulator. We are doing this to you. Whereas 
what Firm D does is: we do this to you and it's a process that you've 
got to go through but we'll try and make it as pleasant as possible for 
you. (Paul) 
I think I was probably more helpful to the client, in fairness, at Firm D, 
because you have your eye on getting extra work from them (Jerry) 
 
Client last year, when [exceptional circumstances interfered with the 
accounts production process], they were incredibly accommodating 
… if the Audit Commission said jump, really you ought to be jumping, 
whereas I think with [firms] it’s more – we want to keep you happy. … 
I do think they’re better at customer service, I do. (Lucy) 
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These quotes demonstrate an increased client focus at all four firms. The 
quotes from Natalie, Christina, Alison, Paul and Derek show auditors 
consciously being responsive to the client, flexible to their wishes, and 
“making it as pleasant as possible” for them. Lucy’s quote demonstrates that 
this responsiveness and improved “customer service” is evident from the 
client’s perspective. Guy, Matilda and Jerry’s quotes illustrate the increased 
pressure on auditors to deliver a high level of client service, through client 
satisfaction monitoring (Guy and Matilda) and the drive to win work (Matilda 
and Jerry). 
The view of the client as a customer has become more prevalent and more 
pervasive as the profession has become more commercialised, as noted by 
several researchers (Anderson-Gough et al., 2001; Carcello, 2005; Carter & 
Spence, 2014; Hanlon, 1994; Herrbach, 2005) and especially Anderson-
Gough et al. (2000). This pervasive importance of the customer is entirely 
consistent with neoliberal ideology (Sikka, 2008a). 
Striving for good client relationships is not a purely private sector 
phenomenon. A number of auditors were keen to stress that they had always 
worked hard to maintain good client relationships. For example, Gary (Firm 
A) said “the Audit Commission auditors weren’t immune from wanting to 
please their clients and I don’t think there is an ethical difference between the 
two.” However, Table 14 demonstrates a clear and conscious shift in the 
extent of auditors’ customer focus. There is also some evidence of a more 
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strategic attitude towards customer service in Guy’s description of “client 
care panels” and in the following quote from Firm C.  
We’ve started to look maybe more formally looking at client 
relationship management.  In the past it just happened and it worked, 
whereas now it’s – ok, are we really speaking to the right people, got 
the right relationships? - Which obviously in a more business type 
environment, where you’re going to be tendering for work, it becomes 
more important to monitor that side and make sure you’ve got the right 
strategy in place. (Derek, Firm C) 
Even with most councils taking up the option of having their auditor 
appointed for them by Public Sector Audit Appointments (PSAA), auditors are 
very mindful of keeping their clients happy.  PSAA collect customer 
satisfaction information and compile scores for each firm, which auditors 
believe are likely to be taken into account in their appointment process. One 
client and former auditor explained: 
rather than being worried about - what does Des think about me? - 
they'll be worried about - what does PSAA think about me? And, you 
know, if my client satisfaction questionnaires have a lower score than 
everybody else's when they go back to PSAA, will that mean that my 
firm  gets ranked bottom, and does that mean that we'll get kicked out 
of the contracts or get less work next time around? (Des, client) 
Thus, even where an auditor is independently appointed, client satisfaction is 
more important than it was under the Audit Commission regime. 
4.3.1.2 Adding value 
Auditors sometimes undertake additional work beyond what is necessary to 
arrive the audit opinion, with the aim of presenting an image to the client of 
an enhanced service, or ‘added value’. Client workshops and high profile 
‘thought piece’ publications (e.g. Audit Commission, 2009; Ernst & Young, 
2016; Grant Thornton, 2017) are examples of work that was undertaken by 
the Audit Commission and the firms continue to offer, even though they are 
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not necessary to support the audit opinion. These types of activities are 
much more visible than the routine audit work, where clients are unlikely to 
be able to assess the level of audit quality (Section 2.5.2).  
The following quote shows that audit firms invest significant effort into this 
type of ‘added value’ activity in order to promote their image.  
we want to be auditor of choice and … we drive that agenda through 
our thought leadership stuff, and this is where we’re giving collateral 
back for free, and workshops that we do, free workshops, all sorts of 
stuff that we still do for free, and we see that as our – you know – way 
of giving back to clients (Guy, Firm A) 
Although Guy talks about “giving back”, and there may be an altruistic 
element to his motivation, he also mentions wanting to be the “auditor of 
choice”. In providing free workshops and generating research reports, Firm A 
is presenting itself both as an expert in the sector and as an organisation that 
has a broader interest than in just making a profit.  
Clients certainly have an awareness of the extra services provided by 
auditors. 
they all [audit firms] deliver services above and beyond - it is part of 
the tender, admittedly, but they all deliver services above and beyond 
what you might call the routine audit work (John, client) 
in the context of what is a very small audit fee, for a foundation trust - 
they are still keen to try and make sure that they are perceived to 
have added value (Des, client) 
Here, the clients’ perception is that the provision of extra services is the norm 
– provided by all the firms (John) and even in relation to small audits (Des). 
The following quote from an audit manager shows that the perception of 
adding value is exactly what the auditors are trying to achieve, as suggested 
by Des. 
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It's the perception of added value, so it's promoting what we do.  So - 
partner involvement, attendance at audit committees, the workshops 
are free – so, those sorts of things. It's being aware of what we can 
say is added value, rather than giving services for free. (Natalie, Firm 
B) 
Natalie is clear that there is an intention that clients should notice the “added 
value” they are getting from their auditors. She also shows how the auditors 
consciously consider their activities as either contributing to the audit opinion 
or added value. Clearly some attendance at audit committees and partner 
involvement would be expected as part of the core audit service, but these 
are both examples of activities that could be reduced in order to cut costs, for 
example, by attending only some audit committees, and by a manager or 
senior manager (rather than a partner) being responsible for most of the 
audit review work. Furthermore, Natalie’s examples include relatively low 
investment activities (attending an audit committee) as well as those that 
require significant input of resources (workshops). The common factor is that 
all “added value” is noticeable by the client. 
A further example of generating ‘added value’ from a limited amount of 
additional resource comes from Firm C.  
We’ve started to look at ways in which we can report back interesting 
things coming from the analytics. (Derek, Firm C) 
Derek’s comment on reporting “interesting things” indicates a motivation for 
pleasing the client by creating reports that they would like to read. It also 
suggests a contrast to the statutory audit reports, which, by implication, are 
less interesting. That the “interesting things” are “coming from the analytics” 
attests to Firm C strategising to maximise the impact of what they already do, 
rather than (or possibly as well as) making significant additional investments.  
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4.3.1.3 Keeping up appearances 
There is some evidence of auditors being advised to be more careful in what 
they say, in order to protect the firm’s image. For example, Dean (Firm B) 
reported being asked not to mention that he lives a significant distance from 
his client, and Matilda (Firm C) spoke of an instance where the firm was 
reluctant to take the blame for delayed audit work:    
they obviously knew that we had staffing issues. And I did say to them 
that we have had staffing issues.  But from the directors' point of view, 
and the partner's point of view, they weren't happy with us saying it's 
resourcing. (Matilda, Firm C) 
In both instances, the auditor has inclined towards an open and honest 
dialogue with the client, but been checked by the firm. Firms are aiming to 
maintain a favourable image with their clients, and too much transparency 
might jeopardise that image. 
4.3.1.4 Targeting the decision makers 
Firms are particularly keen to present an image of quality and competence to 
the decision makers at their clients and potential clients. The primary 
decision makers, i.e. those who are influential in appointing auditors and 
commissioning extra work, are the audit committee and executive board. The 
examples of ‘added value’ provided by firms (Section 4.3.1.2) provide 
evidence of this targeting; for example, partner attendance at audit 
committees is most likely to be noticed by members of the audit committee, 
rather than finance officers contributing to the accounts preparation. Lower 
down the hierarchy, finance officers often have more contact with the 
auditors but less power in influencing the choice of auditors, and are 
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therefore a less important target in terms of making a good impression. This 
point is illustrated by Dean. 
It doesn't matter how well you get on with the accounts team and the 
people who are producing the accounts. The decision makers, in 
terms of appointing auditors, are not those people. (Dean, Firm B) 
Dean expresses frustration that providing what he sees as a good client 
service at officer level does not necessarily help towards winning contracts. 
This also works conversely; a relatively poor service at officer level does not 
necessarily deter clients from reappointing an auditor.  
The increased use of trainees to resource audits, higher staff turnover and 
use of more generalist staff (Section 4.4.5), has led some auditors to worry 
about inexperienced auditors giving a poor impression of their firm. For 
example, Lucy (Firm C) talked about the difficulty of maintaining a good 
impression whilst using generalist staff, sometimes from different countries. 
there were undoubtedly some embarrassing conversations between 
them and the client, where you hadn’t anticipated a question like – 
what is the HRA3 then?  …  Or, I don’t know, what is council housing 
then?  You know, or something like that.  Because you haven’t 
anticipated the question … And it’s quite a worry, as an audit manager, 
because you don’t want to send someone off to deal with the director 
of finance who’s going to give that impression. (Lucy, Firm C) 
But inexperienced auditors do not often come into contact with the staff that 
make decisions about which auditor to appoint. Similarly, if auditors 
undertake less testing than previously, this is more likely to be noticed by 
                                            
3 The Housing Revenue Account (HRA) is a ring-fenced account for income and expenditure 
relating to council (public) housing. 
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officers than audit committees. It is more effective for audit firms to 
concentrate their efforts at board and audit committee level. 
4.3.1.5 Summary: presenting an image to clients 
This section has shown how auditors have aimed to present a favourable 
image to their clients, by prioritising customer service aspects of their work 
and the visibility of their activities, especially to board level decision makers.  
4.3.2 Presenting an image to reviewers and regulators 
Perceived audit quality has been shown to be a major factor in client 
satisfaction (Cameran, Moizer, & Pettinicchio, 2010) and in defending audit 
work against disciplinary action (Carrington, 2010). Since clients are not able 
to assess audit quality directly (Section 2.5.2), they must use other means to 
present themselves as high quality audit suppliers. This section discusses 
the import auditors place on the FRC’s regulatory reviews, and the efforts 
they make to present an image of quality and competence to reviewers and 
regulators. 
4.3.2.1 The importance of Audit Quality Reviews 
PSAA commissions the FRC's Audit Quality Review Team (AQRT) to review 
a sample of audit files of public sector organisations annually for each firm, 
and uses these to compile a published report on the audit quality of each 
firm. These reviews take on a particular importance in the absence of a direct 
measure of audit quality (Section 2.5.2). Passing an AQR (Audit Quality 
Review) is a good indication that an audit opinion would be defensible in the 
event of legal challenge. Furthermore, it is independent and publically 
available evidence of the quality of a firm’s work. 
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The quotes in Table 15 illustrate the perceived importance of AQR. 
Table 15 Example comments about the importance of AQR 
 
Firm A It’s extremely important, because those scores factor in to you know 
nationally produced reports to say – this is how Firm A are on quality. 
(Ashleigh) 
we’re benchmarked as you know against our peers, as other audit 
suppliers, so yeah, it’s important to us (Guy) 
Firm B I think it’s massively important (Mark) 
 
the quality monitoring with the green and the amber, it’s a very big thing 
for us (Christina) 
 
[the partner]’s very fixated on us being green all across the board (Dean) 
 
Firm C the AQRT scores are published, aren’t they, and I think all the firms kind 
of see where they are against each other – so that’s something that is 
very strongly stressed to us in our quality training. (Tracey) 
 
AQRT is very important (Patrick) 
 
Firm D It's the only tangible thing that you can actually point to that you can use 
a differentiator between yourselves and other firms. (Paul) 
 
 
These quotes demonstrate a consensus that AQRs have a very high profile 
across all four firms, consistent with research in relation to the AQRT’s 
predecessor, the Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) (Beattie, Fearnley, & Hines, 
2011).  
A common reason given for why AQR is so important is that the scores are 
published, and can be used as a comparison against their peers. Therefore 
these scores form an essential part of the firm’s image (Tracey, Paul and 
Guy in Table 15 above). Some auditors feel that the competition between the 
firms has intensified the importance of AQR. 
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It’s probably more serious because we’re judged against other firms 
… they’re going to be looking at scores for Firm A nationally in terms 
of how they’re going to choose their auditor. (Ashleigh, Firm A) 
In Ashleigh’s view, AQR scores are more important in the new regime 
because they contribute towards a client’s decision making, which therefore 
affects how much work each firm can sell. This view is not universal. Some 
auditors view the AQRs as being of the same level of significance in the firms 
as they were in the Audit Commission.  
I don’t see any difference of the import of the FRC … I think they’re 
taken seriously. (Alison, Firm D) 
Alison is an example of a number of auditors whose view was that quality 
reviews were very important both under the Audit Commission regime and at 
the firms, and who did not describe a change related to competition. My data 
provides two significant insights into this viewpoint. 
I can still remember those awkward conversations, you know, when 
our sort of geographical based teams - and you know if we didn’t 
perform we were still getting a bit of heat. (Guy, Firm A)   
First, Guy mentions the former Audit Commission practice of talking openly 
about how the different regions had performed in quality reviews. This policy 
of openness within the Audit Commission acted as a surrogate for publishing 
data and comparing the regions against each other simulated competition. 
Guy’s statement indicates that, for him, this practice was sufficient for the 
reviews to seem high profile; the conversations felt “awkward” and poor 
performance resulted in “getting a bit of heat”. 
A second, alternative stance is that audit quality reviews are an important 
reflection on an individual’s work, irrespective of how this is reported. 
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I don’t want anyone coming along and saying – not even an internal 
review – coming along and saying – you didn’t do this properly – 
because that, to me, is evidence that I’m not doing my job very well. 
(Graham, Firm B)  
From this viewpoint, the auditor is concerned about the judgement on 
whether he is doing a good job, irrespective of the reporting or publishing 
mechanism. 
In summary, there is a consensus that AQR scores are extremely important, 
and some auditors regard them as having higher significance than under the 
previous regime. 
4.3.2.2 Incentivising good performance in quality reviews 
There is further evidence of the weight audit firms attach to AQR scores in 
the links firms have created between audit quality scores and progression 
and reward.  
Your quality scores are going to … form part of any assessment that 
you have if you look to progress.  Quality scores are clearly coming 
more into annual appraisals.  And therefore into bonus considerations. 
(Patrick, Firm C) 
Consequently, individuals as well as firms have strong incentives to succeed 
in the reviews. The quality element of performance appraisal applies to all 
grades, including trainees. 
The quality metric that you've got in terms of quality goes right down 
to all trainees so it is right through the whole grade. (Paul, Firm D) 
Thus the importance of quality pervades the whole of the firms’ staff, and 
trainees are taught that this is important. A number of auditors linked AQR 
performance with career progression.  
If you get a very good quality rating, that will obviously support your 
business case for promotion (Tracey, Firm C) 
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I've never had it confirmed but if you fail an AQR review, then you'll 
never be a partner of the firm. (Paul, Firm D) 
 if you failed, internally, it might have an enormous impact on your 
career (Mark, Firm B) 
Beattie et al. (2015) similarly find adverse regulatory reports to be considered 
career damaging.  
Many auditors agreed that they are conscious of a potential regulator review 
when they are documenting their work. 
every time you do something now, you think about - but how is an 
external reviewer going to view this? (Dean, Firm B) 
when you’re completing your assignments, you know that it might get 
picked for AQR. (Mark, Firm B)   
This ongoing consciousness of possible quality reviews pervades the 
auditors’ work and leads to auditors expending effort in making their audit 
files auditable, constructing audit quality around what they believe the FRC is 
looking for (Power, 1997, 2003, 2004). 
4.3.2.3 Clarity, documentation and making audits auditable 
Clarity is a recurring theme in interviews with auditors.  There are two 
reasons for clarity in documentation: first, the auditors themselves need to be 
clear that what they have done is enough to support their audit opinion, and 
second, the audit file needs to demonstrate to an external reviewer such as 
AQR or a court that sufficient work has been done. Thus, documentation is 
very important. 
most of it, although you look at it in different ways, boils down to 
documentation.  If it’s not written down, it hasn’t been done. (Patrick, 
Firm C) 
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Patrick’s stance is defensive; clear documentation is required in order to 
substantiate that the work has been done. Increased clarity in documenting 
what work has been done and why, and how this links to the identified risks, 
is an important factor in being auditable, which is a strategy firms use in 
managing risk (Power, 1997, 2003, 2004).  
Other auditors emphasised that clear documentation helps the auditor to 
glean more comfort from the work done.  
I think I’m happier that what we do gives the right assurance over the 
right areas. Because I think you can follow it a lot more clearly on the 
files as to what you’ve done and why. (Christina, Firm B)  
Christina’s statement that she feels “happier” indicates that clarity helps her 
to take comfort from the work done. Increasing comfort (Pentland, 1993) and 
decreasing anxiety (Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, et al., 2014) have been shown 
to be significant factors for auditors in determining when they have done 
enough work. (See also section 4.4.2.2) The link between clarity and comfort 
is evident across multiple interviews.  
Clarity also helps reviewers to be able to follow an audit file more easily, and, 
crucially, to give it a good quality score.  Derek (Firm C) sees this as a key 
difference between the old and new audit files.  
I think it’s a lot easier to demonstrate the quality we’ve put into the 
files. (Derek, Firm C)    
Derek’s statement does not make any claims or judgements about the quality 
of work undertaken, but suggests that audit quality is better demonstrated 
under the new system. Christina (Firm B) contrasts this with what she 
perceives as the previous practice of keeping auditing until there is a 
sufficient volume of work on file. 
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If I were a partner … I’d feel a lot more comfortable that I could follow 
through what we’ve done on a file and why and that it then led to me 
being able to sign that piece of paper to say it's a true and fair opinion. 
Rather than saying - there’s an awful lot of work there, it must be okay. 
(Christina, Firm B) 
Christina’s depiction of the change: the current practice, where less work is 
done with more clarity, contrasting starkly with to the Audit Commission’s 
custom of producing more work with less clarity, may be a caricature. 
However it provides a helpful illustration of the link between clarity and 
comfort in the audit opinion, and suggests that this is more important than 
the link between volume of work and comfort. The reduced volume of audit 
work is discussed further in Section 4.4.4 and Chapter 5.  
Some auditors expressed concern that the increased demand for 
documentation reduces the time they have for auditing. 
A lot of what we do on an audit file is to demonstrate we've been 
through … a thought process, and to cover ourselves if we're 
challenged - rather than doing what we probably should be doing. 
Because we know we're going to get an external review that says - 
you haven't applied this line of IAS 16 … and so it is a lot more about 
covering your back, and justifying why you've not done something or 
you have done something. (Dean, Firm B) 
The allegation here is that the increasing focus on auditors demonstrating 
what they have done, and justifying their work, detracts from the time 
available to do “what we probably should be doing”. Using Downer’s (2011) 
analogy of the ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ of the audit, auditors have less 
time for the ‘back stage’ work to make themselves comfortable with the 
financial statements (Downer, 2011; Pentland, 1993) because of the 
increased time they must spend on the ‘front stage’ work to satisfy 
regulators. The increased emphasis on auditability links to Power’s (2004) 
idea of secondary risk management. Turley et al. (2016, p. 7) make the 
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related point that “the dominance of a mind-set focused on regulatory 
compliance is detracting from the development of other important 
judgemental skills”, exacerbating the problem. 
4.4 Doing just enough 
This section discusses how auditors balance their commercial objectives of 
presenting an image, managing risk and being efficient through the strategy 
of doing just enough work (Figure 9). 
Section 4.4.1 discusses the pressures, especially on fees, which have led to 
reduced audit budgets, and the various strategies firms have employed to 
cope with the reduced budgets. Section 4.4.2 considers the opposing 
pressure to do enough work to manage the risk of issuing an unsafe audit 
opinion, and to satisfy the regulator. The tensions between these factors are 
shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 10 Just enough audit work 
 
Just 
enough 
Risks not 
meeting 
FRC criteria 
Risks unsafe 
audit opinion 
Inefficient 
Increased 
likelihood of 
finding small 
errors 
More scope for 
FRC to find 
problems 
 Not enough Too much 
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Sections 4.4.3 discusses auditors’ strategies for meeting the challenge of 
doing enough work within the reduced budget: reducing the amount of audit 
work done to ‘just enough’ (Section 4.4.4), and reducing the skill mix 
employed on audits to ‘just enough’ (Section 4.4.5). 
Working longer hours is a further strategy auditors use to do enough work 
within the shorter time provided. This is addressed in Section 4.5.  
4.4.1 Pressures to do less work 
The most obvious pressure to do less work is the reduced audit budgets 
(Section 4.4.1.1), arising from the commercial aim to make a profit by bidding 
low enough to win work and by performing that work efficiently (Figure 9 in 
Section 4.2). However, my data also highlights risk management reasons for 
doing less work (Figure 10 above). Section 4.4.1.2 explains how minimising 
audit working papers can reduce the risk of the regulator finding problems. 
4.4.1.1 Working to reduced audit budgets 
There has been a substantial decrease in UK public sector audit fees since 
2010 (Baylis & Greenwood, 2016). This is partly due to the abolition of the 
Audit Commission and some of its central functions and projects, and partly 
because the auditor’s remit has changed significantly to focus much more 
narrowly on the core financial statements (Section 1.2.3.3). A further reason 
is the introduction of competition. Auditors consider price to be an important 
factor in winning work, leading to pressure on audit budgets in order to offer 
a low cost service.  
Most auditors agree that the time available for auditors to do their work has 
significantly reduced (Table 16).  
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Table 16 Example comments about reduced audit budgets 
Firm A the budgets for the audit are half what they used to be 
Firm B We spend less time on the audits. 
Budgets have tended to come down 
it used to be something like a 400 day audit.  We did it this year for 
about 200 days. 
Firm C We needed to make a 20% saving in hours. 
there's no slack, with such significant cuts in audit fee budgets 
it has to be more streamlined because the fee is significantly 
reduced 
I had something like 800-odd hours on one of my audits … and 
they’ve done this analysis to say that your typical audit, you should 
be like 700 hours.  So now they’re saying you’ve got to go away, 
revisit your profile of staffing to get down to 700 hours. 
the year before I think we'd had four weeks of three of us doing it, 
and that year … it was just me and the team leader … and I think 
we had three weeks. 
Firm D overall the number of days expected for the audit to take was much 
lower. 
I reckon we probably do the audits in probably 40% of what we 
previously did at the Audit Commission. 
it was done on such a shoestring budget 
 
While the figures and the viewpoints vary between auditors and across firms, 
these quotes show a common perception that the time available to do audit 
work has significantly reduced. The following sections discuss the auditors’ 
responses to the reducing budgets. 
4.4.1.2 Minimising risk by minimising working papers 
Going beyond the minimum requirements can be perceived as more risky 
than adhering closely to the necessary steps, as one former auditor explains. 
The more you write, the more [the reviewer] can read and go – well, 
how did we conclude on that?  Or, that looks to be unfinished.  … 
You’re giving more ammunition to … a [quality control] reviewer, to 
say – hold on a minute, there’s an issue here that you’ve missed.  … If 
all you put on the file is all you need to demonstrate that you’ve 
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covered off the risks that you identified in your initial planning 
memorandum, as long as you’ve done that right, you’re safe.  
Because no … reviewer can come in and see what isn’t there.  They 
can only criticise and comment on what is there.  And as long as 
what’s there meets your initial risk assessment, job done – you’re 
safe. (Client and former auditor)  
From this perspective, doing the minimum required to meet the standard is 
not only the most efficient but also the least risky way to complete the audit. 
This view is endorsed by an audit manager.  
Firm D was very much - and I think Firm B are the same as Firm D 
really - don't put anything on the file that isn't needed.  But I think 
that's right.  You don't need - you know, if something's not adding to 
the work you've done, as long as you can say and somebody can 
reperform the work, that's fine. (Auditor who has worked at both Firm 
B and Firm D)  
Thus, the combined imperatives of efficiency and risk management lead to 
the audit being pared back to a minimum.  This practice of only doing what 
can be seen to be done, in this case by the FRC’s reviewers, links to Power’s 
(1997, 2000, 2003a) idea of auditable performance measures shaping 
organisational activity. 
4.4.2 Pressures to do enough work 
In considering the pressure on auditors to do enough work, it is necessary to 
consider the question: enough for what, or for whom? I consider here three 
aspects of enough: enough to reach a safe audit opinion (Section 4.4.2.1), 
enough to feel comfortable (Section 4.4.2.2) and enough to satisfy the 
regulator (Section 4.4.2.3). 
4.4.2.1 Enough to reach a safe audit opinion 
Auditors need to do enough work to support the audit opinion, even within 
the reduced time available. 
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risk in the corporate sense for [Firm A] would be (a) they get the 
accounts wrong and (b) it’s in the press and (c) they get sued. And 
that would affect their reputation so they would lose work. Maybe that 
comes back to what I was earlier saying about the perception of risk 
being greater at [Firm A], the worry about getting things wrong at [Firm 
A] because there’s a real potential for real commercial impact if you 
were seen as being a poor performer. (Gary, Firm A) 
For Gary, not doing enough work leads to the primary risk of “getting the 
accounts wrong” but also the secondary risks of reputation and financial loss 
(Power, 2004). Litigation risks to auditors have decreased in recent decades 
(Sikka, 2008a) but, as Gary indicates, “there’s a real potential for real 
commercial impact” if the firm’s reputation is impaired. Power (2004) points 
out that even a minor adverse event or financial loss could be amplified by 
social processes and the media, leading to wider repercussions. Gary goes 
on to articulate the consequent attitude towards giving a correct opinion. 
there would in the firm be a far greater degree of horror if you found 
that the accounts were wrong than was the case in the Audit 
Commission. Sometimes I felt with the Audit Commission if the 
accounts were signed off and subsequently you found that they were 
wrong there was a sort of ‘oh well, never mind’ attitude - it wasn’t quite 
that bad but I think in Firm A if we’d signed off something which 
subsequently got found to be wrong there would be a great gnashing 
of teeth (Gary, Firm A) 
From Gary’s viewpoint, it is critical for firms to do enough work to manage 
the risk of issuing an unsafe opinion.  
Other auditors’ discussion of doing enough work relates less to their firm’s 
reputation and more to achieving a level of personal comfort (Section 
4.4.2.2) or to scoring well in quality reviews (Section 4.4.2.3).  
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4.4.2.2 Enough to feel comfortable 
Some auditors mentioned the need to do enough work to feel personally 
comfortable about it. 
I suppose - internal QCRs we do quite well at, and also AQR we're 
getting reasonable scores in that - so that's the external assurance 
that you're doing a good quality audit, but I think when you look at a 
set of accounts and you look at the work we've done on each of the 
numbers, you feel comfortable with what you've done. (Natalie, Firm 
B) 
I wouldn't be signing something off if I didn't think it was materially 
accurate and safe to be signing off. (Dean, Firm B) 
Both of these comments refer to personal feelings about the audit work. 
Dean is clear that he relies on his personal opinion to decide whether work is 
“safe” to sign off. Natalie’s comment shows that, for her, scoring well in 
quality reviews is not enough on its own – it is also relevant to “feel 
comfortable with what you’ve done”. In addition, in Christina’s quote in 
Section 4.3.2.3 she professes herself to be “happier” with the assurance she 
is collecting. These quotes demonstrate that, at least for some auditors, 
achieving a personal level of comfort in the audit work (Herrbach, 2005; 
Pentland, 1993) is still important. 
4.4.2.3 Enough to satisfy the regulator 
Most auditors also commented that they need to do enough work to satisfy 
the regulator, as discussed in Section 4.3.2.1; regulatory reviews are 
regarded as extremely important. Enough to satisfy the regulator is not 
necessarily the same as enough to feel comfortable, as is evident from 
Natalie’s quote in Section 4.4.2.2 above.    
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4.4.3 Strategies for being efficient  
Auditors mentioned a number of efficiency strategies they use. 
4.4.3.1 Not wasting time 
That auditors should not waste time is uncontentious and a consistent theme 
across all four firms. A few auditors mentioned specific non-work activities 
that had been eliminated, for example, travelling to meetings or training that 
could be held electronically. However, it is clear that such savings are not 
sufficient to meet the new budgets. 
4.4.3.2 Avoiding repetition 
Some auditors mentioned restructuring and sharing audit files to avoid 
repetition. Again these are uncontentious but provide only limited scope for 
efficiency savings. 
4.4.3.3 New audit practices  
Some auditors reported using new audit practices, especially data analytics, 
in an attempt to make the audit more efficient. Tracey (Firm C) is very 
enthusiastic about the scope for working differently using data analytics. 
that's a huge, huge support for your audit as well.  We've got so much 
information to draw on (Tracey, Firm C)  
The use of data analytics and auditors’ enthusiasm towards it is inconsistent 
across my sample. Some auditors are candid that new audit practices do not 
(so far) provide the required savings. 
There still seems to be this idea of IT audit will be the golden bullet 
that will make it more efficient and give us more assurance but that’s 
not been borne out by practice (Christina, Firm B) 
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Literature agrees that the use of data analytics has so far been limited to 
some firms, and its application is not without challenges (Al-Htaybat & 
Alberti-Alhtaybat, 2017; Brown-Liburd et al., 2015; Earley, 2015; Financial 
Reporting Council, 2017). 
Three other major strategies are much more evident in my interview data 
than the use of new techniques: auditors also reduce the amount of testing 
they do to ‘just enough’ (Section 4.4.4), less expertise is applied to the audit 
(Section 4.4.5) and auditors work longer hours (Section 4.5). 
4.4.4 Just enough audit work 
you’re looking at a situation whereby the same things are being done 
by the same people, really. … It’s not really the same things, because 
it’s a lot less now. (Mark, Firm B) 
the big issue was we did less, basically (Jerry, Firm D) 
Auditors at all four firms were clear that they were doing less audit work than 
before the transfer. This section discusses how auditors reduce the amount 
of work they do in a way that is compatible with the pressures to do enough 
work discussed in Section 4.4.2. 
4.4.4.1 Reducing the number of risks 
Auditors reported their work to be risk based, as at the Audit Commission, in 
that audit procedures are directed towards the risks identified by the auditor. 
Consideration of risk in planning is a longstanding practice (Humphrey & 
Moizer, 1990; Power, 2004) and the use of identified risks to drive the audit 
process and determine testing is widely accepted practice described in 
auditing text books (e.g. Millichamp & Taylor, 2012).  
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My data shows that one way auditors reduce the amount of audit work done 
is to reduce the number of risks identified at the planning stage. This is 
explained concisely by a former audit manager at Firm C, but is also evident 
at other firms. 
There was quite a push - you had to justify something being a 
significant risk, because there was cost attached to that. … so, as a 
result, things that we would have done previously, are not being 
considered necessary. (Lucy, Firm C)   
The “push” Lucy mentions is towards reducing the number of risks identified 
on each audit. Lucy explicitly links risks to costs; because significant risks 
lead to more costs, they need to be justified. She also links the change in 
what is considered a risk to the change in what is considered necessary 
work.   
Some auditors mentioned strategies to reduce the number of risks at the 
planning stage. 
we challenged ourselves - is this really a risk, and if this is, what is the 
best and quickest way of dealing with it? (Alison, Firm D) 
We're supposed to be working off these template audits that say – 
here are the standard risks.  And you shouldn’t be going above that 
without director approval. (Matilda, Firm C) 
The head of public sector audit basically dictated what the significant 
risks were, and you had to get … approval to have anything other than 
those significant risks. (Natalie, Firm D) 
These quotes demonstrate how audit firms control the amount of work their 
auditors do by limiting the number of risks identified at the planning stage 
through the use of challenge and authorisation procedures.  
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4.4.4.2 Reducing testing in less risky areas 
When asked about how they achieve efficiency savings, auditors frequently 
mentioned focus, and consciously avoiding unnecessary work (‘over-
auditing’). 
One of the key things really is that focus on efficiency, thinking - are 
we doing what we need to, and not wasting time on things that we 
don’t need to do? (Tracey, Firm C) 
you definitely have to stand back and say, well, what is the risk? What 
are, what’s the nature of the account balances? What do we need to 
do to get those assurances and do no more (Christina, Firm, B) 
These statements are representative of other auditors and illustrate how they 
question and challenge themselves about the work they need to do, in order 
to eliminate any work that is deemed unnecessary.  
Determining that an items in the financial statements is not risky provides a 
justification for reduced testing of that item.  
for instance, a lot of stuff is what we call material non-significant and 
therefore the procedures that are done around material non-significant 
[are] a lot less (Paul, Firm D) 
By labelling items as “non-significant”, Paul intimates that it is logical that 
these items should not be tested in much detail. This resonates with 
Herrbach’s (2005) researching showing that auditors justify reduced or no 
testing in certain areas by invoking the concept of risk.  
Where items are deemed immaterial, audit work is reduced even further. 
At the Audit Commission, as we do at Firm B, you do something on 
every note in the accounts – so, agree it to workings or the [trial 
balance].  Firm D only looked at material - nothing that wasn't 
material, it wasn't even looked at.  So that's quite a big difference 
(auditor who had moved from Firm D to Firm B; auditor’s emphasis) 
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There is also evidence of a stricter application of materiality, in a bid to meet 
audit budgets. 
I guess now you're very conscious of the time that things are taking, 
and the budgets. So whereas you might have looked a bit more at 
something that didn't look quite right, now you're very much … it's not 
material, I'm going to move on. Whereas in the old way, even if it 
wasn't material, if you thought that something didn't look right, you'd 
still want to do something about it. (Rose, Firm B) 
Rose’s comment demonstrates that immaterial items could be ignored even 
where the auditor notices that “something didn’t look right”.   
4.4.4.3 Reducing less visible audit work 
There is evidence that auditors reduce work in areas that are less visible. 
Systems work is an example of an area that has reduced substantially. 
No one said ‘Oh thank you you’ve documented our systems 
fantastically well’ … At the end of the day, no one really cares - 
particularly not now, when no-one has any money. (Christina, Firm B)   
Detailed systems work would previously have contributed to an auditor’s in-
depth knowledge of a client.  Now, it is judged not necessary to forming an 
opinion on the accounts, and is not valued by the client.  Regular attendance 
at some client meetings is another example of audit work that has reduced.  
By curtailing such activities, auditors have sacrificed some of their rich, 
detailed knowledge of their clients in a bid to keep their audits focused and 
efficient, in a way that clients are unlikely to object or even notice.  This is an 
interesting tension, because Turley et al. (2016) shows that detailed client 
knowledge and regular communication with the client are important factors in 
audit quality. 
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4.4.5 Just enough expertise 
All four firms exhibit much more dynamism in their staffing structures than 
the Audit Commission, where structures were very static and individuals 
stayed in the same post for many years.  
I think within the Commission - ‘coast’ might be the wrong word, but 
you could – obviously, before, you could sit in that role, and you could 
probably do that role for 30 years. I don’t think it’s quite so easy to do 
that in a firm like Firm C, because things are constantly changing, and 
they basically see one of the key aspects of our learning development 
is learning experiences. There’s a big play on that. So, doing things 
you haven’t done before.  Because that’s going to make you a better 
employee, better at your work. So I think there’s more of a push on 
that. Which is good if you buy into the firm and you want to progress. 
(Derek, Firm C) 
There are substantial variations between the four firms. However, common 
features reported unanimously by participants are a higher rate of staff 
leaving, a higher rate of staff promotions, and more graduate trainees. This 
facilitates a change in the staff profile and allows the firms to make efficiency 
savings by using a weaker skill mix to resource audits. The weaker skill mix 
and reduction in specialisation challenge the competence aspect of audit 
quality (Section 2.5.5).  
4.4.5.1 More promotions 
Promotions are now more rapid and more widespread at all four firms.   
I think there was nine of us [in this area] team that transferred across, 
and I think six still remain …  And of that team, every one of that team 
has progressed in the last three years by way of – well, all by way of 
promotion (Guy, Firm A) 
in the course of the year that I was at Firm B there were three or four 
people promoted up to manager grades from senior grade  (Lisa, Firm 
B) 
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in the first year there were six … promoted to senior manager (Patrick, 
Firm C) 
the people that came across with me, other than [three individuals], 
everyone other one has been promoted, including going from trainee 
to assistant manager, to manager, and senior manager for some of 
the trainees that joined across. Promotion, particularly in [city] is more 
rapid. (Paul, Firm D) 
Especially at firms A and D, it seems that most auditors who have stayed 
with their new employer have been promoted. My participants included 
several auditors at all four firms who had been promoted and two (at Firms A 
and C) who had been promoted more than once. This is consistent with an 
observation from Kornberger et al. (2011, p. 521): “one had to be 
continuously promoted, or exit the firm”.  
Auditors see the opportunities both as an incentive and a reward for hard 
work. 
I have grafted harder than I ever have in my life.  For no extra reward.  
Now that’s just on a financial basis, but I suppose for those of us that 
are - you know - have seen it as an opportunity, we’ve thought – well, 
you know, it’ll come.  And to be fair, it has come, this year, for a 
number of us. (Guy, Firm A) 
Thus auditors are encouraged to work (very) hard in order to succeed 
(Anderson-Gough et al., 2001; Lupu & Empson, 2015). Section 4.5 
discusses the increased number of hours worked at all four firms. 
As well as encouraging auditors to work longer hours, an increased 
promotion rate alongside an increased staff turnover (Section 6.6.2) moves 
more experienced staff away from everyday audit work, allowing more 
opportunities for trainees to take on greater responsibility, and weakening the 
skill mix on the audit. 
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4.4.5.2 Weakening the skill mix 
Auditors at all four firms reported that audit work was being undertaken by 
more junior staff. 
… we've taken on quite a lot of trainees each year. So the skill mix 
has come down, and we're using lower grade staff from other offices 
as well, so I guess that brings the skill mix down but it brings the cost 
down. (Rose, Firm B) 
the team leader would do the audit, and you would just come in now 
and again and would do a high level review of the file, so you would 
be very much hands off. (Jerry, Firm D) 
we've got trainees who've got, say, 2 years’ experience, and we put 
them in a team leading environment (Colin, Firm C) 
The increased delegation of audit work to trainees is seen in other research, 
which finds that audits are resourced predominantly with junior staff (Hanlon, 
1994; Lee, 2002; Turley et al., 2016).  
Some auditors were concerned about the level of delegation. 
you’re just fighting over the same experienced staff, because there’s 
hardly anybody, really, that knows what they’re doing (Matilda, Firm 
C) 
you're asking a lot of the trainees to know what the ins and outs of the 
HRA3 are. (Colin, Firm C) 
Matilda’s worry is that that there are fewer experienced auditors in team 
leading positions, and that less experienced staff may not “know what they’re 
doing”. Colin provides an example of complex work that he views as difficult 
for inexperienced staff to tackle effectively. The increased use of more 
inexperienced staff could be detrimental to the audit work because the 
standard of audit work is dependent on the performance of individuals (Flint, 
1988; Herrbach, 2005). However, lack of experience is mitigated by a 
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number of factors. The most significant mitigating factors mentioned by 
participants are: first, the aptitude and enthusiasm of trainees, second, the 
firms’ structured training programmes, and third, the increased structure of 
audit files. In the following paragraphs I consider each of these in turn. Some 
auditors also mentioned managerial supervision as being important in 
managing the inexperience of trainees; however, opinions were varied and 
this did not emerge as significantly different from the Audit Commission, 
other than the general point of less time being available, which is discussed 
elsewhere (e.g. Section 4.4.1). 
Inexperienced trainees apply their aptitude and enthusiasm to compensate 
for their lack of experience.  
… they're generally extremely keen, extremely enthusiastic, and they'll 
work really hard to get that knowledge. (Tracey, Firm C) 
The aptitude and especially the enthusiasm of graduate trainees was noted 
by several participants. The following quotes are illustrative. 
We needed someone to go out and do a stock count on a Sunday. 
She came and said: ‘I’m so pleased that you’ve selected me for doing 
this.’ I’m thinking: crikey, I’ve just destroyed your Sunday … it’s just a 
different attitude. (Paul, Firm D) 
They’re all so terribly keen (Christina, Firm B) 
They have to be really keen and committed even to get through the 
recruitment process (Tracey, Firm C) 
The status of the big firms in particular gives them access to a large pool of 
eligible candidates to choose from, and those who succeed have therefore 
already proved themselves to be committed and determined. This type of 
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candidate is susceptible to be socialised into the ways of the firm and to work 
hard (Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson, 1998). 
The second factor mitigating trainee inexperience is robust training. Large 
firms in particular operate very structured training programmes for all staff 
and especially for trainees. 
They get core skills training – all the core skills training – so 
introduction to audit, so two or three courses they get the first three 
years (Derek, Firm C) 
I think the whole level of training that’s available, and the variety of 
training, is far superior (Tracey, Firm C) 
I feel that the investment in training is more significant (Ashleigh, Firm 
A) 
As well as disseminating key knowledge, Anderson-Gough et al. (1998) point 
out that training also contributes towards socialisation, influencing the 
trainees’ willingness and propensity to work hard. 
The third significant factor allowing the firms to use more junior staff is the 
more rigid structure of the files, which helps firms to control the work done. 
This is discussed further in Section 5.7.1.1. 
4.4.5.3 Less specialisation 
Auditors’ remit has broadened compared to the Audit Commission, where 
their work was restricted primarily to the NHS and local government sectors 
(Audit Commission, 2014a).  
The public sector team itself was doing charities, education, health, 
local government, central government - it was doing every area of the 
public sector. … you wouldn't be as familiar, for example, with 
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changes to the SORP4 or the Code of Practice, because you just 
hadn't had time to focus on the particular sector (Jerry, Firm D) 
Jerry suggests that the inclusion of other areas such as education and 
central government has led to less expertise in specific areas, such as the 
detail of local government accounting practices, because “you just hadn’t the 
time” to keep up-to-date with detailed changes in multiple sectors. Thus, 
even experienced, specialist staff are unable to maintain the same level of 
expertise as under the previous regime. 
There is some evidence of client dissatisfaction from the use of less 
specialised staff.   
clients have always valued - even when we had contractors, they've 
always valued having people that understand public sector and the 
differences - and I think it does frustrate them when they get new 
people and they're having to explain the nuances of how things work 
and you know – ‘what's NNDR5?’ - things like that. The clients do 
benefit from having people who understand what they do (Rose, Firm 
B) 
Rose’s comments accord with the conclusions of Turley et al. (2016), that the 
value in an audit to the client lies in the auditor understanding their business. 
However, as noted in Section 4.2.1.4, it is more important for auditors to 
make a good impression with the decision makers at board level than with 
the officers they encounter more regularly. 
                                            
4 Statement of Recommended Practice 
This refers to the Code of Practice on Local Authority Accounting issued annually as a joint 
publication by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) and the 
Local Authority (Scotland) Accounts Advisory Committee (LASAAC) (CIPFA, 2018)  
5 National Non-Domestic Rates (business rates) collected by local councils 
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Lisa (Firm B) argues that specialist knowledge is necessary in order to do an 
effective job in a complex area. 
even relatively small district councils spend a hell of a lot of money 
and the accounts are very complicated - there are lot of statutory 
overrides and complicated accounting transactions in there. I think 
you need staff of a certain level of experience to deal with that 
competently really. I don’t think it’s something that you can do without 
a degree of experience and a certain amount of training on top of just 
being a qualified accountant (Lisa, Firm B) 
This accords with experimental research showing specialisation to be linked 
to audit quality (Hammersley, 2006; Lowensohn, Johnson, Elder, & Davies, 
2007). However, Christina (Firm B) challenges the view that audits should be 
staffed primarily by specialists, asserting that experienced staff are not 
needed for every audit job.  
It doesn't give you, necessarily, a better audit, if you've got more 
senior people involved.  It just means you probably do more stuff you 
don't need to and doesn't necessarily benefit the client, or us. 
(Christina, Firm B) 
From this viewpoint, using trainees appropriately is not only cheaper but also 
more effective in reducing the amount of audit work to just what is necessary 
(Section 4.4.4). 
There is evidence that the firms regard specialisation as important. All four 
firms recruit trainees to work in a particular sector.  Although trainees do 
some work across different sectors, their specialisation is embedded from 
the start and they are provided with sector-relevant experience and training, 
and opportunities to share the team's knowledge.  
I don't think that [specialist knowledge] has been lost to a large extent 
in that most teams will still be managed by a manager / senior 
manager / even assistant manager, who has brought that wealth of 
experience across with them. I think what's had to become more 
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focused is the use of that experience in driving the rest of the team 
who may not be as experienced (Tracey, Firm C) 
From this perspective, there is no need to retain specific individual auditors in 
order to maintain the quality of the work; rather, expertise is something that 
can be shared and developed within the team. Staffing an audit with 
experienced, specialist auditors might provide an unnecessarily in-depth 
audit, if a trainee with some relevant experience and training could do a good 
enough job.  
4.4.6 Just enough support 
4.4.6.1 Ample support for the audit opinion 
Auditors report that support is available to help them in relation to their audit 
opinion work.  
I think the quality of the technical support at Firm C is hugely superior  
… You know there's probably enormous teams of people at Firm C 
who just focus on quality all day, …  they also have things like … 
valuation experts, PFI6 experts … there's enormous resources to draw 
on, and you can bring that into your audit. (Tracey, Firm C) 
Tracey compares Firm C favourably to her previous experience at the Audit 
Commission. She links the size of the firm with the idea of being supported 
by abundant background resources, stating the support available “almost 
feels like infinite”. Being aware of these resources that can contribute 
towards completing a quality audit and arriving at a safe opinion is a source 
of comfort for her. 
                                            
6 Private Finance Initiative 
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4.4.6.2 Less support in less risky areas 
Less support is available in areas that are less crucial to the audit opinion. 
Matilda (Firm C) provides an example relating to a local authority return to 
the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). 
I don’t know where to find the information.  And you’ve got to have, 
you know, a letter to the client, this, that and the other form … but I 
don’t know where that information is to tell me what I’m supposed to 
be doing. (Matilda, Firm C) 
Matilda expresses frustration in finding out practical details of a procedure 
she is unfamiliar with. Although an essential part of the local government 
auditor’s work, this return to DCLG is not part of the statutory audit and could 
therefore be viewed by the firm as less important and less risky than the 
financial statements work.    
A further example of reduced support relates to everyday decisions and 
activities. Belinda reports finding it more difficult to access peer support.  
I think the people that were close to [office locations] were still getting 
that sort of support, because they could go into the office. But unless 
you went into those offices, you were out at the client completely on 
your own.  Totally cut off. (Belinda, Firm C) 
A change in auditors’ office locations has created barriers in communication 
with other audit managers, leading Belinda to feel less supported after the 
transfer.  
Audit managers are expected to take responsibility for these less crucial 
aspects of their work with minimal support. This might create discomfort for 
auditors but it does not impinge on the most crucial decisions and is 
therefore unlikely to affect the audit opinion. Discomfort leads to higher 
turnover of staff, and therefore serves the firms’ objectives by making way for 
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more graduate trainees, an inexpensive resource (Section 4.4.5.3) who can 
be socialised into the firm’s way of working (Anderson-Gough et al., 1998). 
(See also Section 5.7.) 
4.5 Working longer hours 
Although auditors often refer to being more efficient, my data provides 
relatively few specific examples of how efficiencies are achieved.  At the 
same time, very many auditors mention their increased workload and longer 
hours. Table 17 shows illustrative quotes, each from a different participant. 
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Table 17 Example comments about working longer hours 
Firm A Longer hours.  No question. 
 
I saw the impact on the managers, the audit managers at Firm A and I 
particularly looked at my friends in Firm C and I think they’re absolutely 
running themselves absolutely ragged and I’ve had opportunities to join 
the Firm C and I just wouldn’t. 
 
Firm B It’s not a direct expectation, it’s something that quite a few of us, probably 
half will now just do. 
in the two or three months that - the real sort of crunch time leading up to 
September I was working seven days a week and I was often working 
until midnight. 
 
part time people tend to work more full time hours in the peaks. 
 
most people, at final accounts, are doing lots of hours, which I don't think 
in the Commission days anybody did.  
 
Firm C some long evenings and some early mornings 
 
team leaders, managers would do more but I don’t think trainees would 
do particularly more than 42.  But then a lot of the time they’re doing a lot 
more travelling.  So they’ll be doing 42 plus an hour and a half’s travel 
each way.  So there’s no way they could do that much more anyway. 
 
there was definitely an expectation of long hours 
 
It didn't matter what your contracted hours were, everybody was 
resourced to work 50 hours a week.  And if there was a clash and two 
audit managers wanted the same member of staff for the same weeks, 
they'd quite happily put people in to work 100 hours a week.   
 
you need to work at weekends. 
 
Firm D It’s not as prevalent in public sector. But public sector you can clock up 
easily 70 hour working weeks. 
 
I don’t think it’s a good audit if you have to kill people doing it but then 
that’s maybe why I’m not there 
 
pretty much throughout my time at Firm D I worked most weekends, 
pretty much, Saturday and Sunday. And I was rarely leaving the office 
before 6 or 7 at night, and I was getting in at 8.00. And so basically my 
life, at Firm D, was Firm D. … the whole culture there was like that. So a 
lot of trainees would work through the night and things like that. 
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Table 17 demonstrates clearly that auditors across all four firms are working 
longer hours. The extent of this varies between firms and individuals, but 
there are multiple indications that working longer hours is widespread and 
can be extreme. The tendency towards longer hours appears less marked at 
Firm B than the other three firms; there are quotes that refer to “most people” 
and “quite a few of us”, which seem to qualify the expectation; not everyone 
in Firm B works long hours. The statements relating to the other firms are not 
qualified in this way. The practice of auditors working long hours in their own 
time is well documented in literature (e.g. Anderson-Gough et al., 2001; 
Hanlon, 1994; Lee, 2002; Lupu & Empson, 2015; Pentland, 1993). 
Working longer hours contributes to the ‘just enough’ agenda; auditors are 
less likely to do unnecessary extra work that would lead to unnecessary 
extra risk, if this is in their own time. It also contributes indirectly towards a 
more dynamic staffing structure, in which individuals either accept the longer 
hours and are promoted, or reject the longer hours and leave (Section 4.4.5). 
Longer hours are therefore a significant enabling factor that allows audits to 
be completed with fewer of the firms’ resources. This is both a manifestation 
of the prioritisation of efficiency over fairness as theorised by Hood (1991) 
and a contributor to the firms’ ‘just enough’ agenda (Section 4.4). 
The phenomenon of working longer hours as a response to the change is 
discussed further in Section 6.4. 
4.6 Subordinating public sector concerns 
In the new audit regime, commercial concerns such as efficiency and image 
are valued more highly than they were at the Audit Commission, as 
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discussed in previous sections of this chapter. This section discusses the 
subordination of public sector concerns to commercial concerns. 
4.6.1 Subordinating public sector departments 
Within a firm, public sector is just one specialism alongside other specialisms 
such as retail, mining or banks. This is illustrated in the following extract from 
EY’s website. 
 
(EY, n.d.) 
The concerns of one section of a firm are necessarily subordinate to the 
(commercial) concerns of the firm as a whole. The public sector department 
is one department of many, and it is unlikely to be the most significant.  
the public-sector business, particularly the audit business may not be 
the biggest part of, certainly wouldn’t be the biggest part of their 
revenue stream or profit.  So, in terms of balancing that against what’s 
important in the firm … it’s really quite miniscule actually. … whilst … 
everybody recognises the benefits of specialisation, actually if you 
need bums on seats to get your corporate done and it's millions of 
pounds clients, you move your staff. I think it’s just simple priorities at 
the end of the day that take over. (Alison, Firm D) 
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Although Alison asserts that “everybody recognises the benefits of 
specialisation”, she states that these benefits have to be regarded in the 
context of “what’s important in the firm” as a whole. She contrasts the 
corporate side of the business, with its “millions of pounds clients”, with the 
public sector, which is “really quite miniscule”. As a result, she argues, 
corporate clients are likely to take precedence over public sector clients in 
resourcing decisions. 
Thus, although all four firms retain public sector departments with specialist 
auditors who have chosen to work there, there is a shift in priorities arising 
from these departments being part of a larger firm with commercial 
objectives. This can lead to public sector specialisation being subordinated to 
commercial factors.  
4.6.2 Subordinating public sector expertise 
All four firms have public sector departments of specialist auditors who have 
chosen to work in that sector, and a number of auditors report feeling that 
this specialism is valued by their firm.  
The head of Firm A audit turned up on the induction day for all the 
public sector, Firm A public sector audit, and said this was one of the 
proudest days of his life greeting everybody from the Audit 
Commission, so it had a mega high status (Gary, Firm A) 
The impression that I got was that Firm B were really pleased to get 
this contract and … really keen to develop their sort of profile and the 
work that they did in the public sector (Lisa, Firm B) 
Both of these quotes provide evidence that the firms were pleased to take on 
public sector specialist work. In spite of this, specialist public sector work is 
now only one part of what each firm does, and this makes a difference to 
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individual auditors’ priorities. For example, auditors’ training now covers both 
the public and private sectors, even with the specialist public sector 
department.   
Now, everybody does a chartered accountant qualification first of all. 
So they are able to move across, both into the corporate audit work of 
the private sector, as well as the public sector. (Colin, Firm C) 
For trainees, their public sector specialism is located within their overall 
accountancy training. This applies to the trainees’ practical experience as 
well as their exam-based learning. 
the trainees will be doing a mixture of public sector and private sector 
(Lucy, Firm C) 
Across all firms, trainees gain experience in the private sector as well as the 
public sector. Therefore accountants who train in the public sector 
departments of firms have a much broader commercial experience than 
those who trained at the Audit Commission. Being a public sector auditor is 
only one part of what they do. 
Sector expertise is subordinated not only to general commercial experience, 
but also to commercial skills such as selling and client management.  
I certainly don't feel as if years of experience and specialism is a - it's 
not particularly valued and it's probably not necessary. I think the 
younger ones, the trainees, and new people, can pretty much do the 
work without an in depth knowledge … I don't think the in depth 
knowledge is valued particularly now. I think what's more valued for 
people coming through the firm is bidding for work and preparing for 
bids and contracts. I don't think they want people to spend a long time 
auditing the HRA3 and things like that (Rose, Firm B) 
In the Audit Commission, technically being good was quite a key 
factor in progressing up the ranks - not the only one, but it was useful. 
At Firm D I'd say it was all about your persona, your professional 
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skills, your ability to talk articulately - those sort of things were much 
more highly valued than technical knowledge (Jerry, Firm D) 
This prioritisation of soft skills over technical skills resonates with research 
into the commercialisation of audit and the shift from the professional logic 
towards the commercial logic (Section 2.6.6) and the higher status afforded 
to the commercial logic in accounting firms (Carter & Spence, 2014; Sikka, 
2009a; Spence & Carter, 2014).   
4.6.3 Subordinating the public interest 
Some auditors noted a difference between the overall aims, culture and 
ethos between the Audit Commission and the firms.  
from the Audit Commission, I've got a very strong … I feel 
passionately about the importance of not wasting taxpayers' money. 
… you know, about the ethical side about having integrity and about 
how taxpayers' money is used. Whereas you know Firm D would be 
very much about whether it's material to the client. So maybe 
something that's not - if it's not material to the client then it probably 
doesn't concern Firm D. Whereas at the Audit Commission you might 
think - is this material to the taxpayer or to someone else, or is it 
against Nolan's principles of public life7? You might think there was an 
issue there. (Jerry, Firm D) 
Jerry describes a shift in attitude away from working for the public and the 
tax payer(Audit Commission, 2014a), towards the idea of working for the 
client (Anderson-Gough et al., 2000). As Jerry points out, these two 
objectives are not always congruent.  
There is also evidence of a shift in accountability. 
when we were with the Commission there was a feeling that yes, you 
were accountable to the DA [District Auditor], and the DA was 
                                            
7 Nolan’s principles of public life are: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, 
openness, honesty and leadership (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1995).   
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accountable to the regional director, and they were accountable to the 
Audit Commission central and the audit commissioners.  But it also 
felt as if you were accountable to the general public - yeah? - because 
you felt that what you were doing was being funded by the general 
taxpayer.  Whereas Firm C certainly don't have that feel themselves 
… it felt as if your accountability was to the partner … I think you're 
accountable for delivering ... what they were interested in was 
delivering the profit margin, and delivering the return. (Belinda, Firm 
C) 
Belinda’s statement “Firm C certainly don’t have that feel” echoes the shift in 
attitude described by Jerry at Firm D. The move to the private sector has 
required auditors to adopt a more commercial, market-based mind set. The 
inescapable primary objective is to make a profit for the firm. Helping a public 
sector organisation to achieve its aims, or become more efficient, or save 
money, is certainly desirable, but as a means for making a profit. This is a 
subtle but important difference, and one that could potentially impact on the 
auditor’s independence. This is consistent with the widely documented shift 
from the professional logic towards commercial values in private sector audit 
(e.g. Carcello, 2005; Carter & Spence, 2014; Hanlon, 1994; Humphrey & 
Moizer, 1990; Imhoff, 2003; Shore & Wright, 2018; Spence & Carter, 2014; 
Wyatt & Gaa, 2004; Zeff, 2003b).  
This is not to say that the public interest has been abandoned altogether, 
merely that it is less important than the primary concerns of reaching a safe 
opinion and doing so efficiently, in order to make a profit. 
you get the image of the firms just in it to make the money but I think 
there was a great amount of public concern. There was clearly client 
focus but the concern was actually on what is right and what’s 
appropriate for the public sector. So, that public sector ethos was 
actually, and that’s one of the things that... actually a little bit surprised 
me how strong the public-sector ethos was within [Firm A]. (Gary, 
Firm A) 
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The professional logic continues to exist alongside the commercial logic, 
rather than being supplanted by it (Spence & Carter, 2014; Suddaby et al., 
2009). 
4.6.4 Sidelining CIPFA 
Trainees are increasingly studying for a private sector qualification rather 
than the specialist public sector qualification (CIPFA8). There is evidence that 
the private sector qualification is perceived as more valuable. 
the chartered qualification, it's obviously a good qualification to have, 
but it means that you get a good standard of people applying (Tracey, 
Firm C) 
Tracey’s words, “it’s obviously a good qualification to have”, suggest that 
both she and the graduates regard the qualification as having a high status. 
Anderson-Gough et al. (1998, p. 133) agree that the qualification is “valuable 
and valued” (p. 133). In this example, Tracey suggests that the qualification 
is one of the reasons why firms are likely to attract the best graduates. By 
implication, the CIPFA qualification is less attractive.  
The different status of the public and private sector qualifications is illustrated 
by the rules setting out the qualifications required for signing audit opinions. 
we’re getting a lot more involved in academies [schools] but with you 
having to … have the audit qualification to sign off academies rather 
than the CIPFA, so not all [ex-Audit Commission staff] can sign off. 
(Christina, Firm B) 
This rule excludes some public sector auditors from being able to sign audit 
opinions for a segment of the public sector, academy schools, and therefore 
                                            
8 Chartered Institute of Public Finance Accountants 
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requires some very senior auditors to defer to colleagues at the most 
symbolic stage of the audit.  
More trainees studying for the chartered qualification leads directly to less 
public sector specialisation within the firm, because they are required to have 
a certain amount of private sector experience. This requirement is imposed 
by private sector accountants who set the rules for their training contracts. 
[trainee] has to have commercial experience because she’s doing 
[private sector] exams.  She has to have so many days experience. 
(Guy, Firm A) 
there's still that kind of view from the centre in the Institutes and stuff, 
that we're not proper accounting here, proper auditing. And I suspect 
we're probably much more technically accounting and auditing than a 
lot of people, but it doesn't count. … because it comes under the 
CIPFA … Code, it doesn't count towards their training contracts, which 
is crazy, because we're doing exactly the same … the same auditing 
standards, we're doing technical accounting stuff - public sector 
accounts are very complex things. But … it doesn't count towards the 
training contracts, as I understand. Which is utterly barmy. (Dean, 
Firm B) 
Therefore, if firms choose to offer a private sector qualification, it follows that 
trainees, even in the specialist public sector department, are trained in the 
public sector only as one part of a broader programme.  
The subordination of the public sector accountancy qualification follows the 
broader neoliberalist principle of favouring the private sector and the logic of 
the market (Section 2.6.1). It can even be extended to academic research; 
Goddard (2010) comments that public sector accounting research is 
marginalised in mainstream journals.  
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4.7 Commercialising audit over time 
Flint (1988) reasons that the social function of audit requires a commitment 
by the auditor to the public interest, but the decline of the public interest 
element of the audit and the rise of commercialisation has been noted by 
several authors since at least 1990 (Section 2.6.6), when Humphrey and 
Moizer (1990)  wrote of their concerns about the commercialisation of 
(private sector) audit. They reported auditors regarding the client as the 
customer rather than working in the public interest, selling as an important 
part of their work, and cutting corners to ensure that profit targets were met. 
They argued that growing commercial pressures on audit firms hindered 
auditors’ ability to operate as effective watchdogs. This chapter has shown 
that these same commercial pressures, and similar effects, are now evident 
in the public sector as well as the private sector.  
Commercialising can be seen as a long term trend, the changes triggered by 
the transfer of auditors to the private sector a step change in the same 
direction as the pre-existing and ongoing trend. The step change in 2012 
was precipitated by the transfer of audits to firms and by public sector entities 
gaining the right to appoint their own auditors, but an earlier step change 
occurred in 2004 when foundation trusts were first created, with the power to 
appoint their own auditors (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2012).   
since 2007 … I’ve worked in audits that have operated in a market.  
So even when I was at the Commission, if we had a review by QAD9 
for Monitor10 that was poor, that could have just closed us down. In 
                                            
9 The Quality Assurance Department of ICAEW reviews  
10 Monitor was the independent regulator of NHS foundation trusts. It is now part of NHS 
Improvement. 
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terms of market presence and damage to our reputation. So it goes 
back to then. It’s not a result of being outsourced. (Graham, Firm B) 
Graham’s quote demonstrates that the commercialisation of public sector 
audit was not triggered by the abolition of the Audit Commission, but started 
much earlier. Thus the commercialisation of public sector audit discussed in 
this chapter can be considered as a condensed version of the 
commercialisation that has been observed in the private sector over a long 
period of time. 
4.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has demonstrated that the firms’ commercial concerns have 
become dominant in the field of public sector audit. I have discussed 
strategies employed by the firms to achieve their commercial aims. One 
major strategy is presenting a favourable image both to the client, in the form 
of good customer service, and to reviewers and regulators, in the form of 
auditability. Another key strategy is reducing the amount of work done to ‘just 
enough’, in order to maximise efficiency. Auditors do this by identifying fewer 
risks, and by doing less work in areas that are deemed to be less risky. The 
concept of ‘just enough’ also applies to the level of specialist expertise 
applied to each audit, and the amount of support provided to auditors. The 
primacy of presenting an image and the reduction in expertise and work 
done translate to strengthening the ritualised ‘front stage’ of the audit at the 
expense of the comfort provided by the ‘back stage’ work (Downer, 2011; 
Power, 2011). 
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Commercialising 
public sector audit
Presenting an 
image Doing just enough
Public sector 
concerns
I find that public sector concerns are subordinated to commercial 
considerations, as predicted by Hood (1991). This is partly because public 
sector audits are regarded as just one of a number of specialisms within 
each firm, and partly as a result of audits being staffed by more junior staff, 
with less time to do their work. There is therefore less specialist capacity 
applied to each audit. 
The key concepts of presenting an image, doing just enough and 
subordinating public sector concerns are summarised in Figure 11. 
Figure 11 Commercialising public sector audit 
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Finally, I note that the commercialisation of audit has been ongoing for a 
period of years in the public sector, and reflects an existing trend in the 
private sector. The transfer of Audit Commission auditors to the private 
sector hastened rather than starting that trend. I discuss this further in 
Chapter 7, where I consider the Audit Commission as a weakly autonomous 
Bourdieusian subfield of the widespread field of audit. 
Chapter 5 goes on to explore in detail how these changes have been 
effected in an environment where audit is defined and performed by highly 
skilled professionals who make individual decisions about their work. 
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5 Reconstructing audit quality 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the second element of the substantive theory: 
Reconstructing audit quality (Chapter 7).  
Chapter 4 established that auditors like to spend enough time and effort on 
their audit work to feel comfortable with their audit opinion (Section 4.4.2.2) 
but the amount of audit work firms require, and allow for, has reduced 
(Section 4.4.4). In this chapter, I argue that auditors can reconcile the dual 
objectives of doing a good quality audit and meeting reduced budgets by 
adjusting, or reconstructing, their view of what a good quality audit is. 
This chapter starts by showing how I created the sub-category 
Reconstructing from my data (Section 5.2). It then proceeds to consider each 
stage of the process in detail. I begin with a review of auditors’ perceptions of 
audit quality in Section 5.3 and then consider how audit quality has been 
reinterpreted to align more with the firms’ commercial objectives in Section 
5.4. In Section 5.5, I discuss how risk is reinterpreted to align more to the risk 
to the firm, rather than the risk of a material misstatement, and how this 
affects the work auditors do. Section 5.6 shows how the reinterpretations are 
imposed on and adopted by auditors, assisted and legitimised by the FRC’s 
audit quality inspection regime. This leads to a standardisation of audit 
quality (Section 5.7), both within firms and across different firms. Section 5.8 
discusses the implications of standardisation with reference to the attributes 
of audit quality discussed in Section 2.5. 
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5.2 Constructing the sub-category 
‘Reconstructing audit quality’ helps to explain how firms, and individuals 
working within the firms, reconstruct the meaning of audit quality to fit in with 
commercial priorities.  
The concept of reconstructing audit quality helped to resolve an apparent 
paradox in my interview data: auditors reported fairly consistently that they 
were doing a good quality audit, and meeting the same standards, as under 
the previous regime (Section 5.3), but with significantly fewer resources 
(Section 4.4.1). I used theoretical sampling to explore this puzzle, by adding 
questions to my interview guide to probe into what auditors understood by 
audit quality, and how this might have changed (Appendix D). 
One of my interviews provided a clue as to how it was possible for auditors to 
continue to consider themselves to be doing a good job although they were 
doing less: “it was a different level of audit” (Alison, Firm D). The codes 
‘Changing perspective’ and ‘Rationalising’ helped me to investigate this 
further. I realised that the firms’ interpretations of what it meant to do a good 
quality audit were different from the Audit Commission’s, even within the 
same framework of professional standards. This reinterpretation made it 
possible for auditors to do their work differently, but still consider themselves 
to have done a good job. 
A focused code ‘Standardising’ recognised elements of specification, rigidity 
and sameness in some auditors’ work. I explored this further by theoretical 
sampling, adding questions to my interviews to gather more information 
about whether and how audits were becoming more standardised in different 
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firms (Appendix D). I found standardisation to be present in varying degrees 
at the four firms, in different guises, and that this helped to establish the 
reinterpretations in the firms’ interests. 
Figure 12 shows four key elements of reconstructing audit quality that 
emerged through the analysis: reinterpreting audit quality, reinterpreting risk, 
imposing the new standards (reinterpretations) and standardising.  
Figure 12 Reinterpreting and standardising audit quality 
 
 
Reinterpreting audit quality (Section 5.4) represents the change from the 
Audit Commission view to the firms’ view of what a good quality audit is, in 
line with the firms’ commercial priorities. Notably, efficiency contributes 
towards rather than challenges audit quality. 
Reinterpreting risk (Section 5.5) reflects the way firms “saw risk differently” 
(Lucy, Firm C), calibrating it against their corporate clients. 
Imposing the new standards (Section 5.6.1) explains how auditors are 
induced to adopt the new interpretations. A significant factor is the 
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pervasiveness of the regulatory regime. In Chapter 7 I interpret this 
imposition as symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977). 
The imposition of these interpretations across the regime leads to a 
standardisation of audits (Section 5.7). 
5.3 Auditors’ interpretations of audit quality 
5.3.1 Auditing standards as the basis for audit quality 
My data shows that auditors relate doing a good quality audit to complying 
with professional standards. The following interview extract summarises 
concisely a commonly expressed view.   
Interviewer 
Respondent
Can I ask what you would understand by audit quality? 
 
Audit quality? I would say that the auditing standards have 
been met. No more, no less, really. 
 
 
The following participant quote provides a more comprehensive view of what 
it means to do a good quality audit. 
that the audit trail, the audit story, the audit support, is clear to an 
informed user looking at the file.  That the risk identification is clear at 
the start, and you can track the risks through, it’s focused on the risk 
areas, and you get the conclusions on the risks reported clearly to 
those charged with governance.  I also – obviously it goes wider than 
that –, audit quality involves good client management, working closely 
with the client – and just really – obviously compliance with ISAs, 
which for everybody is compliance with their methodology (Patrick, 
Firm C) 
Patrick’s description is more inclusive than the previous example, but both 
emphasise the auditing standards. Some auditors stressed the importance of 
arriving at a safe audit opinion, and some added considerations of clarity, 
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efficiency and customer service, but fulfilling the ISA requirements was the 
primary criterion for most. This accords with Watkins et al. (2004), who 
comment that practitioner literature defines audit quality as conforming to 
standards. PSAA’s audit quality review (Public Sector Audit Appointments, 
2018b) is one such example. Similarly, Beattie et al. (2015) find that auditors 
increasingly invoke auditing standards in defining what they do.  
The continuing requirement to comply with auditing standards underlies the 
many similarities between audit work in the old and new environments.  
5.3.2 Continuing to do a good quality audit 
Auditors generally reported that they were doing a good quality audit and 
were confident in their audit opinions. When asked about confidence in their 
audit opinion, auditors mostly professed themselves to be very confident.  
I’m very confident (Patrick, Firm C) 
I’m absolutely 100% (Mark, Firm B) 
Many stated that the level of confidence was unchanged from the Audit 
Commission to the firms. 
I don’t think there’s any change in that (Ashleigh, Firm A) 
Yeah, that’s pretty much the same (Matilda, Firm C) 
I think that was equally rigorous as the Audit Commission’s 
methodology (Gary, Firm A) 
Only a minority of auditors stated that they were either more confident or less 
confident in the audit opinion than at the Audit Commission. 
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I think I’m happier that what we do gives the right assurance over the 
right areas. Because I think you can follow it a lot more clearly on the 
files. (Christina, Firm B) 
I’ve got far more confidence in the process than at the Audit 
Commission (Patrick, Firm C) 
Christina and Patrick are representative of a minority who felt increased 
confidence in the firms’ processes compared to the Audit Commission’s. A 
contrasting minority felt less confident. 
I think there's probably slightly less confidence in that audit opinion, 
just ‘cause - higher materiality and a lot less work. (Jerry, Firm D) 
It is notable that this view, of reduced confidence in the audit opinion, was 
only held by auditors who had left the employment of the firm they 
transferred to. Therefore, all auditors still working for the firm they had 
transferred to, and who talked about confidence in their audit opinion, 
professed themselves to be at least as confident in their opinion as they had 
been working for the Audit Commission. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that 
Jerry is only “slightly” less confident despite “a lot less work”. 
The overall picture is that auditors remain confident in their opinions. This is 
consistent with findings from Pentland (1993), Herrbach (2005) and Guénin-
Paracini, Malsch, et al. (2014), who note that auditors do enough work to feel 
comfortable or to allay their anxiety, and with Humphrey and Moizer (1990) 
who report that auditors have an ongoing faith in their own professional 
competence and integrity.  
Similarly, when asked about audit quality, auditors unanimously stated that 
they thought were doing a good quality audit using their own definition.  
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I think what we do is probably a really good quality audit (Christina, 
Firm B) 
This resonates with Suddaby et al. (2009) who find the majority of accounting 
professionals (declare themselves) to be committed to their profession, 
though Sikka (2009a) points out that such self-affirmation can be highly 
problematic and does not necessarily correspond to actual behaviour. 
Humphrey and Moizer (1990) suggest that the participants’ answers to 
specific questions should be considered in the context of their overall 
statements. 
It would be naive, though, to consider such assertions and 
confirmations of independence in isolation of the context in which they 
were provided. Clearly, if audit managers are asked directly whether 
they are independent, it is only to be expected that they reply in the 
affirmative. However, when coupled with the managers' descriptions 
of the way that audit practices were responding to the demands of 
client management, such affirmations serve to illustrate the very 
strength of the managers' belief in their professional integrity. 
(Humphrey & Moizer, 1990, p. 233) 
In this respect, my findings correspond with those of Humphrey and Moizer: 
auditors’ confident assertions are entirely in keeping with their descriptions of 
the way they do their work and how they feel about it. For example, auditors’ 
descriptions of their attitudes to regulatory reviews (e.g. Graham, Section 
4.3.2.1), the importance of a safe audit opinion (Gary, Section 4.4.2.1), and 
firms’ support for the audit opinion (Tracey, Section 4.4.6) all lend 
authenticity to the auditors’ assertions that they have confidence in their 
work.  
In summary, my data shows that auditors remain confident in their audit 
opinion, and feel that they are doing a good quality audit, even while they are 
doing less audit work (Section 4.4.4). 
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5.4 Reinterpreting audit quality 
This section shows how firms have reinterpreted the meaning of audit quality 
to align more closely to their commercial objectives and reduce the amount 
of work done.  
5.4.1 Incorporating efficiency into the definition of quality 
For some auditors, being efficient has become incorporated into the criteria 
for a good quality audit. The following view of a good quality audit was fairly 
representative in my interviews  
I think it's making sure you meet all the accounting standards and 
auditing standards, and doing enough to get the assurance that 
there's no material misstatement … but not doing too much - because 
I think that is just a waste of people's time - clients' time as well, and 
the fee. It's - I guess it's just doing a good job, to the required 
standards (Rose, Firm B) 
Rose is very clear that it is important to do enough work and to meet 
standards, but the emphasis on “not doing too much” work is also integral to 
her definition of a good quality audit. Thus, cost and quality are no longer 
seen as conflicting goals (McNair, 1991); instead, efficiency is a component 
of audit quality. Therefore, reducing audit testing (Section 4.4.4) becomes a 
laudable aim, and one that can improve rather than challenge the quality of 
the audit. 
We are far batter – as a firm, compared to the Audit Commission – we 
are far better at risk assessment. Far better. We used to turn up and 
do an audit because the number was there, basically. Now we’re far 
better and more focused on risks. And that literally makes it – it does 
make it more efficient.  Because we don’t audit everything that we 
used to do. (Patrick, Firm C) 
Patrick views the practice of doing less audit work as a virtue, because the 
audit is “more focused” and “more efficient”. This contrasts with the academic 
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view of audit quality (Section 2.5), where efficiency is notably absent from 
consideration. Moreover, conscientiousness (Section 2.5.6) requires 
sufficient time and is directly challenged by the drive towards efficiency.  
Some auditors present efficiency as a way of providing a better client 
service, which has become more important (Section 4.3.1.1).  
probably actually that level of focus is a good thing, I mean obviously 
for the clients because you’re in for a shorter time, which is always 
popular with them (Tracey, Firm C) 
Tracey asserts that clients “obviously” prefer the more focused audit, 
because auditors are there “for a shorter time”. This reasoning resonates 
with Anderson-Gough et al. (2000), who find a strong client service rhetoric 
in professional service firms to be a powerful mechanism for justifying work 
practices that might otherwise appear unreasonable.   
5.4.2 Incorporating customer service into the definition of quality 
For some auditors, client service (Section 4.3.1.1) has been written in to the 
definition of audit quality. 
one is the actual quality of work that you’re doing – so, does the work 
meet the auditing standards? … so I think firstly it’s demonstrating on 
the file that you’ve complied with standards and your firm’s practice, in 
a clear way.  I think the other side of it is actually the quality of the 
service to the client. (Derek, Firm C) 
For Derek, client service now has such a high status that it is part of his 
interpretation of whether he is doing a good quality audit. As with efficiency 
(Section 5.4.1), client service is notably absent from academic definitions of 
audit quality (Section 2.5). As with efficiency, good customer service is 
potentially in conflict with one of the traditional components of audit quality: in 
this case, independence (Section 2.5.7). Although no specific instances of 
 
 
198 
 
impaired independence were evident in my data, increasing the emphasis on 
client service has the potential to challenge the auditor’s traditional stance in 
this respect. 
5.4.3 Summary: reinterpreting audit quality 
This section has shown how the concept of audit quality has been 
reinterpreted, such that efficiency and customer service are now regarded as 
being commensurate with the idea of a good quality audit, rather than 
challenges to it. 
The methodology I have employed does not permit me to show definitively 
either that auditors’ definition of audit quality has changed, or that any such 
change is a result of the transfer to the private sector. It is not possible to 
retrospectively access auditors’ understandings of audit quality before the 
transfer. In fact, some auditors explicitly argue that changes to the audit do 
not derive from the transfer but have evolved over a much longer period 
(Section 4.7). However, I have shown clearly that efficiency has increased in 
importance (Section 4.4) and that a number of auditors consider it to be at 
least consistent with their aim to do a good quality audit (Section 5.4.1). 
Similarly, it is clear that the emphasis on client service has increased 
(Section 4.3.1) and that, for some auditors, providing a good client service is 
part of the criteria for doing a good quality audit (Section 5.4.2). 
5.5 Reinterpreting risk 
As discussed in Section 4.4.4.1, auditors consider risk as part of their 
planning, and use their risk assessment to drive and justify the procedures 
 
 
199 
 
they undertake. This section shows how firms interpret risk in a different way 
from the Audit Commission, and links this to reduced audit testing. 
5.5.1 The comparative risk of the public sector versus the private sector 
Some auditors suggest that the audit firms have a different view of risk to 
that prevalent in the Audit Commission, regarding public sector entities as 
low risk in comparison to their corporate clients.  
They knew that [council] was very unlikely to go bankrupt, so the risk 
to the audit therefore was kind of lower … whereas a district auditor 
might be worried about the risk of – you know – a material 
misstatement … the kind of Firm C mindset seemed to be more about, 
well, how wrong can it go? (Lucy, Firm C) 
Lucy suggests that the firm’s main concern is the “risk to the audit” and that 
this is linked to whether a client is likely to go bankrupt. The risk of a material 
misstatement (that does not lead to bankruptcy) is much less consequential 
than the risk of bankruptcy, and does not concern firms as much as it did at 
the Audit Commission. This aligns with Power’s (2004, p. 58) view of audit as 
an exercise in “secondary risk management”, whereby firms concentrate on 
managing the risk to themselves of getting their opinion wrong. Lucy’s 
question “How wrong can it go?” illustrates the short step from here to the 
corollary that public sector entities, which might be supposed to derive some 
government protection to prevent public services from being shut down 
altogether, can be regarded as lower risk than private sector clients, where 
no such contingency exists. By contrast, at the Audit Commission, there 
were no corporate clients to compare with.  
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Adopting this view of risk to the audit, or to themselves, facilitates their 
justification of expending fewer resources on public sector audits, where this 
type of risk is lower, compared to corporate audits.  
5.5.2 Different perspectives in identifying risks 
The different perception of overall risk translates to a difference in 
identification of risks during the audit.  
I think actually the firms, certainly Firm D, are pretty good at 
identifying big risks.  It is big risks, and I really mean big risks, you 
know, not the risks that we would have identified which I think were 
much smaller risks. I think it was just a different level of focus and a 
different level of audit and I think it brought it much more aligned to a 
private sector, plc kind of approach. And because, within that, the 
public sector is generally much lower risk, that’s how the audit 
approach was applied. (Alison, Firm D) 
Alison emphasises that the firms use their own perspective of what risks 
should be considered – “I mean really big risks”. The “much smaller risks” 
that might have been identified by the Audit Commission would be unlikely to 
pose a problem in terms of reputational or financial risk to the firms, and are 
therefore no longer regarded as risks. Again, this aligns with Power’s 
concept of secondary risk management (Power, 2004). Alison’s statement 
also makes the point that this change in focus has led to the audit approach 
becoming “much more aligned to a private sector, plc kind of approach”. This 
is, after all, one of the aims of the NPM project: “to improve public services 
by making public sector organizations much more ‘business-like’” 
(Diefenbach, 2009, p. 892).  
The changed perception of risk can be linked to the efficiency savings 
targeted by the firms.  
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in terms of the 20% cut, for instance, you were only going to do that if 
you think something is less risky (Lucy, Firm C)   
Lucy refers to the efficiency target (20%) she had been working towards at 
one of her clients. From the ‘old’ perspective of risk, the firms’ volume of 
testing might seem inadequate, but by “thinking something is less risky”, it 
becomes reasonable to do less work and the savings are more achievable.  
The firms’ perspective in identifying risks ultimately results in less audit 
testing (Section 4.4.4) which is advantageous to the firms as they are able to 
expend less effort in arriving at their audit opinion. 
5.6 Adopting the reconstruction 
This section discusses how the firms’ reconstruction of audit quality, 
including their view of risk, is adopted by auditors, both by being imposed 
(Section 5.6.1) and by being accepted by auditors (Section 5.6.2). 
Auditor responses to the change are also discussed in more detail in Chapter 
6. 
5.6.1 Imposing the reconstruction 
There are two principal ways in which the reconstructed view of audit quality 
is imposed: by requiring auditors to meet the firm’s audit quality standards 
(Section 5.6.1.1) and by preventing them from doing more (Section 5.6.1.2), 
especially through time pressure.  
5.6.1.1 Requiring auditors to meet the firm’s standards 
Section 4.3.2 discussed the immense weight that auditors place on 
regulatory reviews and how they are incentivised to design and construct 
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their files in order to perform well in inspections. Auditors were clear that a 
good performance in a quality review would support a case for promotion, 
whereas poor performance was regarded as career limiting. Thus it is 
extremely important for individuals to produce an audit file that meets the 
firm’s and the regulator’s interpretation of audit quality. This is effectively 
imposed because of how seriously the quality criteria are reinforced and 
embedded through appraisals and training. 
Interviewees across all four firms perceived reviewers to be powerful. 
Auditors afford legitimacy to both managers and quality reviewers, especially 
those from the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and its Audit Quality 
Review Team (AQRT). 
You can’t argue with AQRT.  (Patrick, Firm C) 
The AQRT’s view is definitive and cannot (generally) be challenged; 
furthermore, it carries so much weight that it informs how firms train their 
staff, and therefore how audits are conducted.  
The power and legitimacy of the regulator extends even to circumstances 
where the auditor has more expertise than the reviewer. 
They ask a lot of silly questions. Like - how does this work? …you'll try 
and explain to them how it works, because they haven't done it before, 
and that is half the frustration of the reviews, that they'll clearly raise 
an issue at the end of it that is not an issue, because of their lack of 
understanding of how the public sector operates. (Dean, Firm B) 
Despite his frustration, the same auditor acknowledges that the quality 
scores are very important both to him individually and, from the partners’ 
perspective, to the firm as a whole. 
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5.6.1.2 Preventing auditors from doing more than the minimum 
A lack of resources effectively prevents auditors from doing more work than 
firms specify is needed (Section 4.4.4).  
Some auditors display a positive attitude towards the requirement to reach 
an audit opinion based on reduced audit testing, for example viewing the 
increased efficiency as good for the client (Section 5.4.1). A further example 
highlights the professionalism of auditors in achieving this balance. 
… being brave enough or professional enough to say - this is what we 
need to do to get that assurance, to sign that off ... we’re being forced 
to do that by having fewer people to do all that work (Christina, Firm 
B) 
Christina describes making a decision about how much work is necessary, 
and stopping at that point, as “brave” and “professional”. Nevertheless, 
auditors are “forced” into compliance by “having fewer people”. Her positive 
attitude notwithstanding, Christina does not have a choice; there are not 
enough staff on her team to be able to do the level of audit testing that was 
customary under the old approach.  
The necessity of doing less audit testing because there is less time available, 
is set out more starkly in the following quote. 
you're under such pressure to deliver the audits that you had to do a 
lot less … you had to make some decisions that you weren't going to 
do some stuff because you didn't have the time. (Jerry, Firm D) 
In the same way as Christina, Jerry describes making a decision about when 
enough work had been done, and choosing to do less work than under the 
old approach. Jerry’s words are much more negative than Christina’s; “you’re 
under such pressure” is his starting point for explaining why he has done less 
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work, and he uses the phrase “you had to” twice, implying a lack of real 
choice. The new way of working is being imposed upon him, through 
pressure and lack of time.  
Reduced expertise on the audit team, arising from the increased use of 
trainees and the broader remits of more senior staff (Section 4.4.5.3) is an 
additional factor in auditors’ submission to the new approach. 
it felt to me in terms of the audits that we did less, and there was less 
expertise on the team, so we didn't - we couldn’t go into detail anyway 
because we didn't have that knowledge necessarily. (Jerry, Firm D) 
Jerry suggests that auditors are now less capable of some of the very 
detailed testing that might have been conducted at the Audit Commission. 
Even if there was time available to do the testing, this would not have been 
possible with the staff available, reduced both in number and in terms of skill 
mix. Again, Jerry’s words “we couldn’t” demonstrate that this is a change that 
has been imposed. He is prevented from doing the detailed testing, rather 
than choosing not to do it. 
5.6.2 Adopting the reconstruction 
Some auditors indicate through their language that they have adopted the 
firms’ reconstruction of audit. The following quotes both indicate that the 
auditors fully subscribe to the firm’s views regarding risks and planning. 
Going through proper processes at planning to identify proper risks, 
not risks that you think might be interesting, or, you know, you don’t 
know enough about and therefore you say it’s a risk.  So doing proper 
planning processes to just identify the risks that are just that (Graham, 
Firm B)  
Graham repeatedly uses the word “proper”, indicating that he endorses the 
view he describes regarding risk identification at the planning stage.  
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The issue on planning is that we know the risks, therefore we don't 
need to go into immense amounts of detail and put loads of stuff on 
the file to demonstrate that we know our audit. … So we've been 
encouraged to write less, document less, this year, and that's had an 
effect, so that's taken our time down, basically - which is just common 
sense really. (Colin, Firm C) 
Colin’s comparison here is with previous years at Firm C rather than with the 
Audit Commission. Nevertheless, his use of the term “common sense” 
indicates that he fully accepts the firm’s view that it is better to document less 
in the file to demonstrate his risk assessment.  
In a similar way, Alison talks about “real risks”, indicating that she has 
adopted the firm’s meaning of the word ‘risk’. 
some of it was really considering whether the risks you’re identifying 
really are real risks for that particular organisation. … I think generally 
the risk profile was lower than we would have done it in the Audit 
Commission.  I think that came from as I say being a bigger 
organisation actually balancing the risk within a multinational 
organisation that deals with Plcs as well as public sector. … 
… the facts are if you compare it to private or public limited companies 
it is lower risk and if you think that the public sector should be grouped 
in with that, which was the whole point, then it did its job. My personal 
views are that I don’t necessarily think that it should have been 
because I think there should be a higher standard or a different 
standard for public money (Alison, Firm D) 
In contrast with Graham, Alison is very clear that she personally disagrees 
with the recalibration of public sector risk in line with the private sector. Yet 
her words show her making sense of the change. She talks about the firm 
“balancing the risk” as a logical process and “facts” about the comparative 
risks. Thus she accepts the firm’s logic, even if it does not correspond with 
her personal view. 
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Similarly, Patrick discusses the slightly different view of independence at 
Firm C compared to the Audit Commission.  
We have a hugely robust independence process … This is proper 
independence, not what the Audit Commission thought was 
independence. If you read an advert for a client’s job, then according 
to the Audit Commission you couldn’t work on that audit again, even if 
you considered applying but didn’t apply. … There are many 
examples you could come up with but the Audit Commission’s view on 
independence was far more restrictive than was required under ethical 
standards. (Patrick, Firm C)  
Patrick views the Audit Commission’s view of independence as 
unnecessarily strict with regard to some circumstances. His words “this is 
proper independence” indicate that he fully endorses the firm’s different (less 
restrictive) view of independence. 
Auditors from all firms demonstrate through their language that they accept 
the logic and meanings adopted by the firms, including sometimes in cases 
where they disagree with it. 
5.7 Standardisation 
‘Standardising’ occurs in my data in two different guises. As well as being a 
strategy firms can implement to do just enough work and manage their risk, it 
is also a consequence of the reconstruction of the meaning of audit quality. 
This section explains how the imposition of the reconstruction of audit quality 
in alignment with commercial objectives leads to the standardisation of 
audits, both within firms and across different firms. 
Section 5.7.1 discusses standardisation strategies within firms. These 
strategies are used to differening extents within different firms to help firms to 
present an image (Section 5.7.2) and to expedite the ‘just enough’ agenda 
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(Section 5.7.3). Section 5.7.4 argues that there is a consequent 
subordination of public sector concerns. 
Section 5.7.5 addresses standardisation across firms, arising as a 
consequence of all firms reinterpreting audit quality in similar ways to meet 
their common commercial objectives, and Section 5.7.6 discusses how the 
standard towards which audits are converging is determined within the 
private sector.  
5.7.1 Standardisation strrategies 
Overt standardisation strategies to increase standardisation within firms 
include the use of structure (Section 5.7.1.1), and generic risks (Section 
5.7.1.2). Generic risks are risks specified by the audit firm that can be 
considered at all clients without assessing the clients specifically. Other 
strategies can lead towards standardisation even if that is not their specific 
aim: the increased consistency in the way audit approaches are applied 
(Section 5.7.1.3), the practice of reusing audit working papers (Section 
5.7.1.4) and responses to the ‘just enough’ agenda (Section 5.7.1.5). 
There is evidence of increased use of standardisation from a number of 
auditors at different firms. Although extent of standardisation is variable, all 
firms are experiencing similar pressures towards increased standardisation, 
and there is some evidence of standardisation being likely to increase in the 
future (Section 5.7.1.6). 
5.7.1.1 Standardisation through structure 
Standardisation can be achieved through increasing the structuring of audit 
files. 
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it's very structured in terms of how the file is set out and exactly how 
you do things.  There's lots of mandated forms, for example, you know 
– significant risks, there'll be a specific form that we fill in (Tracey, 
Firm C) 
According to Tracey, the Firm C audit file is “very structured”, with “lots of 
mandated forms” and the structure sets out “exactly how you do things”. This 
indicates a fairly high level of standardisation; files set out in a structured 
way, with mandatory forms and prescriptive guides are likely to encourage 
auditors to perform the audit in a similar way. Auditors at other firms also 
comment on an increased use of structure and standardised forms. 
I think we've got quite a lot more standard documents now. So we've 
built an efficiency into the process, so we don't have to reinvent the 
wheel (Dean, Firm B) 
I think the template was much more populated (Natalie, Firm D)  
Both Natalie’s and Dean’s comments show that more generic information is 
provided to auditors, and are suggestive of a more prescribed audit 
approach. The increase in standardised structures resonates with academic 
criticisms of “a rise in checklists and tick-box approaches to auditing which 
place less emphasis on processes of professional judgement and more 
emphasis on a compliance with rules and procedures mentality” (Humphrey 
et al., 2011, p. 447) and echoes Hopwood’s much earlier observation: 
“Rules, procedures, standardised processes and manuals are now more 
characteristic of the activities of audit firms rather than the widespread 
diffusion of discretion and judgement” (Hopwood, 1998, p. 515). 
These statements suggest a fairly broad, if not universal, increase in 
standardisation, through the increased use of structure, standard forms and 
generic procedures in audit files.  
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5.7.1.2 Standardisation through use of generic risks 
Some auditors mention being provided with generic risks for their audit 
clients.  
you would sort of get told what the big risks were to put in your  - the 
audit plan, so that would really be sort of standardised across the 
public sector team, so you'd really be told what they are. (Jerry, Firm 
D) 
we're supposed to be working off these template audits that say: here 
are the standard risks.  And you shouldn’t be going above that without 
director approval. (Matilda, Firm C) 
This leads to standardisation by a different route. Risk identification drives 
the audit (Section 4.4.4.1) and therefore starting with the same generic risks 
at different audits will direct the auditors towards the same testing 
procedures at those audits. 
5.7.1.3 Standardisation through increased consistency 
Standardisation of files can also be brought about through greater 
consistency in application of the approach. 
actually I don’t think the approach was more standardised, I think the 
application of the approach was better applied … So, the Audit 
Commission had a standard approach but it was just applied in very 
many different ways. I actually think that there was a greater 
consistency within the firm of how the approach was applied. (Alison, 
Firm D) 
This quote is a reminder that standardisation is not new, but was practised to 
some extent at the Audit Commission as well. Alison differentiates between 
standardisation and consistency; in her view, the standardisation of the two 
approaches is similar, but there is a “greater consistency” in how the 
approach is applied at Firm D compared to at the Audit Commission, where it 
could be “applied in many different ways”. Following this logic, a greater 
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consistency in application of the approach at Firm D will ultimately lead to 
audit files that are likely to be more uniform than the final audit files of the 
Audit Commission. 
Dean (Firm B) corroborates Alison’s statement in relation to the Audit 
Commission, and juxtaposes this against the “more standardised” approach 
at Firm B. 
We're more standardised now, I think. In the Commission days, I think 
every audit manager had the way they - despite the fact the 
Commission would say there's a standard approach to everything, I 
think you'd find that most managers in the Audit Commission days did 
what they'd always done on their audits (Dean, Firm B) 
Thus, promoting consistency in how a firm’s audit approach is applied is a 
further mechanism for standardising the audit. 
5.7.1.4 Standardisation through reusing working papers 
Some auditors talked about reusing working papers from different clients in 
order to save time. 
there's definitely efficiencies if you can reuse working papers and stuff 
from different clients, because at the end of the day a district council, 
wherever it is, is the same.  As are CCGs11. (Natalie, Firm B) 
This can be seen as a slightly different version of standardisation, driven by 
the individual rather than the firm. In the absence of a generic form, the 
auditor is using the same working papers across different clients in order to 
save time. Natalie regards this as appropriate because of the similarities 
between some types of clients.   
                                            
11 Clinical Commissioning Groups are NHS organisations responsible for purchasing 
healthcare for their local population. 
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5.7.1.5 Standardisation through ‘just enough’ 
Section 4.4 discussed the reduced time budgets available to auditors and the 
pressure on them to do ‘just enough’ work. As all auditors aim to only do the 
minimum required, there is less and less scope for variation.  
everyone’s been forced to do the same thing, as in cut tests out 
(Christina, Firm B) 
Even without a corporate drive towards standardised procedures, and even if 
auditors want to do more, time pressure and a focus on doing just enough 
work mean that it is less likely that staff have time in their budgets to be 
creative, and more likely that they stick to the same core procedures. 
there are areas that you'd probably - you'd want to look at in more 
depth … but you can't really because the budget's not there (Rose, 
Firm B) 
Rose suggests that the tighter budgets constrain her from doing more work 
in some areas. (See also Section 5.6.1.2.) Thus, even without a strategic 
increase in the use of template files and generic risks, there is a trend 
towards standardisation, because of the increased pressure to meet specific 
standards within a reduced time budget. 
5.7.1.6 The ongoing trend towards standardisation 
The previous sections have demonstrated a clear, if not universal, tendency 
towards a standardisation of audit procedures, through a number of different 
mechanisms. These findings resonate with those of Curtis, Humphrey, and 
Turley (2016) who comment that firms’ approaches are more prescriptive 
than international standards require. 
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Some participants’ comments indicate that standardisation might continue to 
increase as auditors continue to seek efficiency savings. 
there was certainly hope that the standardisation would increase 
(Gary, Firm A) 
we don't make as much of standardising the audit as much as we can, 
I think, to gain efficiencies from it (Natalie, Firm B) 
Gary speaks of standardisation as an aim; he hopes that standardisation will 
increase; and Natalie regards it as an opportunity to be more efficient. As 
well as increasing the intentional use of standardisation strategies, the long 
term trend towards commercialisation (Section 4.7) means that the pressures 
towards standardisation are ongoing. 
5.7.2 Standardisation facilitates presenting an image  
This section discusses the links between the increased standardisation of 
audits (Section 5.7.1) and presenting an image (Section 4.3).  
Section 4.3 established that presenting an image was important to audit firms 
in selling their services and in managing risk. Producing auditable working 
papers emerged as an important strategy in relation to both objectives; clear 
and auditable files help managers have confidence in their team’s work, to 
help the regulators to give the file a good quality score, and, hypothetically, 
to improve the file’s defensibility in court. This section discusses how using 
standard files and formats can help auditors to make their files auditable.  
Structure can be seen as a form of standardisation (Section 5.7.1.1). 
Increased structure can be linked to confidence in the audit opinion. 
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the greater structure at Firm C maybe enhances that confidence, in 
that you're perhaps driven to do things and to specify things more than 
you were at the Audit Commission (Tracey, Firm C) 
Tracey feels that the structured format of the Firm C audit files leads auditors 
“to do things and to specify things more” and that this increases her 
confidence in the file. Increased clarity of audit files helps auditors to have 
confidence in the audit opinion (Section 4.3.2.3), and it helps reviewers both 
internally and externally to be able to follow the audit file, to understand the 
work done and to give it a good quality score. Thus it is not just Tracey’s 
confidence that is increased, but also the reviewers’. 
Standard structures and procedures help firms to demonstrate that they are 
following procedures and therefore complying with requirements for a safe 
audit. This contributes to presenting an image of a good quality audit to 
regulators and courts (Section 4.3.2.2) and therefore contributes to 
legitimacy (Curtis & Turley, 2007; Hatherly, 1999; Power, 2003a). Thus the 
‘front stage’ ritual of audit (Downer, 2011; Power, 2003a) is strengthened. 
5.7.3 Standardisation facilitates ‘just enough’ 
Section 5.7.1.4 explain how the ‘just enough’ agenda encourages 
standardisation, because there is no time for auditors to go beyond the 
minimum required. Conversely, standardising audit procedures also 
facilitates the ‘just enough’ agenda in two significant ways. First, setting out 
detailed standard procedures enables more junior, less expensive staff to 
complete the work (Section 5.7.3.1). Second, auditors’ time is saved if they 
don’t have to think through what tests to do from first principles, because 
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they are already set out in the file (Section 5.7.3.2). Standardisation also 
helps firms to manage risk by controlling the work done (Section 5.7.3.3). 
5.7.3.1 Enabling the audit to be done by inexperienced staff 
By using very specific, rigid procedures, a firm can ensure that the audit is 
performed to a certain standard, irrespective of which individual completes 
the work. This means that firms are less reliant on individuals. If specific 
individuals leave, the procedures can be performed by someone else. If the 
audit is staffed by junior trainees, they can follow the file more easily. 
It's much more automated and much more rigid.  For a financial 
statements audit, you’ve got various sample tables to fill in and you're 
given specific things to do, so it is – it's kind of clearer in a way.  
Because it's very specific. (Matilda, Firm C)  
This minimises the risk of missing out important tests, which can be 
particularly helpful where more junior staff are doing the audit work, as less 
judgement is required. Using more junior staff, contributes to the ‘just 
enough’ agenda (Section 4.4.5). However, Curtis and Turley (2007) caution 
that undertaking audit procedures without understanding can be both 
inefficient and ineffective. 
5.7.3.2 Saving time by limiting judgement 
Standardised procedures and working papers can save auditors thinking 
time; Dean uses the phrase “we don’t have to reinvent the wheel” (Section 
5.7.1.1). Similarly, “efficiencies” are the reason Natalie gives for reusing 
working papers from different clients (Section 5.7.1.4). This echoes audit 
literature; for example, the much-cited study by Cushing and Loebbecke 
(1986) suggests efficiency as one reason for the increase in structured audit 
procedures. 
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One of the ways in which standardisation reduces thinking time is by 
reducing the need for judgement. Thus, standardisation challenges 
judgement (Francis, 1994; Hatherly, 1999). Francis (1994), Hatherly (1999) 
and Turley et al. (2016) among others argue that judgement is fundamental 
to auditing. However, the structure versus judgement debate in auditing 
literature has proponents on both sides (Power, 2003a) and is in any case 
transcended by authors such as Herrbach (2005), Humphrey and Moizer 
(1990) and Fischer (1996), who find that procedures are not necessarily 
followed in practice, and by Downer (2011), Holm and Zaman (2012) and 
Pentland (1993), who view audit procedures more as rhetorical than 
scientific. The use of scientific techniques is itself a judgement, and moving 
towards a more technical or standardised approach can be regarded as 
replacing one act of faith with another (Humphrey & Moizer, 1990). 
5.7.3.3 Controlling the work done 
A more standardised audit file can also be helpful where the audit is staffed 
by experienced individuals, by guiding them through the steps so that it is the 
firm’s version of the required steps, rather than the individual’s, that dictates 
the work that is done.  
maybe with TeamMate and perhaps some of the Audit Commission 
auditors, you know could go down maybe a route of you know being 
particularly interested in an area and I'm not sure there was anything 
on TeamMate to really drive them away from that, other than you 
know the general guidance of the manager and a focus on risks. But I 
think at Firm C it's very clear.  For example, what are the significant 
risks, what are the non-significant ones, what is a trivial balance, and 
there's a specified approach for each of those things, which I think 
again is clearer, and driven more clearly by the Firm C system. 
(Tracey, Firm C) 
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Tracey makes a clear contrast between Firm C and the Audit Commission. 
At the Audit Commission, she alleges, auditors “could go down … a route of 
… being particularly interested in an area”. The standardisation of the Firm C 
file helps the auditor to stay focused on the high risk areas rather than being 
distracted. Thus the firm enforces its ‘just enough’ agenda (Section 5.6.2); 
auditors are prevented from doing more than the minimum. 
Thus, as well as contributing to the efficiency agenda, increased 
standardisation helps the firms to exert management control over audit 
procedures (Power, 2003a), both by ensuring that inexperienced auditors do 
enough work and that more experienced auditors follow the firm’s agenda, 
rather than their own.   
5.7.4 Standardisation and subordinating public sector concerns 
Standardisation challenges specialisation. Following a standardised audit file 
or applying generic risks leads to an increased danger of misdirecting audit 
effort, targeting areas that are not risky for the public sector, and failing to 
address risks that are important. 
Unless you knew continuing care12 was an issue, there's just no way 
you'd ever have picked it up as being a risk. You know, [the file] was 
telling me to look at stock and it was telling me to look at income.  
Well, the only income a PCT13 gets is what the government or the 
Department of Health gives it. (Belinda, Firm C) 
                                            
12 ‘Continuing care’ refers to the obligation on the NHS to fund ongoing care for individuals 
whose needs are too complex to be met through other channels such as social care. 
Financial statements of some healthcare purchasers show substantial provisions and 
contingent liabilities for continuing care costs that could be claimed in relation to their 
patients.   
13 Primary care trusts are NHS healthcare purchasing organisations. 
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Here, Belinda expresses frustration at the focus of the audit file on risks such 
as stock and revenue recognition, which are risky areas for businesses but 
not usually for public sector organisations. Stock is very often minimal in the 
public sector (especially healthcare) and revenue straightforward. Belinda 
argues that the sector-specific issue of continuing care for healthcare 
purchasers could be missed by auditors using a standard Firm C file that 
targets private sector risks such as revenue recognition and stock and 
ignores specific public sector issues and risks. The concentration on 
commercial aims narrows the auditors’ focus (Wrenn, 2014), shifting their 
attention away from other concerns, such as idiosyncrasies of public sector 
accounting. 
Auditors report different levels of standardisation and different attitudes 
towards this. Many welcome the benefits relating to efficiency and clarity 
(Section 5.7.3), but there is some suggestion that a more measured level of 
standardisation is appropriate. 
It's one size fits all across the whole world, every single sector.   
(Belinda, Firm C) 
There's probably scope to become even more standardised in the 
sector that we're working in.  CCGs, trusts, councils, you know.  If 
you're talking private sector, obviously, that's totally different (Natalie, 
Firm B) 
While Belinda is very critical of standardisation, Natalie regards 
standardisation within the public sector as appropriate, though she notes that 
the private sector is “ obviously” “totally different”. 
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5.7.5 Standardising across firms 
The previous section discussed standardisation within firms. In this section, I 
argue that audits are becoming increasingly standardised across firms, as all 
firms strive to cope with the same commercial pressures. 
5.7.5.1 All firms meet the regulatory standards 
The commercial imperative of presenting an image of a good quality audit is 
one driver for standardisation, as all firms strive to meet the same quality 
review criteria. Regulatory reviews are taken extremely seriously (Section 
4.3.2). They contribute to how auditors feel about their work and how firms 
are perceived, they are incentivised through appraisals and bonuses, and the 
possibility of a review is part of auditors’ consciousness as they perform their 
work. Moreover, quality standards influence how firms design their audit 
approach.  
A good quality audit is obviously one that … receives good favourable 
comment from regulators … The whole approach hinges on that. 
(Paul, Firm D) 
Paul’s words “the whole approach hinges on that” illustrate the 
pervasiveness of the regulator’s view. The audit approach is constructed to 
meet the regulator’s standards. This is consistent with the portrayal of audit 
inspections by Beattie et al. (2015) as very influential.  
The standards set by the regulator are also reinforced to individual auditors 
through the firms’ guidance and training. 
we’ll also have a checklist saying – you know, these things came up in 
the AQR and there’d be guidance on how to address those going 
forward (Tracey, Firm C) 
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Any findings from AQRT are always informed to us and they form part 
of our training. (Ashleigh, Firm A)  
In this way, the regulators’ comments arising through quality reviews lead to 
changes in auditors’ practices, so that they align more with the regulator’s 
view of a good quality audit.  
Thus, audits become more standardised across firms, as all firms design, 
redesign and fine-tune their procedures to conform to the FRC’s review 
criteria. Therefore, the pervasiveness of the FRC standards (Section 4.3.2.1) 
leads to standardisation across firms. 
5.7.5.2 No firms go beyond the regulatory standards 
Because the standards set by the FRC are so influential (Section 4.3.2), and 
because audit quality is generally unobservable (Section 2.5.2), there is very 
little incentive for any firm to go beyond those standards. All firms aim for 
‘just enough’ (Section 4.4). 
Under the PSAA regime, which makes use of the FRC’s quality reviews, the 
external observer can access quality scores for firms that undertake public 
sector audits in the UK (Section 4.3.2.1). Therefore the FRC’s view of a 
firm’s audit quality is observable. Achieving a good score from the regulator’s 
review is one way in which firms can demonstrate audit quality. Auditors 
regard meeting the regulatory standards as extremely important (Section 
4.3.2.1). 
Gong beyond the regulatory standards, other than in terms of client service 
or ‘added value’ (Section 4.3.1.2), is largely unobservable and might not 
even be noticed by potential clients.  
 
 
220 
 
I've got to be honest, they can all meet the specification - you know, 
because they are all highly professional, highly experienced firms, so 
it's the usual suspects – [names audit firms] - so a lot of it comes 
down to the price. (John, NHS client) 
John views all the firms bidding for audit work as being of a similar high 
quality.  
Auditors perceive a similar scenario in local government, where most local 
authorities have signed up to PSAA’s national scheme to have their auditors 
appointed for them (Russell, 2017). This changes the dynamic in the 
appointment process, as PSAA, rather than individual clients, appraise the 
bids. Despite the different system, audit quality remains largely 
unobservable. One auditor reflected    
… it doesn't matter how good your score is, because at the end of the 
day when everybody goes into the bidding process, the PSAA - let's 
be honest, are going to score everybody on quality, pretty much the 
same, aren't they? (Dean, Firm B) 
These findings resonate with the contention of Humphrey et al. (2011) that 
firms do not attempt to differentiate themselves based on methodology. 
When asked in what ways their firm is distinctive or different, the main 
explanation provided is that ‘they recruit the best staff’ or ‘offer the 
best training, practical support and career development prospects’. As 
such, the firms appear now to compete on infrastructure and people 
but not on methodologies (Humphrey et al., 2011, pp. 446-447) 
Donovan, Frankel, Lee, Martin, and Seo (2014) contend that customers do 
not purchase audit services on the basis of quality, but assume a standard 
level of quality. They draw an analogy with airlines, which do not attempt to 
differentiate themselves on safety, because a minimum level of safety is 
presumed and no more is required.  
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This lack of differentiation on audit quality is exacerbated by a perceived 
subordination of quality to price. This is evident in John’s quote above and is 
echoed by auditors: although it is very important to meet the FRC’s 
standards, offering a low cost product is even more crucial. 
you just hope that your body of evidence of how you’ve behaved with 
them over the years stands you in good stead for going forward.  But 
again, a tender process is down to price.  (Ashleigh, Firm A) 
Cost is a much more visible feature of audit services and extreme public 
sector cost pressures mean that public sector customers are particularly 
sensitive to cost.  
when all of the clients were asked did you want to save fifty percent 
on your audit fees they all said yes because nobody is going to say 
not, are they, in that scenario? Nobody - you know, they see the 
opportunity to spend less money on audit, they’re going to take it 
(Lisa, Firm B) 
The continued reduction in audit fees (Public Sector Audit Appointments, 
2017) provides evidence that price is also considered an important factor in 
the PSAA appointments process.   
An even bleaker view is that organisations may be happy to be audited by 
auditors who are pressed for time or who lack a good understanding of the 
sector.  The following quote is from an assistant director of finance at an 
NHS foundation trust.  
as someone being audited, I’m surprised that they sometimes don’t 
ask for some things …. but as a client, you’re very happy with that 
situation – which is dreadful in a way, isn’t it?  But you are.  You can’t 
help but be relieved. (NHS client) 
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While seeking out poor audit quality is unlikely to be formal policy in any 
organisation, this does add weight to the argument that there is little demand 
for auditing above a minimum standard. 
In summary, it makes commercial sense for auditors to do enough audit work 
to guard against the risks of delivering an unsafe opinion and the associated 
financial and reputation damage this could cause.  It also makes sense for 
firms to do enough to meet the FRC’s standards, scoring well in the FRC’s 
quality reviews, because this helps to boost their professional image, which 
attracts clients.  There is however little or no incentive for quality to be any 
higher than that which meets professional standards and the FRC’s quality 
criteria. Thus, audit quality is limited to what is auditable through the FRC’s 
regulatory process. Therefore audit quality tends towards a standard, 
minimum quality, as suggested by Akerlof (1970). This contradicts prominent 
scholars Francis (2004, 2011b) and DeFond and Zhang (2014) who view 
audit quality as varying along a continuum, but provides evidence consistent 
with the argument made by Donovan et al. (2014). 
5.7.6 Standardisation to a private sector standard 
The standards towards which audits are tending are set by the regulators, 
who determine the quality criteria against which audits are assessed. The 
most frequently mentioned quality reviewers in my interview data are the 
FRC’s Audit Quality Review Team (AQRT), which is highly influential 
(Section 4.3.2.1). Some participants also mentioned internal quality reviews 
and the role of PSAA in commissioning the FRC reviews.  
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PSAA, a public sector body, is responsible for monitoring public sector audit 
contracts. The PSAA chooses to rely on the FRC’s reviews of audit quality to 
assist in this contract monitoring (Public Sector Audit Appointments, 2018b). 
As the FRC works across the public and private sectors, assessing audit 
quality against common standards, audit quality is necessarily considered in 
a generic way. The FRC is unlikely to focus on any public sector specific 
agenda. The housing revenue account, for example, in local government, is 
substantial for many councils, and council housing is a current topical issue, 
but this is unlikely to feature as a theme in an FRC review, because it does 
not affect the private sector.  
Therefore even though audit quality monitoring and reporting is conducted 
within the public sector, by PSAA, the PSAA’s deferral to the FRC for audit 
quality reviews means that the audit quality standards applied are those of 
the private sector, and there is little consideration of public sector specific 
issues in relation to the financial audit of public sector bodies. 
5.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has shown that in order to realise the commercialisation of the 
audit practiced by the firms, auditors have reconstructed their idea of what a 
good quality audit is. The reinterpretation includes efficiency, and sometimes 
customer service, as attributes of audit quality, and risk is recalibrated in the 
context of the private sector and the firms. The reconstructed audit quality is 
imposed on auditors through the pervasiveness of the regulatory regime. 
The key concepts discussed in this chapter are summarised in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 Reconstructing audit quality 
 
 
This model is revisited in Chapter 7, where I interpret the imposition of the 
reconstruction of the new standards of audit quality as symbolic violence 
wielded by the firms (Bourdieu, 1977). 
Standardisation strategies are used by firms to varying extents to achieve 
efficiency whilst controlling for a minimum level of quality. This is a 
consequence of commercialisation (Power, 2003a) and can lead to the 
subordination of both judgement and specialisation. Constraining auditor 
judgement in favour of more scientific procedures could be argued to bolster 
the ‘front stage’ of audit (Downer, 2011) and thereby increase trust, which 
contributes towards the ‘reputation’ part of audit quality attributes (Section 
2.5.9). At the same time, reducing the specialist knowledge applied to audits 
challenges the judgemental ‘back stage’ procedures (Downer, 2011) and the 
‘competence’ aspect of audit quality (Section 2.5.5). 
imposing 
the new 
standards
reinterpreting 
risk
less work is 
required
reinterpreting 
quality
Reconstructing 
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This chapter has shown that public sector audits are tending towards a 
constant standard, aligned with the standard applied in the private sector 
standard, which has been shown to be deficient (Sikka, 2009b). Furthermore, 
the ongoing tendency for audits to incline towards a standard product 
subverts one of the key objectives of the NPM and neoliberalist agenda: 
choice (J. Clarke, 2004; Pollitt, 2013).    
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6 Embedding the reconstruction 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the third element of the substantive theory: 
Embedding the reconstruction. I show that the reconstruction of audit quality 
(Chapter 5), as a result of commercialisation (Chapter 4), is orchestrated in 
such a way that all auditors’ responses lead to the new meanings becoming 
reinforced and embedded.  
Embedding the reconstruction of audit quality contributes to the overall 
reconstruction of public sector audit by ensuring that new meanings are 
continually reinforced and perpetuated. 
Section 6.2 shows how the sub-category Embedding was constructed from 
the data. The rest of this chapter addresses each stage of this process: 
working in the same way as before (Section 6.3), working longer hours 
(Section 6.4), feeling uncomfortable (Section 6.5), changing perspective 
(Section 6.6) and embedding the change (Section 6.7). 
6.2 Constructing the sub-category 
I noticed early in the data collection process that some interviewees were 
extremely positive about their new working environments. I wondered 
whether this was a particular feature of the individuals or the offices I had 
visited, or whether auditors were generally satisfied with the move and 
pleased with their work. I used theoretical sampling to investigate this further, 
deliberately selecting auditors who worked in different geographical locations 
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and auditors who had left their jobs since the transfer (Appendix D). As well 
as coding the new interviews line by line, I revisited previous interviews with 
this in mind, and coded them for feelings and attitudes. At this point my 
codes included ‘Being positive’ and ‘Feeling uncomfortable’ as well as 
‘Responding to the change’. 
Eventually, my coding reflected broad variations in the attitudes of auditors to 
the change. Comparing the rich codes ‘Responding to the change’ and 
‘Feeling uncomfortable’ was fruitful, leading to a theoretical memo about 
responses to change. I noticed that all responses led eventually to the 
change becoming embedded, and amalgamated these together into the sub-
category ‘Embedding the reconstructed audit’.  
I subsequently linked these ideas to the codes ‘Working in the same way as 
before’ and ‘Working longer hours’ to reflect auditors’ responses to the 
change in the form of a process (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 Reinforcing the reconstructed audit 
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The stages in the process are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
Not all auditors experienced all the stages. 
6.3 Working in the same way as before 
Many auditors at all four firms stated that they continued to work in the same 
way as they did before the transfer. 
it felt very similar, underneath that big change (Guy, Firm A) 
I would say that there was very little, if any, difference really between 
the Firm B audit approach and what we had been doing under the 
Audit Commission (Lisa, Firm B) 
we transferred over and have done the same work as before if you 
stayed in the audit grade. You basically do the same job. (Colin, Firm 
C) 
the audit itself didn’t change (Paul, Firm D) 
In explaining these statements, auditors frequently made reference to 
international standards on auditing (see Section 5.3.1) and other relevant 
standards and guidance as the continuing basis for what they do. The 
following two quotes explain this clearly and are representative of others. 
Well, both methodologies [Audit Commission and Firm C], as all audit 
methodologies, are built around ISAs to ensure compliance with ISAs.  
And therefore the actual application of the audit isn’t fundamentally 
different.(Patrick, Firm C) 
what's the same is kind of the underpinning guidance behind that – so 
you know you're still working to the CIPFA Code, the NHS guidance, 
and so on, that's clearly driving the level of work we're doing. (Tracey, 
Firm C) 
Because the underpinning guidance has not changed significantly, many 
auditors feel that there has not been a significant change in their work. Thus, 
for many auditors, their starting point is to attempt to do their jobs in the 
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same way as before. However, despite these overarching or underpinning 
similarities, auditors have reported many smaller changes, as discussed in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, that have affected the audit.  
There is evidence of some auditors being slow to make changes. 
I think some people still are very much: well, we’ve always done it like 
this, it works, I’m not going to change it unless I absolutely have to. 
(Christina, Firm B) 
Dean and Belinda are examples of auditors continuing to follow old 
procedures at their new employers. 
I'd audited in the way I'd always audited, using my knowledge gained 
with the Audit Commission, and I just fitted it to the Firm C stuff.  And 
the Firm C stuff, where it said that you have to do this, I'd written why 
that was not relevant because ... but what I've done instead is.   
(Belinda, Firm C) 
I don't think [the transition] affects me in terms of - am I doing this, or 
should I be doing that, or ... because my job is still my job. … I set 
myself certain standards for how to do it. I've been doing this long 
enough, I know (Dean, Firm B) 
Both auditors expressed strong views about the ‘correct’ way to do an audit 
and were not willing to compromise them, but instead reported following their 
own idea of what the correct approach was. Examples of this type of 
behaviour, where auditors continue to enact old procedures to satisfy their 
own personal requirements, have also been found in other studies. For 
example, Fischer (1996) and Curtis and Turley (2007), researching the 
introduction of new IT audit procedures and the business risk approach 
respectively, found that auditors were reluctant to believe that some of the 
traditional testing they done in previous years was now unnecessary. 
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6.4 Working longer hours 
Section 4.5 discussed the phenomenon of auditors working longer hours. 
Longer hours are a significant factor in achieving the firms’ efficiency 
objectives (Section 4.5) whilst allowing auditors to feel comfortable that they 
have done enough work (Section 5.3.2). This section discusses working 
longer hours as a stage in the process of reconstructing the audit, and 
explores auditors’ attitudes towards working longer hours, linking longer 
hours with discomfort, which is the next stage in the process (Section 6.5). 
6.4.1.1 Longer hours as a stage in the process of reconstruction 
There is some evidence that auditors were initially inclined to work longer 
hours in an attempt to continue doing their work the same way as before, at 
the same time as meeting the requirements of their new firm. The most 
significant new requirement auditors discussed was the reduced budget 
(Section 4.4.1.1). Section 4.4.3 discussed strategies for being efficient in 
order to cope with the new budget, and that one of the most significant 
strategies, mentioned much more often than changed work practices, was 
simply working longer hours.  
We just worked harder and got the audit done (Lisa, Firm B) 
This is consistent with McDonough and Polzer’s (2012) findings that 
employees tend to respond to conflict between personal and management 
expectations by working harder. 
6.4.1.2 Attitudes towards longer hours 
Auditors frequently used neutral words to describe the practice of working 
longer hours. For example, neither Colin’s statement “you need to work at 
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weekends” (Table 17, Firm C) nor Dean’s statement “most people, at final 
accounts, are doing lots of hours” (Table 17, Firm B) attributes the need to 
work at weekends to the firm or anywhere else. The following quote portrays 
the practice as logical.  
I don’t think that there was necessarily an expectation that people 
were working till two o’clock in the morning to do that. But equally that 
was the inevitable consequence of the position that we found 
ourselves in and to be honest again, this is may be just a fault in my 
personality, I’d rather work till two o’clock in the morning myself than 
expect anybody else to do that. So … that’s just where you end up. 
(Lisa, Firm B) 
The phrases it was “an inevitable consequence” and “that’s just where you 
end up” lack a sense of blame for the longer hours. If anything, Lisa blames 
herself: “this may be just a fault in my personality”. This accords with 
research by Lupu and Empson (2015), who portray the long hours culture as 
normalised. There is also some resonance with the arguments of Anderson-
Gough et al. (2000) that longer hours are required in order to provide good 
client service rather than in order to make a profit for partners. 
Some auditors were much more critical of what they saw as unreasonable 
expectations. For example Belinda (Firm C) said “It felt like we were donkeys 
for them to flog”. McNair (1991) posits that younger (more junior) staff are 
more likely to be dissatisfied with the received logic operating within firms 
than their senior colleagues, because they have not yet been socialised into 
the culture, and because firm procedures conflict with their education that 
encourages truthfulness. McNair is referring to the generally accepted 
custom at accounting firms of not recording all hours that are worked, despite 
official policy that all hours must be recorded. Although Belinda, like all of the 
public sector auditors who transferred, was very experienced in audit, she 
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had not been socialised into the ways of the firms, but into the ways of the 
public sector. Auditors transferring from the Audit Commission lacked the 
socialisation into the firms’ logic that their existing staff had experienced, and 
were more likely to be critical of the firm’s customs, norms and internal logic. 
The firm’s expectations contradict Belinda’s sense of fairness, cultivated 
through many years as a public sector worker.  
The following lengthy quote from a former Firm D auditor provides an 
insightful reflection on the long hours culture at that firm, and his co-
operation with it. 
I'm one who tries to be strict with work / life balance, you know, I have 
interests outside of work - but I was working Saturday and Sunday - I 
was doing six or seven hours on a Saturday and a Sunday … 
sometimes I wasn't getting back till ten at night, and I'd be getting up 
ridiculous time to get to [location] early. ... I was having conversations 
with audit teams in New Zealand and the United States and Eastern 
Europe … you were having to have this conversation in New Zealand 
… funny times of the day … You were constantly on the go. I had a 
blackberry. I never want a blackberry again because it would basically 
start flashing, and you'd just - because you never switched off from 
work, it would start flashing and you'd just have a quick check. And, 
you know, they don't force you to do this, and they tell you - you must 
have a work / life balance, and stuff, but the way all the systems are 
set up, just the budgets and the expectations in appraisals, and the 
bonus procedure, all sort of coerces you into doing these  long hours. 
(Jerry, Firm D) 
Jerry describes his working day being stretched simultaneously in many 
directions: arriving in the office early as well as staying late and working 
weekends, out of hours calls to New Zealand, and staying in touch via 
blackberry. This leads to him working very long hours despite identifying 
himself as “one who tries to be strict with work / life balance” and even 
though “they don’t force you to do this”. This resonates with Lupu and 
Empson’s “autonomy paradox”, whereby “in spite of being subject to 
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increasingly rigorous management control systems, professionals persist in 
believing that their intensive and sustained pattern of overwork is self-
chosen” (Lupu & Empson, 2015, p. 1311). In retrospect, having left Firm D, 
Jerry construes this as coercion, which accords with Lupu and Empson’s 
interpretation of overwork in the context of domination and subjugation.    
For auditors such as Belinda and Jerry, the practice of working longer hours 
is very clearly linked to discomfort. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is often 
depicted as logical and in neutral terms. 
6.5 Feeling uncomfortable 
Many audit staff have experienced discomfort as they tried to manage their 
existing knowledge and understanding of audit work in a new and different 
environment. This section explores some of the sources of discomfort: 
changed working conditions (Section 6.5.1), the change in the role (Section 
6.5.2), personal disagreement with a firm’s official line (Section 6.5.3), 
discomfort with the private sector ethos (Section 6.5.4) and not fitting in 
(Section 6.5.5). 
6.5.1 Discomfort relating to working conditions 
There is evidence of changes in working conditions at all four firms that some 
auditors have found difficult. The practice of working longer hours (Section 
6.4) is one significant factor in auditors’ discomfort. This section discusses 
other changes to working conditions that auditors have found difficult. 
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6.5.1.1 Practical difficulties 
A number of auditors mentioned that the firms have fewer local offices than 
the Audit Commission, and that they were required to travel further. Gary 
(Firm A) provided the following detail about the increase in his daily travel 
time. 
When I was with the Commission I had the choice of an office in 
[location] which is 20 minutes by train away from home or [location] 
which is near [station] which is the station that you come in, then that 
suddenly changed to [station] which is an hour away unless you get 
stuck in traffic or [station] which is an additional half hour when you’re 
already doing close to a two-hour journey. (Gary, Firm A) 
This disclosure was made towards the end of the interview, in response to 
being asked whether there were any other ways in which working for a firm 
was different. This in itself is noteworthy; although a change in locations 
could be seen as relatively trivial, it was significant enough to Gary for him to 
mention without prompting. When asked if the increased travel made a 
difference, he answered “it probably did to me”. Gary indicates that this is 
due to the compound effect of the extended commute alongside the 
extended working day, exacerbated by specific personal circumstances. In 
combination with other things, a seemingly minor change has had enough 
impact to make a difference to people’s lives. 
Lucy (Firm C) experienced similar problems with a change in the location of 
her office base. 
… my official base was [Location A] and, you know, I had children – it 
was [Location B] before.  It’s not that they expected you to go to 
[Location A] every day, but sometimes you had to be in [Location A] at 
8.30 on a Monday morning and for me to get there was just ridiculous. 
(Lucy, Firm C) 
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Again, the change in location might not be regarded as significant, especially 
as Lucy clarifies that she was not expected to go there every day (or even 
very often). However, Lucy’s personal circumstances (having children) made 
this small change very difficult to manage. 
There are also more instances of auditors being expected to stay away from 
home. Dean (Firm B) mentioned being required to stay away from home to 
work at a client 200 miles away. Rose (also Firm B) has not been required to 
stay away, but she illustrates the potential difficulties for part time staff 
associated with working in different locations. 
I have found it quite difficult, because a lot of the opportunities are - 
involves travel, and to develop into different areas, or get experience 
in different sectors, different clients, they tend to be some distance 
away - so - there's a lot of things that are in the [city] office and things 
that you can't always do when you [work part time]. (Rose, Firm B) 
Rose’s comments suggest that although, unlike Lucy, her employer has been 
able to accommodate her working patterns, not volunteering for such 
opportunities could be career limiting. 
One auditor described a practical difficulty in accessing the materials to do 
her job, because the audit files were set up in a font size too small for her to 
read.  
it sounds really silly - but it was all these little boxes on the screen, 
and there was no way you could change the size of any of them, and 
their standard font was 8 point font. … I just couldn't read it … If you 
resized things so that they were big enough to read, you then couldn't 
scroll down to read it all. … they said - well, nobody's ever complained 
before.  I said - well, if you look round your staff, most of them are in 
their 20s (Belinda, Firm C) 
Belinda reports that her problems were met with unconcern by the firm, even 
though they caused her real difficulties in undertaking her work. This 
 
 
236 
 
particular situation is an isolated incident in my data but it is illustrative of 
firms’ treatment of their employees as a uniform commodity, and 
unwillingness to make adjustments and allowances for individual 
circumstances. (See also Section 6.5.1.3). Homogeneity in large accounting 
firms has been observed even internationally (Spence, Dambrin, Carter, 
Husillos, & Archel, 2015). It can be viewed as a legacy of historical ideas of 
professionalism that is challenged by the current shift towards diversity, 
though this shift is currently more evident in discourse than in practice 
(Edgley et al., 2016). 
6.5.1.2 Being expected to be contactable 
A few auditors reported an increased expectation that they would be 
contactable at all times. 
when I walked out of the office on a Thursday evening I'd turn  my 
blackberry off and I wouldn't turn it on again till Monday morning.  And 
I used to get told off that I was not available.  Well, I don't work 
Fridays. (Belinda, Firm C)  
if the client wants something then you respond regardless of whether 
you’re on holiday or not (Alison, Firm D) 
Both of these quotes highlight the auditors’ perception that they are required 
to be available outside of working hours, including weekends (Belinda) and 
holidays (Alison). Alison relates this expectation to responding to the client’s 
demands, which corresponds to the theory that client service is used to 
rationalise firms’ demands (Anderson-Gough et al., 2000). 
There are differences here between the four firms studied. The expectation 
of staying in contact is mentioned at both firms C and D but is not apparent in 
my interviews with employees at firms A and B.  
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6.5.1.3 Not making concessions for individuals 
Lucy (Firm C) makes the general point that Firm C was unwilling to make 
concessions in relating to individual circumstances. 
There was far less understanding or concern for individuals’ 
circumstances. ...  that was a significant factor in a number of people 
leaving.  And it wasn’t even necessarily unwillingness, it was just 
inability to do what they expected you to do, either in terms of location 
or in number of hours. You just couldn’t do it. … they had some very 
difficult conversations …  And most people just decided – I’m just 
going to leave.  Some people left with nothing to go to.  … Part time, 
children, you know, what do you want me to do? … you’re not going to 
leave your children unattended, are you? (Lucy, Firm C)  
Lucy’s comments, echoed by a small number of other participants, resonate 
with extant research that continues to find barriers for women in pursuing 
careers at more senior levels in accounting firms (Anderson-Gough et al., 
2000; Carter et al., 2015; Edgley et al., 2016; Kornberger, Carter, & Ross-
Smith, 2010; Lupu & Empson, 2015). Detailed consideration of gender and 
diversity issues is outside of the scope of this thesis, but the question of 
whether existing difficulties for minority groups are exacerbated through the 
implementation of NPM policies would be an interesting avenue for further 
research. 
6.5.1.4 Summary: discomfort relating to working conditions 
In summary, auditors transferring to firms experienced discomfort in relation 
to being expected to work longer hours, and a number of other minor 
changes that were significant for some individuals. This is consistent with 
other research that finds large accounting firms to be seen as “a ‘nightmare’ 
to work for” in terms of both working hours and conditions (Stringfellow et al., 
2015, p. 96) and is consistent with the subordination of fairness predicted by 
Hood (1991) as a result of prioritising efficiency and risk management 
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(Section 2.6.2). This contributes to the firms’ objectives in two distinct ways: 
first, the long hours are a significant enabling factor in allowing firms to be 
efficient enough to make a profit (Section 4.4.3), and second, the harsh 
working conditions contribute to the more dynamic staffing structure, 
because a high turnover of staff (Section 6.6.2) leads to a weaker and less 
expensive skill mix (Section 4.4.5.2).   
6.5.2 Discomfort relating to the change in the role 
A number of auditors expressed dissatisfaction at the change in their role. 
There are two main reasons for this: first, the narrowing of the auditor’s remit 
(Section 6.5..2.1) and second, the increased emphasis on commercial skills 
such as sales and client service (Section 6.5.2.2).   
6.5.2.1 Narrowing the auditor’s remit 
Alongside the transfer of auditors to firms, the scope of the audit narrowed to 
focus much more on financial statements (Section 1.2.3.3). This reduction in 
the auditors’ remit has led to a lack of variety for some individuals, where 
their job has been focused on the core audit. 
all the performance work has obviously gone, so there's nothing at all 
that relates to that.  Which is a bit of a shame, because that's the stuff 
I used to like doing (Matilda, Firm C) 
personally I felt that the fact that the scope of the audit was a lot wider 
was a good thing. I mean I think it was certainly what attracted me to 
doing the job in terms of variety (Lisa, Firm B) 
Both Matilda and Lisa relate the previous variety in the public sector auditor’s 
role to their job satisfaction. This sense of the changed auditor’s role being 
less interesting is not shared by all participants, however. Some are 
exceptionally positive about the opportunities they have had – see Section 
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4.4.5.1 regarding promotions and Section 6.6.1 regarding auditors embracing 
the change. A very significant difference is that many opportunities are now 
seen as additional to the core audit role. 
… if you want to do it, you volunteer for it, and you do it ontop of the 
job you've already got, and demonstrate that you're willing to 
progress. (Colin, Firm C) 
Opportunities beyond the core audit work are available, but they are 
available only to individuals who are willing to volunteer to work even harder 
than the long hours required to do the core audit role (Section 4.5). For those 
who do not wish to take on additional (voluntary) work, their jobs have 
become more routine. This reflects recent concerns about the recruitment 
and retention of suitable staff in the profession, as audit risks becoming an 
unattractive career (Turley et al., 2016).  
6.5.2.2 Networking and selling 
Section 4.6.2 discussed the firms’ prioritisation of soft skills over technical 
skills.  For some auditors, this shift is a source of discomfort. 
… there was certainly pressure to sort of create those networks of 
clients. It was always in appraisals about building up contacts and 
things like that. And that's something that I felt ... you know, I didn't 
feel I really had those skills. I've never really been an effective 
salesperson, and that's where I felt really out of my depth at Firm D, 
because it really wasn't my cup of tea, doing that sort of thing. (Jerry, 
Firm D) 
Jerry’s discomfort is evident; he felt “out of his depth” and “it really wasn’t 
[his] cup of tea”. He explains that he feels that he lacks skills that have now 
become important (“it was always in appraisals”) for his role. Similarly, 
Christina talks about finding networking difficult. 
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that’s such hard work because I think obviously the bulk of our work is 
still public sector ... So it’s very difficult to build those relationships 
when you realise that you can’t offer anything (Christina, Firm B) 
Both Jerry and Christina are trying to use skills that are relatively unfamiliar 
to them due to their public sector backgrounds, and finding this challenging 
and uncomfortable. 
At the same time, specialist knowledge that was valued at the Audit 
Commission has become less useful. Rose stated that “it's not particularly 
valued and it's probably not necessary” (quote in Section 4.6.2) and that 
skills in bidding for work are now valued more than in depth sector 
knowledge. When asked whether this matters, she responded “only in terms 
of people's self esteem”. In Rose’s view, the devaluation in auditors’ existing 
skills has impacted on individuals’ confidence and self respect.  
Those who find the shift in skills difficult, or who are not interested in 
progressing, are more likely to leave (Section 6.6.2), facilitating efficiency via 
a weaker skill mix (Section 4.4.5.2). 
6.5.3 Disagreeing with the official line 
A number of auditors showed a cynical attitude towards the firms’ 
procedures. Auditors adopted different strategies for dealing with these 
differences in opinion, which can mainly be grouped into two categories: 
open disagreement and cynical distancing. 
6.5.3.1 Open disagreement 
A few auditors openly disagreed with their employer’s procedures, continuing 
to work in their own way despite the changes. Section 6.3 discusses 
auditors’ propensity to continue working in the same way as before. In the 
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following example, Belinda describes how she overtly disagrees with Firm 
C’s audit approach and follows her own procedures instead.  
… some of the rebuttable presumptions that aren't relevant in local 
government - like in the Commission, we always had a standard 
wording as to why you hadn't done it.  Well, because I'd taken out of 
last year's file, I just updated the dates and what have you and put 
that in. But Firm C were saying - you can't rebut this.  And I was 
saying - don't be so stupid, or course I'm rebutting it.  So I was happy 
that I'd got the right audit opinion, but whether it would have got 
through their quality review, I don't know. (Belinda, Firm C) 
The path Belinda has chosen to follow is consistent with her own conscience 
and gives her enough comfort to be able to sign off her audit procedures 
(Section 4.4.2.2) but is more onerous than just following Firm C’s 
procedures, as well as running the risk of failing the firm’s quality review 
process. The position Belinda has chosen is difficult, uncomfortable, and, in 
the longer term, untenable, due to the strict enforcement of the quality control 
regime (Section 4.3.2). 
6.5.3.2 Cynical distancing 
While some auditors were open about their disagreement with their 
employer’s approach or procedures, others were more discreet about their 
cynicism.  
I think we [staff who transferred from the Audit Commission] probably 
had quite a cynical view.  And as an audit manager I didn’t sit there 
and vocalise my cynical view – I said, no, this is what we’re going to 
do, you know, all the rest of it, but I think internally … I wasn’t 
overjoyed by it (Lucy, Firm C) 
Lucy is clear that she felt “cynical” about the move to the private sector, but 
she separates what she thinks “internally” from the view she expresses 
outwardly “as an audit manager”. In her audit manager role, she plays the 
part of a representative of the firm, instructing her team to follow the new 
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corporate procedures. There is a disconnect between what Lucy says “this is 
what we’re going to do” and what she feels “I wasn’t overjoyed”. Kosmala 
and Herrbach (2006) refer to this as ‘cynical distancing’, which can be used 
as a strategy for individuals to maintain an illusion of autonomy. “Distance-
taking enables audit practitioners to perform what is expected from them, 
that is, doing their job properly despite what they seem to ‘really think’” 
(Kosmala & Herrbach, 2006, p. 1401). 
My findings contrast with those of Kosmala and Herrbach (2006), whose 
research suggests that auditors take pleasure in this distancing; they “play” 
(p. 1418) with authenticity whilst keeping an ironical distance. By contrast, 
Lucy is very clearly uncomfortable with her situation. In addition to her 
understated “I wasn’t overjoyed” in the quote above, she later adds a much 
more explicit “God, when you talk about it all the horror comes back to you“. 
This interjection followed a discussion about the reduced expertise on the 
audit (Section 4.4.5) and her fear of creating a bad impression with the client 
(see quote in Section 4.3.1.4) and leaves no doubt as to her discomfort in 
her position. Rather than taking pleasure in minor subversions of firm 
procedures, as suggested by Kosmala and Herrbach (2006), Lucy’s attitude 
has more in common with McNair’s junior auditors who, having not yet been 
socialised into the ways of the firm, are uncomfortable with practices that 
conflict with their existing values (McNair, 1991). (See also Section 6.4.)   
A further example of cynical distancing is auditors’ submission to reviews by 
individuals who may be unfamiliar with public sector accounting. (See also 
Section 5.6.1.) 
 
 
243 
 
That was quite difficult actually because the partner who did the 
review had no previous experience of local government or the public 
sector at all ... she didn’t know what statutory overrides were, she 
didn’t know what SeRCOP14 was … I really questioned, or I wanted to 
question although I really didn’t get the opportunity to formally 
question - in my own head I questioned whether she should have 
been doing the review at all … The [reviewer] sent the staff to do 
[extra work] because she felt it was necessary … she just said you 
have to go and do this, which [when the deadline is imminent] isn’t 
really what you want to be doing, but you know. (Lisa, Firm B) 
Lisa questions “in her own head” whether the reviewer was suitably qualified 
to be doing the job, but doesn’t “get the opportunity” to question this overtly. 
Even though Lisa disagrees with the reviewer, she recognises that the 
reviewer is in a position of power and complies with the requirement to do 
extra work in a particular area. Lisa’s words “that was quite difficult actually” 
indicate that, like Lucy, she found the experience uncomfortable, at least in 
part because of the inconvenience of scheduling in extra work immediately 
before an important deadline. 
6.5.3.3 Summary: disagreeing with the official line 
Auditors have experienced discomfort where they have disagreed with their 
employer’s official line, whether or not they have showed their disagreement 
openly. Despite disagreement with the firms’ procedures, auditors have 
complied to the extent necessary to do what they regard as a good job 
(Section 5.3.2). Therefore the disagreement has minimal impact on the firm 
compared to the much more significant impact on the individual. 
                                            
14 The Service Reporting Code of Practice (SeRCOP) is produced by the Chartered Institute 
of Public Finance Accountants (CIPFA) and sets out mandatory requirements for financial 
reporting for local authorities in the UK. 
 
 
244 
 
6.5.4 Discomfort with the firms’ ethos 
There are a number of instances of auditors feeling uncomfortable with the 
overall ethos of working for a private sector firm.  
Lisa (Firm B) mentions that some audit managers felt uncomfortable about 
the increased emphasis on selling as part of their jobs, which has been part 
of the commercialisation discussed in Chapter 5. 
a couple of managers, ex-Audit Commission managers, weren’t 
comfortable with it and felt it wasn’t appropriate in the light of, you 
know, the current ethical guidance (Lisa, Firm B) 
Some auditors are uncomfortable with the very idea of private sector firms 
making profits from the public sector.  
the daily rate was excruciatingly embarrassing – it was £1,500 a day 
(Lucy, Firm C) 
when you work in the public sector, you are always aware … this is 
being paid for by public money … [the partner]’d do things like have a 
chauffeur driven car from [office location] to [council location].  And 
that would get charged to the audit. (Belinda, Firm C)   
Both quotes suggest an uneasiness on the auditor’s part with the firm’s 
approach to charging the private sector. Gary (Firm A) echoes Belinda’s 
concerns, but in an even broader context: his over-arching philosophy 
towards making money.  
I didn’t actually join an organisation to make loads of money and the 
whole thing is about making money. There might be a public-sector 
ethos but it is about ultimately making money for Firm A and for Firm 
A partners and I was a little bit worried about that. (Gary, Firm A) 
Gary’s point is so fundamental that it cannot be overcome. 
It is interesting to note that while some auditors are concerned about public 
sector money being paid to private sector firms, fees have reduced (Section 
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2.6.5) and both auditors and clients report that clients are happy about this. 
Belinda (quoted above) says explicitly “they're happy, because the cost's 
gone down”. Her discomfort with the partner’s behaviour comes from her 
own conscience rather than client dissatisfaction.  
The difficulties auditors have experienced in relation to philosophy and ethos 
(this section), and where their personal views are in conflict with their 
employer’s (Section 6.5.3) are consistent with other researchers’ findings in 
relation to public sector reorganisations, that have been attributed to 
cognitive dissonance (Johnson, Smith, & Codling, 2000; McDonough & 
Polzer, 2012; White, 2014). White (2014) specifically attributes emotional 
distress in privatised policing services to the tension between the logic of the 
public good and the logic of the market. 
6.5.5 Not fitting in 
There are a number of instances of auditors feeling that they do not fit in at 
their new employer. A number of auditors mention the much younger age 
demographic at firms.  
the age profile is one of the things you notice (Tracey, Firm C) 
the average age of my department is probably about 24 (Paul, Firm D) 
That accounting firms are largely staffed by trainee auditors is well 
documented (e.g. Hanlon, 1994; Turley et al., 2016); see also Section 
4.4.5.2. 
They’re mainly young, in their 20s, because you need to have that 
energy and not have those family commitments.  I think just about 
everybody that I knew that has got a family has left. (Belinda, Firm C)   
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A few auditors made the point that some of the individuals employed by the 
Audit Commission would have been unlikely to have been working in a 
private sector firm. 
We weren’t the type of people they’d normally recruit. (Lucy, Firm C) 
The general demographics of people joining Firm D was generally 
people who were public school educated and were very good bright 
people, very confident in themselves. And to them Firm D was a 
stepping stone, I think, to move on to greater things (Jerry, Firm D) 
Traditionally, accounting firms have fostered homogeneity by recruiting 
according to ‘fit’ and by encouraging and incentivising trainees to behave like 
their peers (Edgley et al., 2016; Hanlon, 1994). This both explains and is 
explained by the firms’ perceived lack of concessions for individual 
circumstances discussed in Section 6.5.1.3. 
6.6 Changing perspective 
My interviews took place between three and four years after the transfer, 
after which time auditors had had chance to reflect, adjust and respond to 
their new environment. At this stage, most auditors had made changes that 
reduced their initial discomfort. Two alternative responses are evident in my 
data: embracing the change, whereby auditors adapt their own viewpoint to 
be more compatible with their employer’s (Section 6.6.1), and exiting the 
situation by leaving the employment of the firm (Section 6.6.2).  
6.6.1  Embracing the change 
My data shows two main ways in which auditors can embrace the change. 
Some auditors have ‘converted’ to the private sector approach and the 
reconstructed audit (Section 6.6.1.1), while others are able to adjust their 
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existing perceptions and maintain that there has been no significant change 
(Section 6.6.1.2). 
6.6.1.1 Converting 
Some individuals have changed their viewpoint following the change, 
embracing the new regime wholeheartedly. 
… coming from a public sector background, it was very much, you 
know - private sector - nasty, public sector - good - which, it turns out, 
that was a bit naive … it’s not just about being in it for the profit, … 
actually, you’re still doing a very good job and helping businesses 
(Christina, Firm B) 
Christina refers to her original cynicism about the private sector “just being in 
it for the profit”, suggesting that this might affect her view of the value of her 
work. After working at Firm B, she ‘converts’ to the view that she is “still 
doing a very good job” because there is value in helping businesses.  
Some auditors are explicit that they prefer the firms’ approach to audit. 
I’ve got far more confidence in the process than at the Audit 
Commission … There’s an entire professional practices directorate, a 
full risk directorate, everything that overlays, and supports … to 
ensure that the audit opinions are safe. … I’m trying to not be too 
negative about the Audit Commission.  But … we didn’t know how to 
do an audit. … five minutes in Firm C could tell you that.  Our audit 
approach was haphazard, risky… (Patrick, Firm C) 
It is unclear whether Patrick was originally sceptical about the transfer, as 
Christina was. However, he has clearly ‘converted’ to the firm’s way of doing 
an audit and now subscribes fully to the firm’s audit approach. As part of this 
conversion, Patrick talks very negatively about the Audit Commission, 
discrediting the old way of working. This is consistent with Fischer’s (1996) 
suggestion that auditors have to let go of established procedures in order to 
fully embrace new ones. 
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There are examples of auditors embracing the change at all four firms. All of 
these auditors have worked hard and benefited from the change in the form 
of promotions or other opportunities (Section 4.4.5.1). The following two 
quotes provide more evidence about the perception of the opportunities 
available at the firms. 
Firm D offered me some things that I would never have got to have 
done. Not long after I arrived I ended up going to [country] doing a 
review of the impact of aid in the health system in [location]. Doing an 
evaluation for a parliamentary body which I reported to Parliament. … 
I got to meet the Minister of Health in [country] and the British 
Ambassador. I went to parts of [country] that you don’t normally do, so 
you’re on a boat and taken out to places. I was followed by the Military 
Police out there. A huge number of different things that I would never 
have been able to do. (Paul, Firm D) 
for people who are ambitious and have some ability as well, there was 
a real great opportunity and some people have absolutely, absolutely 
thrived on that. (Gary, Firm A) 
Paul displays huge enthusiasm for the prestigious opportunities Firm D has 
offered him that he perceives he “never would have got to have done” at the 
Audit Commission, and Gary endorses this sentiment in the context of Firm 
A, reporting that some individuals have “absolutely, absolutely thrived”. 
Gary’s statement restricts this to “some people”, implying that while some 
have thrived, others have not. A further example from Firm C links 
‘conversion’ to benefiting from the change.  
I think those who are doing well within the firm, who’ve kind of bought 
into the firm’s culture, and ambitions, and what the firm wants to do, 
they kind of display that.  So for me, I’ve done quite well since I’ve 
joined the firm, I do buy into the vision and what they’re trying to do, 
and stuff, and maybe others less so, they still think back to the good 
old days, maybe haven’t bought into it so much and just see it as a 
job. (Derek, Firm C) 
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Thus opportunities and promotions are linked with ‘playing the game’ 
according to the firms’ rules (Carter & Spence, 2014; Lupu & Empson, 2015). 
For those who embrace the change and work hard, the opportunities are 
substantial. 
6.6.1.2 Understating the change 
Some auditors reported not experiencing much change. 
The biggest change is focus. … I think it’s just the absolute focus on 
efficiency that – I can’t say is different to the Commission, but it’s 
ramped up.  We were already on that journey.  We were already doing 
what we needed to do but no more.  But I think it’s more and more. 
(Graham, Firm B)  
Graham appears to find the transition easier than some other auditors; he 
accepts the commercial focus, linking it back to his experience working on 
foundation trust audits, which were part of a commercial market alongside 
the Audit Commission regime (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2012). Similarly, 
Derek emphasises the similarities between the new approach and the work 
he did at the Audit Commission. 
now you’ve got a slightly – another focus – that you want to do a good 
piece of work, you want to meet the deadlines, but you actually want 
to keep the client happy as well.  So, hopefully, I probably always did 
it that way within the Commission (Derek, Firm C) 
Derek portrays the change to a greater client focus as not making a 
difference to him personally, because he “always did it that way”. By 
recognising elements of his old practice in the new approach, this makes the 
new approach easier to accept.   
Within Firms A and B, there is evidence of a corporate narrative of 
continuation with the old approach, which seems to have helped some 
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individuals to adjust. For example, Guy emphasises the continuation 
importance of the public sector to Firm A. 
given the critical mass of numbers that have come over as well,  
we’ve retained some of that public ethos and we see that as some of 
our unique selling points … Although we may be part of a private 
sector firm, we work in the public sector … A lot of what we did before 
… I think has carried through. (Guy, Firm A) 
Guy’s perception is that being in the public sector remains an important part 
of the department’s character, even in the new firm. This helps to ease the 
transition by retaining some of the Audit Commission narratives, specifically 
those of public sector ethos and values.  
6.6.2 Leaving 
Leaving public sector audit is an alternative way of changing perspective in 
order to lessen the discomfort arising from the transition. A significant 
number of auditors left their jobs within the first two or three years of the 
transfer.  
There would be people who would hand in their notice without having 
another job to go to …. The turnover was massive. So by the time I'd 
left, I think probably at least half - at least half of the Audit 
Commission staff had left. But the turnover is also quite high in their 
own staff. But that's the model they kind of work to. So they take on a 
lot of graduates, and train a lot of them up, but they expect a lot of 
them to leave, and a lot of them do leave. So yeah, the turnover was 
like something I'd never seen before. And they did sort of make 
attempts to say they wanted to bring turnover down, but I didn't really 
see how they could on the model they worked to, because at the end 
of the day they want a lot of people to leave, because they want a lot 
of junior staff, because they're cheaper, basically - and you know, 
there are very few partners, so not everyone can get to those senior 
grades, so - so yeah, turnover was ridiculous. (Jerry, Firm D) 
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As Jerry explains, this is high turnover was compatible with the firm’s 
objectives, facilitating a weaker skill mix (Section 4.4.5.2), which increases 
efficiency.  
There is also evidence of increased staff turnover in the other three firms. 
I think people have been leaving on a fairly steady basis (Gary, Firm 
A) 
… there’s quite a few people have left (Lisa, Firm B) 
People have left. When you look around the room now … you'd 
probably say there's more Firm C people there now than there are ex- 
AC. (Colin, Firm C) 
I have not attempted to draw comparisons between the staff turnover rates of 
different firms, because the firms operate contracts in different geographical 
areas (Section 1.2.3.1), which might be expected to have different economic 
and labour market conditions affecting staff turnover. However, it is very 
clear that all four firms have experienced a significant increase in staff 
turnover. As Jerry’s quote suggests, high attrition rates have been observed 
in audit firms in general and are not limited to staff transferring from the 
public sector (Financial Reporting Council, 2018; Hanlon, 1994; Lee, 2002; 
Turley et al., 2016).  
At least some of the increased turnover is due to auditors’ discomfort or 
dissatisfaction with their new jobs, as the following quotes demonstrate.  
… it’s much more stressful, I’d say.  And less enjoyable.  Hence why 
everybody’s leaving.  We’ve had so many leavers. (Matilda, Firm C) 
you're asking in terms of how the staff find it - some staff just voted 
with their feet (Paul, Firm D) 
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A number of auditors expressed the view that some individuals simply didn’t 
want to work in the private sector.  
[Many people have thrived on the new opportunities but] if that’s not 
your motivation in life, and I think that’s probably true for a lot of 
people in the Audit Commission - they weren’t in the world of work to 
make pots of money, they were there for other reasons - that 
becomes hard. So, one lot of people thrive and a lot of people leave. 
(Gary, Firm A) 
… predominantly, the people who worked in District Audit and then 
the Audit Commission had chosen to work in the public sector, and in 
that environment.  And you are going to get people leaving because, 
although Firm C has been generally a positive experience, it is still 
very private sector and fundamentally different. (Patrick, Firm C) 
Gary refers to individuals’ motivations; some people are not motivated by the 
opportunities the firms offer, but are working as public sector auditors “for 
other reasons”. His next words “that becomes hard” connect this mismatch 
with discomfort (Section 6.5.4). Again this view was expressed at all four 
firms. 
There is evidence of some people’s predisposition against private sector 
firms in that some individuals sought new jobs and even left the Audit 
Commission before they were due to transfer. 
Some people left before the transfer.  Not many, but a few (Belinda, 
Firm C) 
These individuals had decided, even without any direct experience, that they 
did not want to work for the firm they were to be transferred to. Patrick’s 
statement above, that the private sector is “fundamentally different”, justifies 
this stance.  
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One former audit manager who now works at a local council disassociates 
herself from her former firm to such a degree that she no longer identifies 
herself as an auditor. 
My colleagues at the council and the county keep saying - why are 
they looking at that, Belinda?  I keep saying - don't ask me, I'm not an 
auditor any more, I don't understand their audit approach and it makes 
no sense to me whatsoever (Belinda, Firm C) 
Belinda seeks to distance herself completely from an audit approach and 
ethos she was uncomfortable with. 
This is an interesting contrast to the study by Currie, Tuck, and Morrell 
(2015) which found that employees (tax inspectors) also left in response to 
unwelcome changes in their work environment, but in that scenario the 
predominant reason for their “escape” was to pursue more lucrative careers 
in the private sector. 
6.7 Embedding the change 
My sample of auditors included only one who was significantly critical of the 
new approach to audit who was still employed by that firm. This resonates 
with research by White (2014) into police privatisation. 
many of these individuals have gradually come to terms with the logic 
of the market … Furthermore, employment churn has resulted in 
many of these individuals being replaced by new … recruits—who 
often have private sector backgrounds and receive lower pay and less 
favourable employment terms and conditions (White, 2014, p. 1014) 
As in White’s study, auditors in my sample have either come to terms with 
the new approach or been replaced by graduate trainees, who are more 
susceptible to be socialised in the ways of the firms (Anderson-Gough et al., 
1998, 2001). Thus high staff turnover can be seen as an advantage. 
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of course people do leave and I think there has been an awful lot of 
people who have left but obviously, that means the firm can actually 
grow their own and bring their own into the public sector (Gary, Firm 
A) 
It didn’t feel like they cared whether you stayed or left, and to be fair to 
them, I don’t think they did care if you stayed or left, ‘cause I think we 
were relatively expensive (Lucy, Firm C) 
Therefore a certain amount of discomfort helps firms to streamline their 
staffing structure, by encouraging a high rate of staff turnover. As Lucy points 
out, some of the staff leaving are relatively expensive compared to the 
graduate trainees they can be replaced with. 
6.8 Chapter summary 
 This chapter has discussed the different responses of auditors to the 
reconstruction of audit and their new working conditions. Many auditors 
initially work in the same way as before, working longer hours in an attempt 
to get through all the work, and experience discomfort as a result of the 
change. A large majority of auditors lessen their discomfort either by 
embracing the change over time or by leaving, to be replaced by graduates 
who are both less expensive and more susceptible to socialisation. Both 
responses, embracing the change and leaving, lead to the same result: the 
reconstructed audit is embedded. This is summarised in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15 Embedding the reconstruction 
 
I discuss this further in Chapter 7, where I interpret these responses to the 
change in terms of habitus and hysteresis (Bourdieu, 1977).  
This chapter has completed the discussion of my three sub-categories that 
constitute my core category of reconstructing public sector audit. Chapter 7 
goes on to synthesise the three chapters together into an overall substantive 
theory of reconstructing public sector audit, and to link my substantive theory 
to extant formal theory using Bourdieu’s theory of practice (Bourdieu, 1977). 
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7 A grounded theory of reconstructing public sector audit  
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters 4 - 6 have set out the detailed findings of the research in relation to 
three sub-categories: Commercialising public sector audit, Reconstructing 
audit quality and Embedding the reconstruction. The aim of this chapter is 
first, to show how these findings and sub-categories come together to create 
a substantive grounded theory of reconstructing public sector audit, and 
second, to relate my substantive theory to extant formal theory, in order to 
help interpret my theory in existing theoretical terms. I have chosen to use a 
Bourdieusian conceptual framework (Section 2.7) for this purpose, because 
this facilitates considering macro structures in the context of individual 
behaviour, and takes into account the differential power of individual actors 
and structures. 
This chapter starts by showing how I derived a core category and three sub-
categories from the focused codes and the data (Section 7.2). Section 7.3 
shows the development of the core category, Reconstructing public sector 
audit, in more detail. In Section 7.4 I discuss the relationships between the 
categories and how they fit together to create my substantive theory of 
reconstructing public sector audit. 
Section 7.5 explains and justifies my choice of Bourdieusian formal theory to 
interpret my substantive theory. The chapter then proceeds by considering 
each of the elements of my substantive theory in relation to Bourdieusian 
concepts. Section 7.6 reflects on the commercialisation of audit discussed in 
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Chapter 4. I discuss how public sector audit under the Audit Commission 
regime can be construed as an autonomous Bourdieusian subfield 
(Bourdieu, 1993; Everett, 2002) with values distinct from the wider field of 
commercial audit. The abolition of the Audit Commission regime can be seen 
as a dismantling of the autonomy of this subfield, so that it takes on the 
commercial values of the wider field. In Section 7.7 I revisit my discussion of 
the reconstruction of audit quality and risk  from Chapter 5, viewing the 
meaning of what it is to do a good quality audit as doxa (Bourdieu, 1977; 
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In Section 7.8 I deploy Bourdieu’s concept of 
hysteresis (Bourdieu, 1977; Hardy, 2014) to shed light on auditors’ different 
responses to the change in their work, which were discussed in Chapter 6. 
Section 7.9 reviews my overall theory of reconstructing public sector audit in 
the light of Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu 
& Wacquant, 1992). I contend that the accounting profession and large firms 
exercise symbolic violence on the public sector. As a result, private sector 
culture is allowed to permeate and reproduce itself in the public sector audit 
arena, and firms are able to dominate the public sector audit field.  
7.2 Constructing categories from data 
7.2.1 Output from the focused coding stage 
Chapter 3 described the coding procedures I used to yield meaningful codes 
from my interview data. Table 18 presents a list of the focused codes I 
worked with to generate my substantive grounded theory. 
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Table 18 List of focused codes 
Competing for work 
Managing risk 
Reinterpreting risk 
Being efficient 
(Not) being clear 
Doing just enough 
Being customer focused 
Offering a low cost service 
Reducing audit work 
Weakening the skill mix 
Working longer hours 
Getting audit assurance 
Presenting an image 
Standardising 
Subordinating public sector 
concerns 
 
Feeling uncomfortable 
Working in the same way as before 
Changing perspective 
Being auditable 
Reinterpreting audit quality 
Being imposed on  
Selling  
Resisting the change 
Embracing the change 
 
These codes contributed to different extents towards my theory. For 
example, ‘Doing just enough’ was pivotal to the Commercialising 
subcategory (Section 4.2), whereas ‘Selling’ was much less evident. 
Nevertheless, I retained it as a focused code because it was important in 
making sense of the Commercialising sub-category. 
7.2.2 Constructing categories from the focused codes 
Section 3.14 explained that I arranged the focused codes into tentative 
categories that expressed the main ideas of my research. My first tentative 
category was ‘Doing a good quality audit’.  This idea arose frequently in my 
data, encompassed very many of my codes, and seemed pervasive in my 
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analysis. I recognised at an early stage that audit quality is a problematic 
concept (Section 2.5) and used theoretical sampling (Section 3.7.2) to direct 
my interview questioning (Appendix D) to explore how practitioners 
understood audit quality, in order to develop this as a category. Attempting to 
define this category, explicating its properties and exploring its relationship 
with other codes, continually led me to the interrelationships between doing a 
good quality audit and being commercial, and to how definitions of audit 
quality had shifted. Eventually, I created the separate categories 
‘Commercialising’ and ‘Reconstructing audit quality’ to focus my analysis 
more on these ideas. ‘Reconstructing audit quality’ recognised the 
problematic definition and different social constructions of audit quality, and 
helped to explain how auditors understood audit quality within the new 
commercialised environment. I puzzled over whether the category should be 
named ‘Reconstructing audit quality’ or just ‘Reconstructing audit’. Returning 
to my data, I noticed that not only were these categories different but that 
‘Reconstructing audit quality’ facilitated ‘Reconstructing the audit’, because 
meeting audit quality criteria was so important that it changed the meaning of 
audit.  
I decided to treat ‘Reconstructing public sector audit’ as my core category, 
summarising the main ideas in my study. ‘Commercialising’ became a 
subcategory, helpful in understanding how the audit had changed in 
response to the new commercial environment. ‘Reconstructing audit quality’ 
was a second subcategory, which helped to explain how auditors’ 
perceptions of audit quality changed. The final sub-category, ‘Embedding the 
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reconstruction’, contained ideas about how individuals’ responses served to 
embed and perpetuate the new reconstruction of audit.  
Table 19 shows the core category and sub-categories, and the focused 
codes that helped to define them. 
Table 19 Core category, subcategories and focused codes 
 
Core category Sub-categories Related focused codes 
 
Reconstructing 
public sector 
audit  
(Section 7.3) 
Commercialising 
public sector 
audit 
(Chapter 4) 
 
Managing risk, Being efficient, 
Competing for work, Presenting an 
image, Being customer focused, 
Offering a low cost service, Selling, 
Getting audit assurance, (Not) 
being clear, Being auditable, Doing 
just enough, Reducing audit work, 
Weakening the skill mix,  
Working longer hours, 
Subordinating public sector 
concerns 
 
Reconstructing 
audit quality 
(Chapter 5) 
 
Reinterpreting risk, Reinterpreting 
audit quality, Subordinating public 
sector concerns, Being imposed 
on, Standardising  
Embedding the 
reconstruction 
(Chapter 6) 
 
Working in the same way as 
before, Working longer hours, 
Feeling uncomfortable, 
Changing perspective, Resisting 
the change, Embracing the change 
 
 
The development of each of the three sub-categories is explained at the start 
of each of the findings chapters, in sections 4.2, 5.2 and 6.2 respectively. In 
the following section I show how I constructed the core category, 
Reconstructing public sector audit, from the data, the focused codes and 
sub-categories. 
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7.3 The core category: Reconstructing public sector audit  
 ‘Reconstructing public sector audit’ is the core category and overall theme of 
my research.  
The category Reconstructing arose from combining together several focused 
codes, including Changing perspective, which appeared in several different 
interviews, in different guises.  
we didn’t know how to do an audit….five minutes in Firm C could tell 
you that. (Patrick, Firm C) 
I did expect a more slick – you know … public sector bad, private 
sector slick … and it’s absolutely not the case. (Guy, Firm A) 
maybe there was an over-auditing by the Audit Commission … in 
terms of definition of Firm D anyway (Paul, Firm D) 
All of these quotes indicate changes in viewpoints. Patrick has clearly 
changed his mind about ‘”how to do an audit”; by using “we” he includes 
himself in his indictment of the Audit Commission methodology. Guy admits 
to preconceptions about the private sector, which he now regards as false. 
Paul alludes to the possibility of different definitions of what is enough (or too 
much) auditing.  
Some of the changes auditors discussed ran very deep.  
It’s just really quite different in terms of attitude. There’s a different 
philosophy. (Paul, Firm D) 
we come at it from a different point of view (Rose, Firm B) 
a new reality (Dean, Firm B) 
fundamentally different (Patrick, Firm C) 
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These auditors’ words highlighted differences that are fundamental: changes 
in philosophy, reality and points of view, all of which indicate shifts in 
underlying assumptions, rather than just changes in processes, procedures 
and practice.  
At the same time, there was evidence that auditors actively and consciously 
changed their practices over time. 
we’ve gone through a few years of developing our use of [the 
software] (Mark, Firm, B) 
I think it almost takes a couple of years to get the file looking right, and 
understanding how things pull through (Derek, Firm, C) 
Mark and Derek both indicate that their practices are refined, or 
reconstructed, over time, with agency. 
I created Reconstructing public sector audit as a category to bring together 
ideas about how auditors reconstructed the audit, with agency, and at a 
fundamental level. I elevated this to the core category for the research, 
because it summarised the main ideas of the sub-categories at a deeper, 
more fundamental level. ‘Reconstructing public sector audit’ encompasses 
the whole process of change from antecedent (commercialisation) to how the 
change is effected (by reconstructing auditors’ ideas about audit quality) to 
the perpetuation of the new meanings and practices (embedding the 
reconstruction).  
The next section focuses on the relationship between the core category and 
sub-categories. 
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7.4 Constructing the substantive grounded theory 
Chapter 3, especially Section 3.14, describes how I worked with the codes, 
sub-categories and core category to explore the relationships between them 
in order to construct a substantive grounded theory. This section discusses 
the relationships identified between the core category and sub-categories, 
and presents the substantive grounded theory.  
7.4.1 Relationships between the sub-categories 
Commercialising public sector audit (Chapter 4) is the antecedent for 
reconstructing audit quality (Chapter 5). Commercialising means prioritising 
commercial considerations and subordinating public sector considerations. 
This shift in priorities is in line with the long term trend towards New Public 
Management (Hood, 1991) and the wider neoliberalist agenda (Sikka, 
2015a). Pressures to increase efficiency are intense and stem both from 
public sector austerity and the firms’ need to make a profit. Substantial 
reductions in audit budgets have made it untenable for auditors to persist 
with their pre-existing interpretations of audit quality. Reconstructing the 
concept of audit quality is the strategy auditors use, both at an individual and 
firm level, to enable them to continue to meet their personal and professional 
standards within their changed environment.   
The fundamental and comprehensive way in which audit quality is 
reconstructed leads to embedding the reconstruction (Chapter 6), 
irrespective of whether auditors agree with the change. Changes in 
perspective and practice cause many auditors to feel uncomfortable. To 
lessen their discomfort, they can adapt their personal viewpoints in order to 
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embrace the change, or they can leave the profession. All auditors’ 
responses lead to the change becoming embedded. 
7.4.2 Relationship between the core category and other categories  
The pervasive focus on presenting an image to regulators combined with 
intense budget pressures means that there is less scope for individual 
interpretation of what audit work is necessary, and the firms’ reconstruction 
of audit quality increasingly defines what auditors do. Therefore the 
commercialisation of audit, leading to a reconstruction of audit quality, which 
is embedded through all responses to it, results in a reconstruction of the 
meaning of audit. The concepts in all three sub-categories, as well as their 
combined impact, lead to reconstructing public sector audit. This thesis 
therefore addresses the overall reconstruction of financial audit in the English 
public sector. 
Figure 16 Relationships between the core category and sub-categories 
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7.4.3 The substantive grounded theory 
Figure 17 presents a diagrammatic representation of the substantive 
grounded theory that emerged through the analysis and theorising. The 
diagram shows the key elements of each of the three sub-categories: 
commercialising public sector audit, reconstructing audit quality and 
embedding the reconstruction, as well as the overarching relationship of 
facilitation between the three sub-categories and the core category, 
reconstructing public sector audit.  
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Figure 17 Substantive theory of reconstructing public sector audit 
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So far, this thesis has set out my substantive theory of reconstructing public 
sector audit in three sub-categories: Commercialising public sector audit 
(Chapter 4), Reconstructing audit quality (Chapter 5) and Embedding the 
reconstruction (Chapter 6), which individually and in combination lead to the 
reconstruction of public sector audit, that is, a changed understanding of the 
meaning of financial audit in the English public sector.  
The first sub-category, Commercialising public sector audit, concerns the 
prioritisation of commercial objectives over public sector considerations. An 
acute focus on image and efficiency strengthens the ritualised ‘front stage’ of 
audit, while detailed specialist knowledge is allowed to wane, and less audit 
testing is undertaken. 
The second sub-category, Reconstructing audit quality, arises as a strategy 
through which auditors reconcile the commercialisation of audit with their 
personal and professional standards. Redefining what constitutes a good 
quality audit enables auditors to perceive that they are doing a good job as 
they perform fewer audit procedures and their detailed specialist knowledge 
declines. The FRC’s quality criteria provide a benchmark towards which 
audits converge. 
The third sub-category, Embedding the reconstruction, explains how the 
reconstructed audit becomes established at an individual, firm and national 
level, irrespective of whether individuals agree with the changes. Many 
auditors experience discomfort, which can be ascribed to physical changes 
in work arrangements and to cognitive dissonance associated with a shift in 
philosophy. Auditors can choose to lessen their discomfort, either by 
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adjusting their personal viewpoints to accommodate the changes, or by 
leaving the profession. Because leavers are replaced with compliant and 
inexpensive trainees, both options lead to the firms’ reconstruction of audit 
being reinforced. 
Competition, efficiency pressures and the regulatory regime are common 
across the sector. The commercialisation of audit, leading to a reconstruction 
of audit quality, which is embedded through all responses to it, is evident, to 
a varying extent, at all four firms. Individually and in combination, the 
commercialisation of audit, reconstruction of the meaning of quality, and the 
way the new logic is embedded, lead to a reconstruction of the meaning of 
public sector audit across the whole of the English public sector. 
7.5 Reflecting on and extending the emergent theory 
Through comparing other scholars’ evidence and ideas with your 
grounded theoy, you may show where and how their ideas illuminate 
your theoretical categories and how your theory extends, transcends 
or challenges dominant ideas in your field. (Charmaz, 2014, p. 305) 
The aim of this section is to discuss the substantive theory of reconstructing 
public sector audit in the light of extant theory. This is useful in locating my 
research in relation to existing knowledge in the research domains of audit 
and New Public Management. I have elected to use Bourdieusian concepts 
and theories for this purpose. These were outlined in Section 2.7. Section 
7.5.1 justifies their use in interpreting my substantive theory. The following 
sections Section 7.6 to 7.9 review each of the elements of the substantive 
theory using this theoretical perspective. 
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7.5.1 Justification for using Bourdieusian concepts and theories 
Recent years have seen an increase in use of Bourdieu’s concepts and 
theories in accounting research (Cooper & Coulson, 2014; Everett, 2018; 
Malsch et al., 2011). This includes a number of studies that specifically focus 
on audit. For example, Everett (2003) and Stringfellow et al. (2015) both 
deploy the concept of symbolic violence to explore the domination of large 
audit firms. Lupu and Empson (2015) use Bourdieu’s concept of illusio to 
help explain how large audit firms induce their highly paid professional staff 
to work very long hours. In their study of organisational change, Oakes et al. 
(1998) interpret the increased importance of economic factors in the 
Canadian museum sector through a lens of Bourdieusian fields and symbolic 
capital. Malsch et al. (2011) suggest, and Everett (2018) endorses, that there 
is considerable potential to mobilise Bourdieusian ideas still further, and 
more comprehensively, in accounting research. Everett (2018) contends that 
the concept of symbolic violence is particularly under-used.  
Bourdieu’s concepts are helpful because they link individual behaviour with 
macro structures (Everett, 2002), and structures with agency (McDonough & 
Polzer, 2012). In my research, this translates to linking how individuals 
perform their audit work to the overall meaning of audit, and how individuals 
respond to change in their environment to changes in the accepted meaning 
of what auditors do. Thus Bourdieu’s ideas of habitus, field and capital help 
to interpret my theory of how audit has been reconstructed as a result of an 
exogenously instigated change enacted by individuals.  
Unlike the concept of fields in organisation theory, Bourdieusian fields focus 
on power relations, and studying social spaces from this perspective 
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facilitates unveiling and exposing, or rationally analysing (Bourdieu, 1977), 
strategies of domination. This is one of Bourdieu’s objectives, the first step in 
resistance to domination, and part of the process of social change (Cooper & 
Coulson, 2014; Malsch et al., 2011). Bourdieu’s theories help me to move 
beyond the taken-for-granted doxa of the profession (Lupu & Empson, 2015; 
Stringfellow et al., 2015) to consider the relative power of different actors and 
the effect this has on how public sector audit is interpreted and performed. 
7.6 Commercialising: Taking on the values of the widespread field 
Chapter 4 argued that public sector audit has become more commercialised 
over time, and especially following the transfer of auditors to private firms. 
Here I view the commercialisation of public sector audit through a 
Bourdieusian lens. 
7.6.1 The Audit Commission regime as a field of restricted production 
The public sector audit regime in place in the UK until 2012 was significantly 
influenced from within the public sector; the Audit Commission appointed and 
controlled audit contracts, and most public sector auditors were employed in-
house (Section 1.2.2). Especially within the Audit Commission’s audit 
practice, auditors were shielded from the full influence of the market forces 
that led to the commercialisation of private sector audit in the 1980s and 
1990s (Section 2.6.6). Although some commercialisation was evident, 
especially with the introduction of foundation trusts with the right to appoint 
their own auditors (Basioudis & Ellwood, 2005), the Audit Commission 
sought to uphold the value of public interest and regulated independence 
and fees in a way that limited audit firms’ incentives, and their need, to 
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promote their image, manage their risks, and reduce their costs. 
Competences such as technical expertise and public sector knowledge were 
highly valued and can be regarded as symbolic capital within that field. The 
Audit Commission’s audit practice could therefore be regarded as a field of 
restricted production (Bourdieu, 1993) and a relatively autonomous subfield 
of the wider field of audit. 
7.6.2 The audit profession as the widespread field 
The wider audit profession sells its services not to specialist purchasers but 
to generalist business managers, therefore its chief frame of reference is the 
business world rather than the audit world. This is characteristic of a 
widespread field (Bourdieu, 1993) and leads to an emphasis on generalist 
values.  
The commercialisation of audit has been widely documented by Hanlon 
(1994) and others (Section 2.6.6) and has been characterised by a shift of 
emphasis from technical values to more commercial business values. 
Economic capital has been shown to be the most important symbolic capital 
within firms in recent decades (Carter & Spence, 2014), as audit firms have 
begun to behave more like businesses than like professions (Hopwood, 
1998). 
7.6.3 Taking on the values of the widespread field 
With the dissolution of the Audit Commission regime, public sector auditors, 
as employees of private firms, can now sell their services directly to their 
clients, a more generalist market, who value more generalist attributes of the 
audit such as cost and customer service. Section 4.3 and Section 5.7.5.2 
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show that this is only partially mitigated where entities opt into the PSAA 
scheme to have their auditors appointed centrally. Thus, the field of public 
sector audit has become more generalised. In this more generalised field, 
more generalised values, such as efficiency and income generation, take 
precedence, reflecting the general trend towards the commercialisation of 
audit (Section 2.6.6). In Bourdieusian terminology, the sub-field of public 
sector audit that was previously weakly autonomous, with its own values and 
priorities (Section 2.7.3) has now taken on more comprehensively the values 
of the wider field (Bourdieu, 1993; Everett, 2002), which are commercial.  
7.7 Reconstructing audit quality: a new doxa 
Chapter 5 discussed two specific ways in which the meaning of audit quality 
has been reconstructed. First, audit quality has begun to encompass ideas of 
efficiency (Section 5.4.1) and customer service (Section 5.4.2), and second, 
risk has been recalibrated to align with the private sector (Section 5.5). In 
Bourdieusian terminology, the new doxa is that public sector risk should be 
considered alongside corporate risk, rather than separately, and that 
commercial considerations form a significant part of audit quality. In both 
cases, the new doxa is aligned with the widespread field of the profession 
(Section 2.7). 
A separate but related part of the new doxa is the devaluation of public 
sector expertise relative to commercial skills (Section 4.6), and the 
associated devaluation in symbolic capital of public sector work, public sector 
client portfolios and the CIPFA qualification (Section 4.6.4). Following this 
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logic, trainees studying towards private sector accountancy qualifications 
leads to higher symbolic capital both for individual trainees and for the firm. 
7.8 Embedding the change: habitus and hysteresis 
Chapter 6 discussed auditors’ responses to the new working environment 
and the reconstruction of audit quality as a process: working in the same way 
as before, working longer hours, feeling uncomfortable, and finally changing 
perspective. Changing perspective was viewed as a means of lessening 
discomfort and could be achieved by either embracing the new way of 
working (doxa) or by leaving. 
The concept of habitus, which describes the way individuals are predisposed 
to act in particular situations, is helpful in understanding auditors’ responses 
to the change in their work. Many studies of habitus refer back to 
participants’ childhoods (e.g. Lupu et al., 2018) because childhood is the site 
of formation of the primary habitus (Section 2.7.1), but in my study, 
secondary habitus, acquired later in life through subsequent experiences 
(Wacquant, 2014) is particularly relevant. Auditors who transferred from the 
Audit Commission to the firms had a minimum of three years’ experience ( as 
the trainee intake was cancelled from 2010 (Audit Commission, 2011)) and 
had therefore acquired a secondary habitus commensurate with working in 
the public sector and the Audit Commission’s approach to audit.  
Habitus is linked to the field in which it was formed and leads individuals to 
behave according to their past experiences in that field. Where the field 
changes, individuals’ actions may no longer be appropriate. This is the 
hysteresis effect. Thus, some auditors continued ‘Working in the same way 
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as before’ (Section 6.3) even after the change, and even where it was not 
appropriate under the new ‘rules of the game’. As a result, they had to work 
longer hours (Section 6.4). I consider that auditors who have transferred from 
the Audit Commission have suffered from the hysteresis effect; their habitus 
(predisposition to act) takes time to adjust to the change in the field (the way 
they are expected to act). Hysteresis can lead to “uncertainty, confusion and 
frustration” (Yang, 2013, p. 1531), which corresponds to the ‘Feeling 
uncomfortable’ stage (Section 6.5) of my discussion.  
Section 6.5 lists five sources of discomfort in my data, all of which broadly 
resonate with the concept of hysteresis. First, discomfort relating to working 
conditions represents a change in doxa in terms of what is regarded to be 
reasonable (Lupu & Empson, 2015). This also resonates with McDonough 
and Polzer’s (2012) discussion of hysteresis in the context of frustration with 
working conditions. Second, discomfort regarding the change in auditors’ role 
also relates to changes in the ‘rules of the game’: auditors are frustrated that 
their job has become more boring, or that different skills (social capital) are 
required to do well. A third source of discomfort is disagreeing with the 
official line. This arises because auditors are still working within the previous 
doxa, to arrive at an audit opinion that would have been ‘safe’ according to 
the Audit Commission’s approach. Fourth, discomfort with the firm’s ethos 
corresponds directly to McDonough and Polzer’s (2012) interpretation of 
hysteresis as the mismatch between the public service habitus and the 
commercial habitus. Fifth, not fitting in reflects that auditors inculcated in 
public service have a mismatched portfolio of symbolic capital to succeed in 
the changed field. 
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Habitus can change over time (Lupu et al., 2018) in certain circumstances, 
and with agency. In my study, there is evidence that, of those auditors who 
have stayed in their jobs, most have eventually embraced the new doxa, and 
now accept the firms’ culture and approach (Section 6.6.1). A significant 
number of individuals left following the change. This could be interpreted as 
an ongoing hysteresis effect, a continued unwillingness to change and 
accept the new doxa. Alternatively, leaving could be construed as a form of 
acceptance of the new doxa: individuals accept that public sector audit has 
changed, and because they are unwilling to work with the new doxa, they 
leave and cease to be auditors.  
The firms’ domination of audit practices is perpetuated because almost all 
responses to the change lead to a reinforcement of the new commercialised 
approach. This is a feature of symbolic violence, which is discussed in the 
next section. 
7.9 Reconstructing public sector audit through symbolic violence 
My substantive grounded theory of reconstructing audit (Figure 17 in Section 
7.4.3) shows that the meaning of audit has been reconstructed in 
accordance with the firms’ objectives, through commercialising, 
reconstructing audit quality, and embedding the change. Public sector 
auditors subscribe to the doxa of the pervasive importance of FRC reviews, 
commercial skills and experience, and the private sector qualification, even 
though this has the effect of devaluing their own technical expertise, sense of 
public service, and their public sector qualifications. Bourdieu’s concept of 
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symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) can be 
invoked here to explain how this has been achieved. In my research,  
Two key characteristics of symbolic violence are its imposition on dominated 
parties (public sector auditors), leaving them no choice but to accept the 
conditions of their domination, and the complicity of both the dominant 
(private sector firms) and the dominated (public sector auditors) in this.  
7.9.1 Imposition of the new doxa 
My findings demonstrate that the new doxa is imposed on auditors. Section 
5.6.1 discussed how the reconstructed meaning of audit quality, 
incorporating efficiency and client service, and with risk recalibrated to align 
with corporations, is imposed, because auditors are both required to meet 
the quality standards set by the FRC and prevented from varying their work 
by prohibitively small budgets.  
7.9.2 Complicity of auditors 
A further feature of symbolic violence is that the dominated (individual 
auditors) are complicit in their own domination. This complicity occurs when 
actors in the field perceive the doxa as natural and self-evident. In my 
research, public sector auditors largely accept the meanings and definitions 
constructed in the private sector and submit to their application in the public 
sector. Section 5.6.2 showed how auditors misrecognise the new logic as 
“proper” and “common sense”. This is illusio; being taken in by the game.  
Auditors comply with the doxa even where they disagree with it (Section 
6.5.3.2). This arises because the chartered accountancy qualification and 
especially AQRT are afforded high symbolic capital. To benefit from the 
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symbolic capital associated with a private sector qualification, firms must play 
by the rules that are applied, for example requiring trainees to work part of 
their training contract on corporate audits, thus undermining the public sector 
specialism. The quote from Dean in Section 4.6.4 shows that he clearly 
disagree with the rules about private sector experience, describing them as 
“crazy” and “utterly barmy”, but he does not dispute that they must be 
followed.  
Even auditors who leave can be regarded as complicit in the domination, 
because their positions are filled by new actors (usually graduate trainees) 
who are ready to embrace the new doxa, via socialisation (Anderson-Gough 
et al., 1998). Leaving can be seen as a response to symbolic violence: 
subordinated actors respond by voluntarily exiting the game, rather than by 
actively resisting (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). This is seen in Belinda’s 
quote in Section 6.6.2 “I’m not an auditor any more”. 
7.10 Chapter summary 
This chapter has set out how I have moved from focused codes and sub-
categories generated from my research interviews to construct a single core 
category with concepts related to other concepts and codes. Section 7.4 
described the resulting substantive theory of reconstructing public sector 
audit. 
I then related my substantive grounded theory to Bourdieu’s formal theory of 
symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977).  I have used Bourdieu’s concepts and 
theories to demonstrate that symbolic violence in the audit field has led to 
private sector firms being able to reinforce and perpetuate their own view of 
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what it means to do a good quality audit in the public sector. The result is the 
continued domination of large accounting firms. As Bourdieu predicts, the 
status quo is reproduced (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), as the dominant 
parties (large accounting firms) continue to dominate the audit field, and 
have extended their remit to encompass public sector audit. 
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8 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This research set out to explore the effects of the transfer of auditors from 
the English public sector to private firms in 2012 as a result of the abolition of 
the Audit Commission. The context of the research is the UK government’s 
ongoing austerity agenda and the shrinking of the public sector, and the 
neoliberal drive to make the public sector more like the private sector, all of 
which have contributed to a substantial reduction in audit fees and therefore 
the time auditors have to do their work.  
Financial audit is a key accountability mechanism for public sector 
organisations, which spend hundreds of millions of pounds of public money 
(Section 2.3). To the external observer, it is unclear whether there is any 
difference in accountability arising from the change in financial audit (Section 
2.5.2), although it is very clear that fees have reduced (Baylis & Greenwood, 
2016; Public Sector Audit Appointments, 2017). In this research I sought to 
explore beneath the surface the differences between the old (public sector) 
and new (private sector) audit processes, to illuminate less obvious changes 
that have occurred.   
The objective of the research was to create a grounded theory of the change 
in public sector audit. The research question evolved as the study 
progressed, in line with the grounded theory methodology employed 
(Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) (Chapter 3). The initial research 
question was: 
 
 
280 
 
Initial research question (RQ) 
How is public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
 
As I gathered and analysed rich data, I developed and addressed sub-
questions, which assisted in addressing the main research question. These 
were set out in Section 1.5 and are reproduced in Figure 3 below. 
Reproduction of Figure 3 The evolving research question 
RQ: How is public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
SQ1: How is the quality of public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
SQ2: What is audit quality? 
SQ3: What strategies do auditors use to maintain audit quality in the face 
of changes to their environment? 
 
SQ4: What is the effect of commercial strategies on the audit and the 
auditor? 
 
SQ5: How are the changes so widely accepted despite significant 
discomfort? 
 
SQ6: What are the practical implications of the research findings? 
 
These questions helped me to create and refine codes and categories 
(Chapter 3) which I was able to construct into a substantive grounded theory 
of the reconstruction of public sector audit. The detailed findings and 
discussion are set out in the three chapters: Chapter 4 Commercialising 
public sector audit; Chapter 5 Reconstructing audit quality; and Chapter 6 
Embedding the reconstruction. An overview of the grounded theory is set out 
in in Chapter 7 including in diagrammatical format in Figure 17 (Section 
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7.4.3), and the later part of Chapter 7 relates these findings to a 
Bourdieusian framework of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977). 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 provides a synthesis of the 
research findings in order to provide an answer to the research question. 
Section 8.3 sets out the theoretical contribution of my work. It details how the 
substantive theory provides insights in relation to changes in public sector 
audit, the commercialisation of audit, the effects of the New Public 
Management agenda, and the audit quality debate. The use of Bourdieu’s 
theory of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977) to interpret the substantive 
theory provides an additional contribution to existing work on the domination 
of the accounting profession and the Big Four audit firms. Section 8.4 
outlines the contribution this work makes to policy by illuminating the 
changes to English public sector audit as a result of the transfer of audit to 
firms. Section 8.5 sets out recommendations for further research.  
8.2 Synthesis of empirical findings  
8.2.1 Commercialising public sector audit 
The commercialisation of audit in the private sector has been widely 
documented from about 1990 onwards (e.g. Carcello, 2005; Carter & 
Spence, 2014; Hanlon, 1994; Humphrey & Moizer, 1990; Imhoff, 2003; 
Spence & Carter, 2014; Wyatt & Gaa, 2004; Zeff, 2003a). Chapter 4 showed 
that this commercialisation has now permeated the public sector. 
Commercialisation of public sector audit was not precipitated by the abolition 
of the Audit Commission and the transfer of auditors to firms, but this major 
change accelerated a trend towards commercialisation that was already in 
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train. The commercial priorities that have come most significantly to the fore 
are presenting an image (to clients, reviewers and regulators) (Section 4.3) 
and doing ‘just enough’ (Section 4.4) to present a good image whilst 
maximising profit. As a result, technical expertise and public sector 
specialisation have become relatively devalued. 
In Chapter 7 I considered the Audit Commission’s audit practice as a weakly 
autonomous Bourdieusian subfield (Bourdieu, 1993; Everett, 2002) (see 
Section 2.7.3 and Section 7.6 for a detailed explanation) in which capitals are 
valued according to internal, specialist criteria, which can be different and 
even opposite to the values accepted in the wider field. The values of the 
autonomous subfield of the Audit Commission were influenced by the wider 
field (the accounting profession and the private sector) over a period of time, 
becoming gradually more commercial and more entrepreneurial. The 
creation of NHS foundation trusts, with the power to appoint their own 
auditors, in 2004 (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2015), was a notable step on 
this journey and the removal of the Audit Commission’s appointment regime 
instigated a much sharper shift towards the commercialism and 
entrepreneurialism of the private sector, as the field of public sector audit has 
taken on the values of the wider field of corporate audit. 
8.2.2 Reconstructing audit quality 
Chapter 5 considered the question of how these changes have been 
achieved, in a situation where auditors, highly skilled and experienced 
individuals, invoke their own individual comfort levels in order to determine 
whether they have done enough work (Pentland, 1993).  
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I argued that firms have orchestrated a reconstruction of the meaning of a 
good quality audit that is congruent with their own commercial objectives. 
Using the reconstructed meaning, less work is necessary to achieve a good 
quality audit. Auditors can continue to fulfil their expectations of themselves 
as professionals, by doing a good job in less time, because what it means to 
do a good job has changed. In Chapter 7 I showed how this change can be 
viewed through the lens of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1977): auditors have 
the new meanings imposed on them and are simultaneously complicit in their 
own domination, by misrecognising the corporate logic as natural. I showed 
that symbolic violence in the audit field has led to private sector firms being 
able to reinforce and perpetuate their own view of what it means to do a 
good quality audit in the public sector.  
Chapter 5 argued that audits are becoming more standardised, converging 
towards a constant, shaped in the form of private sector audits, through the 
Financial Reporting Council’s regime of quality reviews. All firms are keen to 
meet the standards, and there is very little advantage to exceeding the 
standards. This results in a lack of variation in the provision of audit, and a 
lack of choice for public sector bodies in appointing their auditors, as all firms 
provide increasingly uniform products. This contradicts prominent views of 
audit quality as a continuum, with clients choosing what level of audit quality 
to purchase (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Francis, 2004, 2011b). It also aligns 
public sector audit standards with the standard applied in the private sector, 
which has been shown to be deficient (Sikka, 2009b).  
The ongoing tendency for audits to incline towards a constant subverts one 
of the key objectives of the NPM and neoliberalist agenda: choice (J. Clarke, 
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2004; Pollitt, 2013). Choice is a key part of the rhetoric of both government 
(Pollitt, 2013) and neoliberalism (J. Clarke, 2004), yet my work shows 
ongoing, and arguably increasing, limitations to public bodies’ choice of 
auditor. The lack of choice is compounded in practice by the decision of most 
local authorities to opt into the PSAA scheme to have their auditor appointed 
for them (Public Sector Audit Appointments, 2018a).  
There is some evidence that at a micro level, audit procedures are becoming 
more standardised (Section 5.7). Constraining auditor judgement in favour of 
more scientific procedures could be argued to bolster the ‘front stage’ of 
audit (Downer, 2011) and thereby increase trust, which contributes towards 
the ‘reputation’ element of audit quality (Section 2.5.9). At the same time, 
reducing the specialist knowledge applied to audits challenges the 
judgemental ‘back stage’ procedures (Downer, 2011) and the ‘competence’ 
aspect of audit quality (Section 2.5.5). 
8.2.3 Embedding the reconstruction 
Chapter 6 explored auditors’ various responses to the change and concluded 
that all responses led to the reconstructed audit becoming accepted and 
embedded. Auditors initially worked in the same way as before, often 
working longer hours in an attempt to get through all the audit tasks, and 
experiencing discomfort as a result of the change. A large majority of 
auditors eventually lessened their discomfort either by embracing the change 
over time or by leaving, to be replaced by graduates who are both less 
expensive and more susceptible to socialisation (Anderson-Gough et al., 
1998). Both responses, embracing the change and leaving, lead to the same 
result, interpreted in Chapter 7 as the acceptance and perpetuation of a new 
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doxa as the reconstructed audit becomes embedded. The accounting firms 
have succeeded in dominating the field of the public sector despite some 
auditors’ recognition of deficiencies of private sector firms in respect of 
specialist public sector knowledge, and in spite of the resistance of some 
individuals to the new doxa. As Bourdieu predicts, the dominating and 
dominated parties work together so that the status quo is reproduced and 
perpetuated, and the accounting firms’ domination is preserved.  
8.2.4 Evaluating the reconstructed audit 
This thesis has shown that the commercialisation of public sector audit has 
led to a reconstruction of audit that is more standardised and requires less 
work to be done, but as Pentland (2000) remarks, it is difficult to say whether 
more (or less) auditing is good or bad, and for whom. Here I consider the 
characteristics of the reconstructed audit as described in chapters 4 and 5, in 
the context of the theoretical attributes of audit quality set out in Section 2.5: 
competence, conscientiousness, independence, moral courage and 
reputation. 
8.2.4.1 Competence 
The reconstructed audit uses more trainees, and employs less specialist 
expertise (Section 4.4.5), but auditors’ work is more standardised and 
controlled (Section 5.7), to ensure that audits meet a minimum ‘just enough’ 
standard. Less judgement is required to undertake the more standardised 
audit, but this is not problematic in itself, as there is no explicit link between 
judgement and quality.  
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The reconstructed audit favours the type of competence that facilitates 
compliance and the ‘just enough’ audit. The reduced experience and 
expertise of auditors means that individuals performing audit testing are less 
likely to be able to make judgements in complex areas, but the increased 
focus on compliance and control means they are more likely to meet 
minimum standards, audit files are more auditable, and the firms’ image is 
protected.   
8.2.4.2 Conscientiousness 
Auditors have significantly less time to do their work (Section 4.4.1.1), yet 
there is considerable evidence that they work much longer hours than 
previously (Section 4.5). This is consistent with other research which 
demonstrates that auditors ensure that their work is done to a standard they 
are comfortable with (Herrbach, 2005). Auditors who feel uncomfortable tend 
to leave (Section 6.6.2) and those who stay are confident in their opinions 
(Section 5.3.2). There is therefore little evidence of any change in 
conscientiousness. 
8.2.4.3 Independence 
There has been a significant shift from working for the taxpayer or the 
government, to working for the client. The increased focus on client service is 
evident at all four firms (Section 4.3.1.1). The increased focus on client 
service is a potential challenge to the independence component of audit 
quality (Anderson-Gough et al., 2000). 
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8.2.4.4 Moral courage 
My findings provided little evidence in relation to moral courage. This is 
expected because significant disagreements with the client are relatively 
rare, and confidentiality might prevent them from being disclosed in an 
interview situation. I did not seek hypothetical reassurances from auditors as 
I judged them too easy to provide and therefore relatively meaningless. 
There is potential for a decrease in moral courage related to the decrease in 
experience of auditors and reduced focus on the public interest, but this has 
not been demonstrated in my research. 
8.2.4.5 Reputation 
Audit firms are very careful to guard their reputations. Chapter 4 showed how 
the commercialisation of audit has led to an increased focus on presenting 
an image, and, as noted in Section 8.2.4.1 above, the increased 
standardisation of audits helps to protect the firms’ reputation, by making 
audit files more auditable. 
Multiple researchers suggest that large audit firms provide better audit quality 
than smaller firms (DeAngelo, 1981); this premise is accepted to such an 
extent that auditor size is used as a proxy for quality in some quantitative 
research (e.g. Tate, 2007). Furthermore, Beattie et al. (2012) show that 
auditor size is perceived by auditors and clients to be a factor in audit quality. 
Therefore, the transfer of audits to large firms is likely to have increased the 
reputation of the auditors and hence the credibility associated with the audit. 
If the role of audit is to signal the credibility of financial statements (Section 
2.3), then it can be argued that being audited by a larger firm increases audit 
quality. 
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8.2.4.6 Summary: evaluating the reconstructed audit 
My work provides evidence that the transfer of audits to large private sector 
firms has strengthened the ‘front stage’ of audit (Downer, 2011; Power, 
2011), increasing the credibility of the audit and therefore the legitimacy of 
the financial statements. At the same time, the ‘back stage’ work on the audit 
opinion, to achieve comfort in the financial statements, has decreased, and 
independence is threatened. 
 Auditors state unanimously that they are comfortable with their audit 
opinions. A significant factor in this is auditors’ conscientiousness in working 
longer hours until they reach a personal level of comfort, and individuals 
leaving the profession if this is not acceptable to them. Auditors who continue 
to work for the firms are those who do not feel compromised by the level of 
work they do. 
8.2.5 Synthesis of findings in relation to the research question 
The initial research question was set out in Section 3.1.1 as: 
 
RQ: How is public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
 
This question was answered by addressing six sub-questions (Figure 3), 
which are discussed here. 
 
SQ1: How is the quality of public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
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It is impossible to tell whether the assurance provided by the new regime is 
the same, less, or greater than under the old regime, because audit 
assurance cannot be measured (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). However, it is 
clear that under the new regime, the volume of audit work done has reduced 
(Section 4.4.4), and that auditors’ objectives are defined by the private sector 
and are more aligned with commercial objectives than with the public 
interest.  
 
SQ2: What is audit quality? 
 
There is no definitive answer to the question “What is audit quality?” 
Most auditors associate audit quality with compliance with international 
standards. Academic definitions include considerations of competence, 
conscientiousness, independence, and reputation. ICAS adds moral 
courage, which I endorse (Section 2.5.8) and the firms add efficiency and, 
sometimes, customer service, both of which I contest, because they do not 
enhance, and potentially impair, the auditor’s ability to find an error (Section 
5.4.1-2).  
Some authors have argued for the primacy of reputation in the definition of 
audit quality, because the credibility of the financial statements depends on 
the perception that the auditor would find an error (Section 2.5.9). This is 
predicated on the theory that credibility is important, as in agency theory and 
signalling theory (Section 2.3). In the public sector, a key role of audit is 
ensuring the accountability and stewardship of public funds, so management 
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control theory can be argued to be more relevant (Section 2.3.2). From a 
management control theory perspective, considerations of competence, 
conscientiousness, independence and moral courage carry more weight than 
reputation. 
I conclude that the most relevant attributes of audit quality for public sector 
audit are: competence, conscientiousness, independence and moral 
courage, and a secondary factor is auditor reputation.  
 
SQ3: What strategies do auditors use to maintain audit quality in the face 
of changes to their environment? 
 
 
Chapter 4 set out the strategies auditors use to simultaneously maintain 
audit quality and meet reduced audit budgets as: using less experienced 
staff, doing less audit work, being clear and auditable, working longer hours, 
focusing more on customer service, and subordinating public sector 
concerns. The new strategies form part of the doxa in place in the firms, 
which is consistent with the well documented commercialisation of audit in 
the private sector, and from which the Audit Commission regime had 
previously shielded public sector auditors (Section 7.6).  
 
SQ4: What is the effect of commercial strategies on the audit and the 
auditor? 
 
 
The effect of the commercial strategies on the audit is to strengthen the ‘front 
stage’ of the audit associated with credibility and public perception and to 
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weaken the ‘back stage’ associated with the auditors’ comfort in the financial 
statements (Section 8.2.4).  
Auditors have responded in different ways to the change. Their responses 
are analysed in Chapter 6. Many auditors experienced discomfort consistent 
with cognitive dissonance, as their habitus conflicted with the doxa in their 
new working environment. The eventual effect is that auditors either embrace 
the changes or leave the firms, to be replaced by new auditors who are 
socialised to accept the firms’ doxa. The firms’ reconstruction of audit 
becomes embedded, as audits are staffed only by individuals who subscribe 
to the new approach. 
 
SQ5: How are the changes so widely accepted despite significant 
discomfort? 
 
 
Private sector audit firms have imposed their values on the public sector 
through symbolic violence (Section 7.9). The transfer of auditors to the 
private sector has ended the autonomy of the public sector audit field, so that 
the values of the wider field have become embedded in the field of public 
sector audit (Section 7.6), and public sector audit is now undertaken in 
accordance with private sector priorities. This, and the loss of public sector 
specialisation among auditors, has largely been accepted as natural and 
uncontestable (Section 5.6).  
 
SQ6: What are the practical implications of the research findings? 
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Auditors are now working to the firms’ reconstruction of audit, which holds 
that less work is necessary to reach an opinion on public sector financial 
statements (Section 5.4), and that public sector risk is aligned with private 
sector risk (Section 5.5). As a result, less work is done on areas of the 
financial statements that are deemed to be less material, and it becomes 
more likely that smaller errors in financial statements, especially in specialist 
areas, could go unnoticed. 
I now return to the initial research question. 
 
RQ: How is public sector audit affected by privatisation? 
 
The effect of privatisation on public sector audit has been to deconstruct the 
autonomous subfield of public sector audit that existed under the Audit 
Commission regime, and to instil the firms’ commercial logic as the new doxa 
for public sector audit. Private sector firms have taken control over public 
sector audit and what it means. 
If the purpose of audit is to enhance the credibility of financial statements, 
then this is beneficial, because credibility is enhanced by the public’s faith in 
the big firms’ reputations. However, if the purpose of audit is the 
accountability of public sector bodies to Parliament, then it is arguable that 
audit has been weakened, because audits now consist of fewer procedures 
undertaken by less experienced staff.  
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8.3 Theoretical contribution  
8.3.1 Substantive theory of reconstructing public sector audit 
This research provides a substantive theory of reconstructing public sector 
audit, which has been summarised and discussed in Section 8.2. This 
section outlines how this substantive theory contributes to extant research. 
8.3.1.1 Contribution to research on public sector audit 
Goddard (2010) laments a lack of research engagement with accounting 
practitioners and with public policy implementation in the field of public sector 
accounting. This research involved direct engagement with audit 
practitioners through intensive interviews with auditors who had experienced 
the transfer of audits from the private sector to the public sector. The 
research employed a grounded theory approach in order to stay close to the 
data and generate a relevant theory.  
This study responds to a call from Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2015) for 
more research to understand the effects of the dissolution of the Audit 
Commission. One of the most significant effects of the transfer of auditors to 
the private sector is that public sector audit has taken on more 
comprehensively the increasingly commercialised values of the wider audit 
field. As a result, presenting an image is emphasised, and the ‘front stage’ of 
audit is bolstered at the expense of the comfort and assurance of the ‘back 
stage’ elements of audit.  
8.3.1.2 Contribution to research on the commercialisation of audit 
The commercialisation of audit in the private sector is well documented. This 
research shows clearly how the phenomenon of commercialisation has 
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extended to the public sector. This has happened both gradually over time 
and more suddenly at certain points in time, especially the point when audits 
were transferred to the private sector in 2012. I viewed the extension of the 
private sector culture, or doxa, in terms of symbolic domination (Bourdieu, 
1977). 
8.3.1.3 Contribution to the debate on ‘enterprise culture’ 
The ongoing commercialisation of the audit is consistent with what Sikka 
(2008a) refers to as ‘enterprise culture’. This research responds to Sikka’s 
call for more debate about the consequences of the growth in enterprise 
culture by explicating some of the detailed strategies adopted by auditors in 
order to achieve their new commercial objectives of making a profit, 
presenting an image and managing risk. A specific strategy auditors employ 
is to challenge the number of risks identified at the planning stage, with the 
aim of minimising the amount of testing they need to undertake.  
8.3.1.4 Contribution to understanding how NPM cost savings are achieved 
This research also provides detail that helps to explain how costs savings 
have been achieved through the transfers of public sector audit services to 
the private sector. Humphrey and Miller (2012, p. 310) argue for “the 
continuing importance of knowing more about what is done in the name of 
new public management”. This research contributes to that agenda by 
showing how audit firms save costs: by making more use of junior, less 
experienced staff, by doing less audit testing, and by facilitating a culture of 
working long hours. This adds to our understanding of how New Public 
Management cost savings are achieved, and helps to dispel the myth of 
inherent private sector efficiency and superiority. 
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8.3.1.5 Contribution to audit quality research 
This research contributes to academic discussions about audit quality in two 
ways. First, I have synthesised definitions of audit quality in relation to the 
public sector and concluded that attributes of audit quality most relevant to 
the public sector are: competence, conscientiousness, independence and 
moral courage, and that audit firm reputation is a secondary factor. Second, 
my conclusions show that audits are tending towards a uniform standard. 
Because audit firms are keen to minimise costs while meeting the regulator’s 
standards, all auditors are focused on doing just enough work to meet the 
standards, and audit quality is converging towards a constant across all 
firms. This contradicts prominent scholars Francis (2004, 2011b) and 
DeFond and Zhang (2014) who view audit quality as varying along a 
continuum, but provides evidence in support of the argument made by 
Donovan et al. (2014), following Akerlof’s (1970) logic that quality reduces to 
a minimum level where differences in quality cannot be observed.  
8.3.2 Contribution to formal theory 
Several authors have used a Bourdieusian theoretical framework to interpret 
their analysis of audit firms (Section 7.5.1. Hamilton and Ó Hógartaigh (2009, 
p. 911) have shown how the true and fair view is constructed by “the rites 
and rituals of the profession”. Audit firms have been shown to wield symbolic 
power to consolidate their dominant position over smaller firms in the UK 
(Stringfellow et al., 2015) and to facilitate their expansion into new areas 
(Andon et al., 2015). This research extends these findings by demonstrating 
how audit firms have wielded their symbolic power to reconstruct and 
dominate the previously autonomous subfield of public sector audit. Firms 
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have achieved this by imposing their own meanings on auditors through 
symbolic violence. This adds to our understanding of how the dominant 
parties in the audit sector continue to define how audit works. 
8.4 Policy implications 
Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2012) call for more research to understand the 
consequences of the reduced oversight of auditors arising from the abolition 
of the Audit Commission. This study shows that the oversight of the Audit 
Quality Response Team of the Financial Reporting Council is taken very 
seriously by audit firms, who attach high importance to the FRC’s reviews. 
Thus the meaning of a good quality audit is shaped to a large extent by the 
FRC, and imposed on auditors by the firms.  
The firms’ construction of audit involves deciding on the amount of audit work 
necessary by considering risk, using the same construction of risk for both 
the public sector and corporate clients. There are two points here, the first of 
which is that that the volume of work done is reduced because the firms view 
public sector clients as less risky than their corporate clients. This means 
that the government’s assurance on the stewardship of public funds is often 
now based on less audit work than under the previous regime. This is a 
change that is largely invisible because it does not affect the publically 
reported elements of the audit, the audit opinion and the FRC’s reviews.   
The second point is the normative question of whether public sector 
assurance should be based on a private sector conceptualisation of risk, or 
in accordance with some other standard. This is a subject that is worthy of 
further debate. Such a debate is unlikely to be demanded by public sector 
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bodies, for whom extra scrutiny would demand extra resources in terms of 
time and money, and who are already facing severe cost pressures due to 
the austerity agenda. If audit is a public good, and legislators impose audit 
requirements for the benefit of the community (Hay & Cordery, 2018; Jim 
Stewart, 2006), then it is also incumbent on legislators to ensure that the 
imposed requirements are appropriate. Therefore, government should 
consider the level of audit that is desirable in the public sector, and whether 
this should be the same as in the private sector, or different.  
This research contributes to a greater understanding of public sector audit in 
England, and how it has changed since the transfer of auditors to the private 
sector. This could be valuable to those making policy decisions in other 
jurisdictions of the UK (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), which still 
operate national audit institutions similar to the Audit Commission. If any of 
those governments should consider the transfer of public sector audit to the 
private sector, this research helps to provide a rounded picture of the 
potential change: that lower audit fees are achieved through reduced audit 
work and an accompanying impact on the level of accountability of local 
government. 
8.5 Recommendations for future research 
Future research could consider in more detail the normative question of what 
public sector audit should achieve, and whether it is beneficial for 
government audits to be conducted on the same basis as private sector 
audits or whether public money should be considered separately, and judged 
against a different standard.   
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More varied data sources could be used to explore perspectives of other 
stakeholders, for example, audit committees, the Financial Reporting 
Council, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance Accountants (CIPFA), and 
the National Audit Office. It would also be interesting to compare the detail of 
public sector audit undertaken to systems in other countries, especially 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This would help to separate the 
changes that have happened for all auditors over time from the changes as a 
result of the transfer of audit to the private sector. 
Three specific areas of interest arose during the study that have not been 
followed up as part of this research but could provide interesting avenues for 
further work. These are: the impact of branding, the role of data analytics, 
and the effect of changes on women and minority groups.  
The increased importance of brand image was a very clear theme in some 
interviews with auditors. One of the key themes in my research was 
‘presenting an image’. In this research I have restricted my consideration of 
presenting an image to the point of view of the individual auditor and how this 
affects their audit work. However, my interviews provided additional insights 
such as differing reactions of clients to public sector auditors versus brand 
name auditors, and the perceived importance of corporate social 
responsibility. 
An increased use of analytics in the audit was a major theme in some 
interviews, but absent from others. The changing role of data analytics in 
delivering audits could be researched in much more detail. In particular, it 
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would be interesting to explore whether the use of data analytics impacts on 
audit assurance and the amount of audit testing done.  
The question of whether existing difficulties for minority groups are 
exacerbated through the implementation of NPM policies also arose through 
this study. My interviews provide some evidence that adapting to working in 
private sector firms might have been more difficult for older people, part time 
workers and parents, which I have not explored fully in this thesis. This could 
be a fruitful avenue to explore further, especially in the light of firms’ 
ostensive commitment to increasing diversity (Edgley et al., 2016).  
8.6 Overall conclusion 
This research used a grounded theory methodology and intensive interviews 
with practitioners to construct a grounded theory of reconstructing public 
sector audit. 
I have related the substantive grounded theory to a Bourdieusian framework 
of symbolic violence to show how audit firms have orchestrated a 
reconstruction of the meaning of public sector audit in accordance with their 
own commercial objectives, which are not necessarily the same as society’s 
objectives. This has led to private sector conceptualisations of risk 
determining public sector audit programmes, an invisible reduction in public 
sector audit work, and an increasing standardisation of public sector audit. 
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Appendix B Output from the pilot study 
 
Table 20 Output from the pilot study 
 
Tentative 
focused 
code 
My ideas relating to this code Considerations for the 
main study 
 
Presenting 
an image 
 
The audit report has largely the same 
content as previously, but has been 
‘repackaged’.  Branding is more obvious. 
Maintaining consistency of staffing (in 
terms of individuals) is seen as helping 
with the transfer.  Firms seem to be 
aiming to show that the audit has not 
changed. 
At the same time the auditors seem to be 
less present; they avoiding working at 
client sites and do the audit over a 
shorter time period.   
There is also a suggestion that auditors 
are less helpful.  Where issues arise 
during the audit, auditors are less willing 
to help clients sort these out.  Auditors 
are also possibly more demanding of 
clients in terms of their expectations 
regarding working papers. 
 
Is branding important 
and does this affect 
how auditors do their 
job? 
 
Is consistency of 
staffing a practical 
issue, or an image 
issue, or both? 
 
Are auditors less 
present and less 
helpful? Is there a 
tension here with 
presenting a good 
image of the firm? 
Not being 
too perfect 
 
Both interviewees hint that there is less 
audit work being done now but that the 
current amount of audit work is 
adequate.  Auditors are confident in their 
opinion and that is enough.   
 
What has been lost and 
does it matter? 
 
Taking 
personal 
responsibility 
 
There have been significant promotions 
at the firms.  Staff have bigger portfolios. 
 
Staff are expected to take more personal 
responsibility for their own development, 
for technical issues arising, and for the 
audit opinion. 
Managers take more responsibility for 
understanding what is happening over 
the whole audit.  Trainees take more 
responsibility for completing their work 
within the budget. 
Auditors are held to account via links 
between quality scores and pay. 
 
How do managers feel 
about taking more 
responsibility? 
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Table 20 Output from the pilot study (continued) 
 
Tentative 
focused 
code 
My ideas relating to this code Considerations for the 
main study 
 
Protecting 
the firm 
 
 
Firms are focused on protecting 
themselves and auditors are made aware 
of this, it is something they are conscious 
of and the reasoning behind some of the 
firms’ quality procedures. 
In addition, firms are seen to be cautious 
in terms of independence and reluctant 
to take on any additional work that would 
have any risk of threatening this. 
Possible link to more strict processes / 
procedures, to minimise risk to the firm. 
 
Compare with other 
auditors and other 
firms. 
 
How do processes and 
procedures help to 
protect the firm?   
Being a 
generalist or 
a specialist 
 
Participants discuss the lack of 
specialisation in public sector accounts, 
which is complex and different from the 
commercial sector. 
Two reasons are suggested for the lack 
of specialisation at firms. 
Firstly, reprofiling the skill mix in order to 
do the audit at a lower cost means there 
are more trainees joining at the same 
time as turnover of more experienced 
staff, leading to less experience in the 
audit team overall. 
Secondly, deadlines moving forward 
means that staff need to be more flexible 
and can't necessarily just specialise in 
one area.   
The firms are potentially using more 
stringent processes to cope with the lack 
of specialist experience of staff. 
 
How do firms cope with 
a weakening skill mix? 
 
Are staff able to cope 
with specialist issues if 
they are required to be 
generalists? 
Scoring 
audit quality 
 
While I have been exploring the idea of 
audit quality not being measurable, 
auditors seem to be quite accepting of 
the idea of a quality score for their audits.  
The scores are seen as important – they 
are linked to individual performance and 
pay. 
 
Do auditors think that 
quality reviews can 
come up with an 
appropriate score to 
represent the quality of 
the audit? 
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Appendix C Original Interview Guide 
 
1. Explain interview to participants 
 What my DBA is 
 My research topic & RQ 
 Ethical approval process / this has been to committee 
 That they volunteering to participate and can drop out at any time 
 They are responding as an individual rather than representative of 
their firm 
 Interview will be recorded 
 Information can be kept confidential 
 Sign form 
 Please ask if any questions either as we go through or later 
 
2. Overall research question 
How has public sector audit work changed following the transfer of audit 
services from the Audit Commission to the private sector? 
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3. Questions 
Table 21 Original interview questions 
Question Rationale 
 
Background questions – personal to 
the participant 
 
How long have you worked for the 
Audit Commission / firm / current 
employer? 
 
Prior to working for the Audit 
Commission, had you worked for a 
private firm?  
 
What was / is your job title?  Has 
this changed? 
 
What is / was your role?  Has this 
changed? 
 
Which are the main clients you 
work on now? 
 
 
 
Understanding the participant so 
that I am better able to see 
participant’s viewpoint. 
 
Background questions – differences 
 
Are there any clients you worked on 
both before and after the transfer? 
 
When you are working at your 
public sector clients, are you 
generally working with the same 
colleagues as before the transfer, 
or are they different? 
 
 
 
Understanding background to 
differences between work before 
and after the transfer - as a 
backdrop to understanding 
participant’s viewpoint 
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Table 21 Original interview questions (continued) 
Question Rationale 
 
Differences in audit practices 
 
What do you do now that is different 
to when you worked at the Audit 
Commission? 
 
What do you do now that is the 
same as when you worked at the 
Audit Commission? 
 
 
One of the principal reasons for 
privatisation is increased efficiency 
brought about by private sector 
innovation(Boycko et al., 1996; 
Savas, 1987).  Has innovation led to 
differences in the audit process?  
Are there some areas of the audit 
that have not been altered by 
efficiency / innovation? 
 
 
Confidence in the audit opinion 
 
Do you feel more / less confident in 
the audit opinion than previously?   
 
Why? 
 
Is there any difference in how 
competent you feel? 
 
Is there any difference in how 
independent you feel? 
 
 
One of the principal reasons for 
privatisation is increased efficiency 
brought about by private sector 
innovation (Boycko et al., 1996; 
Savas, 1987).   
 
The audit opinion is the main 
product of the audit.  Competence 
and independence are the two key 
elements of the DeAngelo (1981) 
definition of audit quality. 
  
 
Audit quality 
 
What is audit quality?   
 
Are you providing a good quality 
audit?   
 
 
Audit quality can be thought of as a 
binary concept (good audit / bad 
audit) (DeAngelo, 1981) or on a 
continuum (Francis, 2004, 2011b) 
 
 
Changes in audit quality 
 
Has the quality of the audit 
changed?  In what way?   
 
Have clients commented on the 
change?  What did they say?  Are 
they happy? 
 
Is there any change in what you 
report to the Audit Committee? 
 
 
Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle (2012) 
suggest that the removal of the Audit 
Commission removes assurance of 
audit quality 
 
Savas (1987) and Megginson (2005) 
suggests that privatisation can lead 
to an improvement in service quality. 
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Appendix D Evolved Interview Guide 
 
1. Explain interview to participants 
What my DBA is 
My research topic & RQ 
Ethical approval process / this has been to committee 
That they volunteering to participate and can drop out at any time 
They are responding as an individual rather than representative of their firm 
Interview will be recorded 
Information can be kept confidential 
Sign form 
Please ask if any questions either as we go through or later 
 
2. Overall research question: 
How has public sector audit work changed following the transfer of audit 
services from the Audit Commission to the private sector? 
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3. Questions 
Table 22 Evolved interview questions 
 
Original question 
 
Rationale Update  Rationale 
 
Background 
questions – 
personal to the 
participant 
 
How long have you 
worked for the 
Audit Commission / 
firm / current 
employer? 
 
Prior to working for 
the Audit 
Commission, had 
you worked for a 
private firm?  
 
What was / is your 
job title?  Has this 
changed? 
 
What is / was your 
role?  Has this 
changed? 
 
Which are the main 
clients you work on 
now? 
 
Understanding the 
participant so that I 
am better able to 
see participant’s 
viewpoint. 
 
Maintain 
although don’t 
necessarily 
delve into 
detail unless 
volunteered / 
seems 
relevant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No need to 
ask – this will 
come out if it 
is relevant 
 
Useful 
starting point 
for 
interviewees 
to answer 
some fact 
based 
questions 
Length of 
service is 
useful 
background 
to the 
discussion in 
terms of how 
experienced 
auditors feel 
themselves to 
be. 
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Table 22 Evolved interview questions (continued) 
 
Original question 
 
Rationale Update  Rationale 
 
Background 
questions – 
differences between 
AC / firm 
 
Are there any clients 
you worked on both 
before and after the 
transfer? 
 
When you are 
working at your 
public sector clients, 
are you generally 
working with the 
same colleagues as 
before the transfer, 
or are they 
different? 
 
 
Understanding 
background to 
differences 
between work 
before and after 
the transfer - as a 
backdrop to 
understanding 
participant’s 
viewpoint 
 
 
Maintain 
although don’t 
necessarily 
delve into 
detail unless 
volunteered / 
seems 
relevant 
 
Still useful to 
have this as 
context / 
background 
but no need 
for lots of 
detail 
 
Differences in audit 
practices 
 
What do you do now 
that is different to 
when you worked at 
the Audit 
Commission? 
 
What do you do now 
that is the same as 
when you worked at 
the Audit 
Commission? 
 
 
 
One of the 
principal reasons 
for privatisation is 
increased 
efficiency brought 
about by private 
sector innovation 
(Boycko et al., 
1996; Savas, 
1987).  Has 
innovation led to 
differences in the 
audit process?  
Are there some 
areas of the audit 
that have not been 
altered by 
efficiency / 
innovation? 
 
 
 
Maintain and 
probe for 
further info 
 
Have auditors 
been able to 
influence the 
audit 
approach? 
 
Is there a 
difference in 
how risks are 
identified? 
 
Anything 
missed out? 
 
Has brought 
out lots of 
useful 
information 
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Table 22 Evolved interview questions (continued) 
 
Original question 
 
Rationale Update  Rationale 
 
Confidence in the 
audit opinion 
 
Do you feel more 
/ less confident in 
the audit opinion 
than previously?   
 
Why? 
 
Is there any 
difference in how 
competent you 
feel? 
 
Is there any 
difference in how 
independent you 
feel? 
 
One of the principal 
reasons for 
privatisation is 
increased efficiency 
brought about by 
private sector 
innovation (Boycko 
et al., 1996; Savas, 
1987).   
 
The audit opinion is 
the main product of 
the audit.  
Competence and 
independence are 
the two key 
elements of the 
DeAngelo (1981) 
definition of audit 
quality. 
 
 
Maintain 
 
It would be 
very important 
if auditors 
found any 
difference in 
confidence 
however from 
interviews so 
far this seems 
unlikely.  
Some useful 
info from 
independence 
discussion 
though. 
 
Audit quality 
 
What is audit 
quality?   
 
Are you providing 
a good quality 
audit?   
 
 
Audit quality can be 
thought of as a 
binary concept 
(good audit / bad 
audit) (DeAngelo, 
1981) or on a 
continuum (Francis, 
2004, 2011b) 
 
 
Maintain 
Add: what 
makes a good 
quality auditor? 
Add: is 
documentation 
a part of 
quality? 
Add: is the 
quality of the 
audit in the 
control of the 
manager or the 
firm? 
 
Useful 
because of 
the follow on 
question 
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Table 22 Evolved interview questions (continued) 
 
Original question 
 
Rationale Update  Rationale 
 
Changes in audit 
quality 
 
Has the quality of 
the audit 
changed?  In 
what way?   
 
Have clients 
commented on 
the change?  
What did they 
say?  Are they 
happy? 
 
Is there any 
change in what 
you report to the 
Audit Committee? 
 
 
Ellwood & Garcia-
Lacalle (2012) 
suggest that the 
removal of the Audit 
Commission 
removes assurance 
of audit quality 
 
Savas (1987) and 
Megginson (2005) 
suggests that 
privatisation can lead 
to an improvement in 
service quality. 
 
 
Remove “has 
the quality of 
audit 
changed” 
 
 
Maintain the 
question of 
the client 
viewpoint 
High level 
Individual 
level 
 
Auditors will 
not say (so 
far) that the 
quality of audit 
has changed 
and this 
should be 
picked up by 
other 
questions 
anyway so no 
need for this 
to be explicit. 
 
 
Anything else? 
 
Is there anything 
else you would 
like to tell me? 
 
Can I contact you 
again? 
 
Is there anyone 
else you think I 
should talk to? 
 
 
At the initial stages, 
analysis should seek 
to uncover as many 
categories as 
possible (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990) 
 
 
 
Maintain 
 
Some 
unexpected 
info has arisen 
in the last few 
minutes 
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Table 22 Evolved interview questions (continued) 
 
Original question 
 
Rationale Update  Rationale 
Additional questions Dec 2016 
Do you feel that the 
audit has become 
more standardised? 
 
Are there 
opportunities to do 
things in different 
ways if you want to? 
(flexible / rigid) 
  Seeking to find 
out more 
about this 
focused code 
Is the staff profile 
changing? 
Leavers? 
trainees? 
Promotions? 
  Seeking to find 
out more 
about this 
focused code 
Do you feel that your 
public sector 
expertise is 
important / valued? 
 
Where there is a lack 
of specialised staff, 
how do you 
compensate for this?  
(standardisation?) 
 
  Seeking to find 
out more 
about this 
focused code 
How supported are 
auditors? 
e.g. by managers 
/ by firm’s 
infrastructure? 
Does it make a 
difference being in 
a firm? 
 Seeking to find 
out more 
about this 
focused code 
Is there pressure to 
be more efficient?  
How is this 
achieved? 
What has been cut 
out? 
“not too perfect”? 
  Seeking to find 
out more 
about this 
focused code 
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Table 22 Evolved interview questions (continued) 
 
Original question 
 
Rationale Update  Rationale 
Do you have more / 
less responsibility? 
 
Are expectations of 
auditors different? 
 
Are you more / less 
accountable? How? 
Reward if things go 
well? 
Blame if things go 
wrong? 
  Seeking to find 
out more 
about this 
focused code 
How do you feel 
about quality 
scores? 
Evidence of good 
performance – for 
progression / for 
winning work? 
Does the quality 
score reflect good 
quality? 
 
Before this 
question – 
how do you 
know whether 
you are doing 
a good quality 
audit? 
Find out 
whether 
quality scores 
is an answer 
to this 
question 
Is there a difference 
in how the firm views 
corporate vs public 
sector audits? (e.g. 
in terms of risk to the 
firm) 
  Seeking to find 
out more 
about this 
focused code 
Is there a certain 
type of person who 
succeeds in a firm? 
  Some 
interviewees 
have 
commented 
e.g. on the 
age profile of 
the new work 
place. 
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Table 22 Evolved interview questions (continued) 
 
Original question 
 
Rationale Update  Rationale 
Additional questions Jan 2017 
Would it be worth 
speaking to non-execs? 
 It depends on 
the authority.  
I knew that 
already.  
Leave for 
now. 
 
Comparison Firms D / B  Some 
differences at 
Firm D.  
Could do with 
more Firm D 
interviews. 
 
Is there a difference in 
how much you work in / 
out of the office?  / 
location of offices?  Does 
this make a difference to 
how well supported you 
feel? 
   
Controls or substantive – 
is there a change? 
 Definitely a 
move 
towards 
substantive 
but feel this is 
unlikely core 
to my work -> 
remove this 
one 
 
Additional questions Feb 2017 
Discuss my emerging 
theory and invite 
comments 
  Seeking 
member 
reflections 
(Tracy, 2010) 
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Appendix E Schedule of interviews  
Table 23 Schedule of interviews  
 Reference Type of 
interview 
Date Audit firm 
participant 
transferred 
to15  
Participant 
stayed at or left 
the firm 
transferred to 
Participant’s 
employer at the 
time of the 
interview16  
Participant’s 
position at time 
of interview17 
Pilot study P1  Face to 
face 
3/11/15 N/a 
 
N/a Colleague 
P2  
 
Telephone 6/11/15 Council Manager 
P3 
  
Telephone 9/11/15 Firm D Manager 
Initial sample P4 
 
Face to 
face 
12/11/15 Firm B Stayed Firm B Manager 
P5 Face to 
face  
19/11/15 Firm C  Stayed Firm C Manager 
P6 Face to 
face  
19/11/15 Firm C Stayed Firm C Manager 
P7 Face to 
face  
20/11/15 Firm C Stayed Firm C Manager 
                                            
15 Audit firms are labelled as Firm A, B, C, D, in order to preserve anonymity. Only four firms were involved in the transfer of Audit Commission audits to the 
private sector, although others firms do conduct public sector audit work.  
16 I have categorised the participants’ work places as a firm, NHS, council or other, in order to preserve anonymity. All participants had remained within the 
sector in some capacity. 
17 To help maintain anonymity, I have classified participants as managers, team leaders or directors rather than using more specific job titles. Senior 
managers are included as managers. One deputy director is classified as a director. 
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Table 23 Schedule of interviews (continued) 
 Reference Type of 
interview 
Date Audit firm 
participant 
transferred 
to15  
Participant 
stayed at or 
left the firm 
transferred to 
Participant’s 
employer at the 
time of the 
interview16  
Participant’s 
position at time 
of interview17 
Initial sample 
(continued) 
P8 Face to 
face 
26/11/15 Firm B Stayed Firm B Manager 
P9 Face to 
face  
15/12/15 Firm A Stayed Firm A Manager 
P10 Face to 
face  
15/12/15 Firm A Stayed Firm A Director 
Theoretical 
sampling to find 
participants from 
different 
geographical 
offices of Firm C, 
and auditors who 
had left the firm 
they had originally 
transferred to 
P11 Face to 
face  
12/12/16 Firm C Stayed Firm C Manager 
P12 Face to 
face  
13/12/16 Firm C Left NHS Manager 
P13 Face to 
face 
13/12/16  Firm C  Left Council Manager 
P14 Face to 
face 
4/1/17  Firm D Left Firm B Manager 
P15 Face to 
face 
4/1/17  Firm B Stayed Firm B Manager 
Theoretical 
sampling to find 
views of auditors 
from Firm D and 
auditors who had 
left Firm B 
P16 
 
Telephone 1/3/17 Firm D Stayed Firm D Director 
P17 
 
Telephone 7/3/17  Firm B Left Other  Manager 
P18 Telephone 7/3/17  Firm D Left Other Director 
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Table 23 Schedule of interviews (continued) 
 Reference Type of 
interview 
Date Audit firm 
participant 
transferred 
to15  
Participant 
stayed at or 
left the firm 
transferred to 
Participant’s 
employer at the 
time of the 
interview16 
Participant’s 
position at time 
of interview17 
Theoretical 
sampling to find an 
alternative 
perspective on 
Firm A 
P19 Telephone 10/3/17 Firm A Left Council Director 
Theoretical 
sampling to 
include more client 
perspectives 
P20 Telephone 24/3/17 N/a NHS  Director 
Theoretical 
sampling to obtain 
their “member 
reflections” (Tracy, 
2010, p. 844)  from 
auditors who have 
stayed in their jobs 
P21 
 
Telephone 27/3/17 Firm C Stayed Firm C Manager 
P22 Face to 
face 
28/3/17 Firm B Stayed Firm B Team leader 
P23 Face to 
face 
28/3/17 Firm B Stayed Firm B Team leader 
Theoretical 
sampling – to 
consider clients’ 
perspectives on 
my emerging 
theory 
P24 Face to 
face 
30/3/17 N/a NHS and 
council 
Director  
P25 
 
Telephone 31/3/17 Firm E  Left Council Manager 
P26 
 
Telephone 24/5/17 N/a NHS Director 
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Appendix F Submission to Ethics Committee 
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Appendix G Participant consent form 
 
Title of Study: 
 
(1) DBA Research: 
Privatisation of audit services: what is 
the impact on the audit? 
(2) Possible additional research 
project: 
Auditor perspectives on audit quality 
Person(s) conducting the research: 
 
Helen Watson 
 Programme of study: 
 
DBA 
Address of the researcher for 
correspondence: 
 
Newcastle Business School 
Northumbria University  
City Campus East 1, 
Newcastle Upon Tyne 
NE1 8ST 
 
Telephone 
 
07813 513440 
E-mail: 
 
h.watson@northumbria.ac.uk 
Description of the broad nature of the 
research: 
 
 
 
I will conduct semi-structured 
interviews with auditors from each of 
the four firms who took on Audit 
Commission staff in 2012, to find out 
detailed audit staff perspectives on how 
the audit is conducted. 
Description of the involvement 
expected of participants including the 
broad nature of questions to be 
answered or events to be observed or 
activities to be undertaken, and the 
expected time commitment: 
 
I will conduct and record semi-
structured interviews with participants 
to obtain their perspectives on the audit 
work they undertake.  I am particularly 
interested in (1) how has the audit 
changed since the transfer to the 
private sector in October 2012? 
(2) what does audit quality mean to 
auditors? 
Each interview is likely to last around 1 
hour. 
I may need to make further contact with 
some interviewees after the interview, 
in order to refine my research.  This 
may be via phone, e-mail, or a second 
interview.  Involvement in this 
additional contact would be optional. 
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Description of how the data you 
provide will be securely stored and/or 
destroyed upon completion of the 
project. 
 
The data will be stored securely.  Hard 
copies of data will be kept locked away 
and soft copies on a secure server 
protected by password access. 
Data will be anonymised.  In the 
transcription, data analysis and thesis, 
participants will be referred to as 
Participant A at Firm B, etc.  The key to 
which participant is which will be kept 
in paper format, separate from the 
recordings. 
 
Information obtained in this study, including this consent form, will be kept 
strictly confidential (i.e. will not be passed to others) and anonymous (i.e. 
individuals and organisations will not be identified unless this is expressly 
excluded in the details given above). 
Data obtained through this research may be reproduced and published in a 
variety of forms and for a variety of audiences related to the broad nature of 
the research detailed above. It will not be used for purposes other than those 
outlined above without your permission.  
Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time. 
By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the 
above information and agree to participate in this study on the basis of the 
above information. 
 
Participant’s signature:     Date: 
 
 
Student’s signature:      Date: 
 
Please keep one copy of this form for your own records 
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Appendix H Ethics amendment request 
 
Project Name: DBA: Exploring the 
effect of privatising public sector audit 
Date original ethical approval 
received: 17 July 2015 
Principal Investigator: Helen Watson Department: AFM 
Date: 10 February 2017 Project Ref:  
 
Description of Change: 
Participants to include not only auditors but also others who have a view or 
interest in public sector audit; this could include local authority and NHS 
employee and non-executive directors, and employees of relevant 
regulators (such as the Financial Reporting Council, Public Sector Audit 
Appointments and the National Audit Office) 
Some interviews to be conducted by telephone rather than in person.  
Where interviews are undertaken by telephone, I will not insist on a signed 
participant form from the participant.  I will provide the form in advance of 
the interview and discuss it with the participant at the start of the interview 
to ensure that they are happy with it. 
 
Reasons for Change: 
During the course of the research some participants have suggested that I 
could seek further information from clients or from regulators; this was also 
suggested feedback when I presented my research.  Amending my 
research in this way is consistent with my grounded theory methodology. 
Telephone interviews are more cost effective and practical than face-to-
face interviews where the participants live some distance away.  I have 
potential interviews in London, Reading and Brighton. 
 
Anticipated Implications: 
Widening the pool of participants will help me to broaden my research.  I 
do not foresee any ethical implications for this. 
It may be more difficult to get a signed ethics form when I have interviewed 
participants by telephone; however, I can ensure that each participant has 
access to the ethics form and check that they understand it and are happy 
with it before I start the interview. 
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Appendix I Example diagrams and mind maps 
used for theorising  
 
Figure 18, Figure 19 and Figure 20 are images illustrating how I related 
codes and concepts to each other. They were created as part of the data 
analysis process and were not originally intended to form part of the thesis. I 
decided to include them to demonstrate how I undertook this stage of data 
analysis. 
Figure 18 Example diagram used for theorising 
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Figure 19 Example mind map used for theorising 
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Figure 20 Example mind map used for theorising 
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Appendix J Illustrative example of initial coding 
Table 24 Example of initial coding 
Raw interview data to be coded Initial codes 
Interviewer
 
Participant 
 
 
What can you tell me about the audit approach for Firm C - 
how's that been developed and how is it different? 
We have a different electronic system – so, we had TeamMate 
in the Audit Commission, which now seems a very long time 
ago! - and obviously there were some problems with 
TeamMate, I think you know that there was a lot of repetition to 
some extent, and it wasn't always clear how that flowed 
through.  Firm C, as a global firm, has a global audit approach, 
so that's certainly a key difference.    And I think what I find 
working at Firm C is the level of technical guidance, the way 
that links in to the audit approach, it's very structured in terms of 
how the file is set out and exactly how you do things.  There's.   
 
 
 
 
Using different software 
 
Relegating the Commission to the distant past 
 
Acknowledging problems with AC way of 
working 
Repeating work, Cutting out waste 
 
Not being clear 
 
Being in a global firm, Having a firm-wide 
approach  
Being part of a big firm, Fitting in,  
Supporting audit staff 
Being supported with technical guidance 
 
Linking to the audit approach 
 
Following a process 
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Table 24 Example of initial coding (continued) 
Raw interview data to be coded Initial codes 
 lots of mandated forms, for example, you know – significant 
risks, there'll be a specific form that we fill in, that I think maybe 
wasn't quite as structured at the Audit Commission.  I think the 
file setup is different, just in terms of how you approach it on the 
actual electronic audit file – I think in terms of whether we go for 
a controls of substantive approach – that’s still varying per audit 
really and depending on what we find, but we also at Firm C 
have IT general controls which I think is a much more structured 
process than it was at the Audit Commission – I mean there 
was some work done there, but I think at Firm C there are 
specific IT teams.  There's IT auditors who will just work on that.  
They're obviously very experienced.  And our approach at Firm  
Following a process 
 
Following mandated procedures 
 
Conforming 
 
Using different software 
 
Following a process 
 
Adjusting the approach to the audit 
Adjusting the approach depending on findings 
Complying with the firm’s approach 
 
Reviewing IT controls 
 
Following a process 
Supporting audit staff 
Using IT specialists 
 
Being an expert 
Being very experienced 
Conforming 
Complying with the firm’s approach 
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Table 24 Example of initial coding (continued) 
Raw interview data to be coded Initial codes 
 C is that generally we will only do controls – sort of overall 
control work - if we can rely on the IT controls as well, because 
that is the only way we can carry assurance forward 
Following a controls approach 
 
Regarding IT controls as key 
 
Complying with the firm’s approach 
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Appendix K Illustrative example of focused coding 
Table 25 Example of focused coding 
Raw interview data to be coded Initial codes Focused codes How I arrived at these 
focused codes 
Interviewer
 
 
 
Participant 
 
 
What can you tell me about the 
audit approach for Firm C - 
how's that been developed and 
how is it different? 
We have a different electronic 
system – so, we had 
TeamMate in the Audit 
Commission, which now 
seems a very long time ago! 
and obviously there were some
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using different software 
 
Relegating the Commission 
to the distant past 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subordinating the 
public sector  
 
 
 
 
 
 
I judged this initial code to 
be mundane, so did not 
create a focused code 
from it. 
 
I linked this to other codes 
about how auditors viewed 
the Commission and the 
firms  
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Table 25 Example of focused coding (continued) 
Raw interview data to be coded Initial codes Focused codes How I arrived at these 
focused codes 
 problems with TeamMate, I 
think you know that there was 
a lot of repetition to some 
extent, and it wasn't always 
clear how that flowed through.  
Firm C, as a global firm, has a 
global audit approach, so that's 
certainly a key difference.    
And I think what I find working 
at Firm C is the level of 
technical guidance, the way  
Acknowledging problems 
with AC way of working  
 
Repeating work, Cutting out 
waste 
 
Not being clear 
 
Doing a good quality audit 
 
Being in a global firm 
Having a firm-wide 
approach 
 
Being part of a big firm, 
Fitting in  
 
Supporting audit staff 
Being supported with 
technical guidance 
 
 
Doing less work 
 
 
 
 
Standardising 
 
Fitting in 
 
Supporting audit staff 
 
 
‘Doing less work’ 
encompassed ideas of not 
repeating work (here) and 
doing less testing / being 
more focused (from other 
interviews)  
I tried and then abandoned 
‘Doing a good quality audit’ 
as a focused code, as 
other codes were more 
helpful and informative.  
‘Fitting in’ helped me to 
explore auditors’ 
responses to the change. 
I elevated ‘Supporting 
audit staff’ to a focused 
code because it appeared 
in different forms in other 
places and led to some 
interesting comparisons. 
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Table 25 Example of focused coding (continued) 
Raw interview data to be coded Initial codes Focused codes How I arrived at these 
focused codes 
 that links in to the audit 
approach, it's very structured 
in terms of how the file is set 
out and exactly how you do 
things.  There's lots of 
mandated forms, for example, 
you know – significant risks, 
there'll be a specific form that 
we fill in, that I think maybe 
wasn't quite as structured at 
the Audit Commission.  I think  
Linking to the audit 
approach 
Following a process 
 
Following a process 
 
Following mandated 
procedures 
 
Conforming 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardising 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardising 
 
 
 
‘Standardising’ brought 
together many of the initial 
codes from this excerpt 
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Table 25 Example of focused coding (continued) 
Raw interview data to be coded Initial codes Focused codes How I arrived at these 
focused codes 
 the file setup is different, just in 
terms of how you approach it 
on the actual electronic audit 
file – I think in terms of whether 
we go for a controls of 
substantive approach – that’s 
still varying per audit really and 
depending on what we find, but 
we also at Firm C have IT 
general controls which I think 
is a much more structured  
 
 
Using different software 
 
 
Following a process 
 
Adjusting the approach to 
the audit 
 
Adjusting the approach 
depending on findings 
 
Complying with the firm’s 
approach 
 
Reviewing IT controls 
 
Following a process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardising 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The initial code ‘Adjusting 
the approach to the audit’ 
can be considered as the 
opposite of standardising. I 
first created a focused 
code ‘Tailoring’ and then 
subsumed this within 
‘Standardising’ as it proved 
to be helpful in considering 
to what extent processes 
had been standardised or 
not standardised. 
Data analytics and use of 
IT are interesting aspects 
of my data, but I decided 
not to pursue this as the 
main concern of my study. 
This is a potential area of 
interest for future study. 
 
 
349 
 
Table 25 Example of focused coding (continued) 
Raw interview data to be coded Initial codes Focused codes How I arrived at these 
focused codes 
 process than it was at the Audit 
Commission – I mean there 
was some work done there, 
but I think at Firm C there are 
specific IT teams.  There's IT 
auditors who will just work on 
that.  They're obviously very 
experienced.  And our 
approach at Firm C is that 
generally we will only do 
controls – sort of overall  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supporting audit staff 
 
Using IT specialists 
Being an expert 
Being very experienced 
 
Conforming 
Complying with the firm’s 
approach 
 
Following a controls 
approach 
 
 
 
 
Supporting audit staff 
 
 
Specialising 
 
 
 
Standardising 
 
 
 
I created the focused code 
‘Specialising’ from some 
different data, and 
subsequently assimilated 
the codes ‘Being and 
expert’ and ‘Being very 
experienced’ within it. 
 
 
After some investigation 
and consideration, I 
decided not to pursue the 
code ‘Following a controls 
approach’ because other 
codes illuminated the data 
much better. 
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Table 25 Example of focused coding (continued) 
Raw interview data to be coded Initial codes Focused codes How I arrived at these 
focused codes 
 control work - if we can rely on 
the IT controls as well, 
because that is the only way 
we can carry assurance 
forward 
 
Regarding IT controls as 
key 
Complying with the firm’s 
approach 
 
 
 
Standardising 
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Appendix L E-mail to participants to elicit member 
reflections 
 
Dear [name] 
 
I’m contacting you because I interviewed you several months ago as part of 
my doctoral research project into the changes in public sector audit following 
the transfer of auditors from the Audit Commission to firms. I’m currently in 
the process of writing up my thesis and would like to share my findings with 
you – see below. I’ve condensed these as much as possible so that you can 
read them quickly – I know it is an extremely busy time of year.  
 
I’d really appreciate it if you could read through the below and respond and 
let me know your thoughts. 
 
Once again, thank you very much for your participation. 
 
Helen 
 
Reconstructing public sector audit 
 
Since the 2012 transfer of public sector auditors to firms, audit has become 
more commercialised. There is more emphasis on professional image and 
efficiency, and less on public sector specialisation. The focus has shifted 
from public interest towards client service. Before 2012, the Audit 
Commission espoused public sector values but was increasingly influenced 
by wider commercial values. Since then, public sector audit has more 
comprehensively taken on commercial values, subordinating (though not 
disregarding) the public interest.  
 
Audit firms have reconstructed what it means to undertake a good quality 
audit in the UK public sector, in line with their commercial objectives. 
Efficiency is incorporated into auditors’ understanding of audit quality, such 
that less work is necessary to do a good quality audit. This is achieved by an 
increasing focus on fewer risks, and a subtly different view of risk, which 
considers public sector organisations alongside corporate entities and 
prioritises risk to the firm. 
 
FRC reviews are taken extremely seriously. Auditors aim to construct an 
audit file that will pass AQR. Very tight budgets mean there is no time for 
extra work and little scope for variation. Thus, the FRC plays a significant 
role in constructing the standard to which all auditors work. Audits at all firms 
are tending towards the same standard. This standard is now in the control 
of the private sector, via firms and the FRC.  
 
Some auditors’ personal views of what is a good quality audit, or what is 
enough work, differ from their employer’s view. Tight budgets do not allow for 
individuals auditing to their own personal standards. This can lead to 
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frustration and discomfort. Auditors either accept the new way of doing 
things, or leave, to be replaced by trainees who can be socialised into the 
firms’ way of working. Both options lead to embedding the firms’ 
interpretation of what is a good quality audit. 
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Appendix M Quality criteria 
 
This  table is organised according to Malsch and Salterio’s audit-specific quality questions (Malsch & Salterio, 2016), but also 
references Tracy’s eight quality criteria (Tracy, 2010) and how these are met. 
 
Table 26 Quality criteria and how they are met in this research 
Quality questions 
(Malsch & Salterio, 
2016) 
How academics suggest this 
can be demonstrated  
How this is evidenced in my work Link to 
evidence in 
my work 
1. Is theory mobilized 
in a credible and 
meaningful way? 
(Malsch & Salterio, 
2016 p. 10) 
 
This relates to Tracy’s  
concepts of 
meaningful coherence, 
and rich rigour (Tracy, 
2010). 
There should be a good 
methodological fit between 
research method and theory 
(Malsch & Salterio, 2016)  
 
Theory should be used as an 
interpretive lens for making 
sense of field observations. 
(Malsch & Salterio, 2016) 
Sufficient, appropriate and 
complex theoretical 
constructs are used (Tracy, 
2010) 
Following Charmaz’s (2014) constructivist grounded 
theory methodology helped to maintain epistemological 
and methodological coherence. 
 
The ‘field story’ arising from the data (Locke, 2001) was 
connected to appropriate literature and existing theory 
towards the end of the research process, using the codes 
from the grounded theory process as a guide. For 
example, the key concept “doing just enough” arose 
directly from the data, and exploring its properties and 
changes led me to the Bourdieusian concept of symbolic 
violence. At the end of my study, I reviewed my 
substantive theory in the light of Bourdieusian formal 
theory. 
 
Sections 
3.2 and 3.3 
 
 
Section 
3.16 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
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Table 26 Quality criteria and how they are met in this research (continued) 
Quality questions 
(Malsch & Salterio, 
2016) 
How academics suggest this can be 
demonstrated  
How this is evidenced in my work Link to 
evidence in 
my work 
2. Does data collection 
reflect an ‘‘in-depth’’ 
investigation? (Malsch 
& Salterio, 2016 p. 11) 
 
This links to  Tracy’s 
concept of  rich rigour 
(Tracy, 2010 p. 840-
841) 
 
The data represent the complexity 
and richness of the field (Malsch & 
Salterio, 2016). 
 The study uses sufficient and 
appropriate data, time in the field, 
sample(s), context(s)  and data 
collection and analysis processes 
(Tracy, 2010). 
Jonsen, Fendt, and Point (2018) 
advise quantifying some aspects of 
the research in writing up; for 
example, disclosing the length of 
interviews and the number of pages 
of transcribed data.  
 
I conducted 23 in-depth interviews of up to 110 
mins in length, all with experienced professionals, 
most with auditors who directly experienced the 
transfer from the Audit Commission to the firms. 
The sample included diverse contexts within this 
setting: all four audit firms, and seven different 
locations. 
Data collection and analysis followed the principles 
and procedures of constructivist grounded theory 
(Charmaz, 2014) and used the grounded theory 
concept of theoretical saturation (Charmaz, 2014) 
to determine when to stop collecting data. 
Section 3.6 
 
Section 3.7 
and  
Appendix E 
 
 
Section 3.9 
 
 
Section 
3.7.3 
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Table 26 Quality criteria and how they are met in this research (continued) 
Quality questions (Malsch 
& Salterio, 2016) 
How academics suggest this can be 
demonstrated  
How this is evidenced in my work Link to 
evidence in my 
work 
3. Are the findings 
‘‘trustworthy’’? (Malsch & 
Salterio, 2016 p. 12-13) 
 
This is similar to Tracy’s 
concept of sincerity (Tracy, 
2010), which she splits into 
self-reflexivity and 
transparency. 
 
The researcher should use data from 
multiple sources. Tracy (2010) suggests 
the term “crystallization” as a relativist 
equivalent to the realist “triangulation” 
suggested by Malsch and Salterio 
(2016), representing the aim to produce 
complex, multi-dimensional findings. 
 
The researcher should demonstrate 
negative case analysis (Malsch & 
Salterio, 2016) 
Findings should be shared with the 
groups from whom the data were 
originally obtained (Jonsen et al., 2018; 
Malsch & Salterio, 2016).  Tracy (2010) 
refers to this as member reflection. 
The research should be reflexive and 
transparent (Tracy, 2010).  
Gurd (2008) emphasizes the importance 
of setting out clearly how the data 
collection and analysis has been done. 
 Crystallisation is achieved through 
interviewing different individuals via 
theoretical sampling. I interviewed 
auditors from four different firms, seven 
different locations, grades from team 
lead to director, some who were still 
working for the firm they transferred 
into and some who had left, as well as 
clients and non-executive directors. 
There was a split of male and female, 
full time and part time auditors. 
Negative cases were analysed through 
constant comparison. 
I undertook ‘member reflections’ during 
and after later interviews. 
I used memo writing to record my 
thoughts and reflections throughout the 
data analysis period.  
As well as describing the coding 
process, I have included an interview 
excerpt to demonstrate how this has 
been applied. 
 
Section 3.6 
and  
Appendix E 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 3.9.2 
 
Section 3.15 
 
Section 3.9.3  
 
Appendix J 
and  
Appendix K 
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Table 26 Quality criteria and how they are met in this research (continued) 
Quality questions (Malsch 
& Salterio, 2016) 
How academics suggest this can be 
demonstrated  
How this is evidenced in my work Link to 
evidence in my 
work 
4. Does the manuscript 
report the richness of the 
empirical material in a 
convincing and appropriate 
manner? (Malsch & 
Salterio, 2016 p. 14-15) 
Tracy (2010) links this to 
credibility, which is 
evidenced by 
demonstrating that the 
researcher has 
experienced the field and 
done a sufficient quantity 
of work. 
The researcher should show the reader 
the data through appropriate use of 
carefully selected detailed quotes 
(Golden-Biddle & Locke, 1997; Malsch & 
Salterio, 2016; Tracy, 2010). These 
should show the rich detail of data by 
including contradictions and counter-
views (Malsch & Salterio, 2016; Tracy, 
2010). 
Some quantifications, e.g. number and 
length of interviews, can be useful to 
demonstrate the depth of the research 
(Malsch & Salterio, 2016; Tracy, 2010).  
Careful writing is necessary to convince 
the reader (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 
1997; Malsch & Salterio, 2016; Tracy, 
2010). 
 
I have included excerpts from 
interviews to support the findings and 
demonstrate a multiplicity of views. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have provided some appropriate 
quantitative details about my data 
collection.   
Quotes 
support the 
research 
throughout 
chapters 4, 5 
and 6  
 
 
 
 
Section 3.6 
and Appendix 
E 
  
 
 
357 
 
Table 26 Quality criteria and how they are met in this research (continued) 
Quality questions (Malsch & 
Salterio, 2016) 
How academics suggest 
this can be demonstrated  
How this is evidenced in my work Link to 
evidence in my 
work 
5. Does the analysis of the 
field material help understand 
the global issue that sent the 
researcher to the field? 
(Malsch & Salterio, 2016 p. 
15-16) 
This links to Tracy’s (2010) 
concept of resonance, which 
she defines as having an 
influence on readers, and her 
concepts of a worthy topic 
and significant contribution. 
Research can be situated 
in a local context but 
needs to be linked to 
broader settings and 
theory (Malsch & Salterio, 
2016). 
 
 
 
 
Aesthetic, evocative 
representation can help 
the reader to identify with 
the research (Tracy, 
2010). 
 
This research is situated in the context of the UK 
public sector audit and specifically the 2012 
transfer of auditors to the private sector. The 
findings are linked to relevant academic work on 
New Public Management, the commercialisation 
of audit, and audit quality, among other areas. At 
the end of the research, the substantive grounded 
theory is related to Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic 
violence (Bourdieu, 1977). 
 
I have included sufficient detailed descriptions that 
readers should be able to apply them to other 
settings, for example, commercial audit. 
 
 
 
The contributions of the research are specifically 
highlighted.  
 
Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Quotes 
included 
throughout 
chapters 4, 5 
and 6 
 
Section 1.4 
Sections 8.3 
and 8.4 
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